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The cybersecurity community has made substantial efforts to understand and mitigate 
security flaws in information systems. Oftentimes when a compromise is discovered, 
it is difficult to identify the actions performed by an attacker.  
In this study, we explore the compromise phase, i.e., when an attacker exploits the 
host he/she gained access to using a vulnerability exposed by an information system. 
More specifically, we look at the main actions performed during the compromise and 
the factors deterring the attackers from exploiting the compromised systems.  
Because of the lack of security datasets on compromised systems, we need to deploy 
systems to more adequately study attackers and the different techniques they employ 
to compromise computer. Security researchers employ target computers, called 
honeypots, that are not used by normal or authorized users.  
 
In this study we first describe the distributed honeypot network architecture deployed 
at the University of Maryland and the different honeypot-based experiments enabling 
the data collection required to conduct the studies on attackers’ behavior.  
In a first experiment we explore the attackers’ skill levels and the purpose of the 
malicious software installed on the honeypots. We determined the relative skill levels 
of the attackers and classified the different software installed.  
We then focused on the crimes committed by the attackers, i.e., the attacks launched 
from the honeypots by the attackers. We defined the different computer crimes 
observed (e.g., brute-force attacks and denial of service attacks) and their 
characteristics (whether they were coordinated and/or destructive). We looked at the 
impact of computer resources restrictions on the crimes and then, at the deterrent 
effect of warning and surveillance. Lastly, we used different metrics related to the 
attack sessions to investigate the impact of surveillance on the attackers based on 
their country of origin.  
During attacks, we found that attackers mainly installed IRC-based bot tools and 
sometimes shared their honeypot access. From the analysis on crimes, it appears that 
deterrence does not work; we showed attackers seem to favor certain computer 
resources. Lastly, we observed that the presence of surveillance had no significant 
impact on the attack sessions, however surveillance altered the behavior originating 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
Whether we like it or not, parts of our everyday lives are stored on computer systems 
somewhere on the Internet. Today’s society heavily relies on information systems and 
the Internet. Interconnecting computer networks removed country-boundaries and 
made worldwide communications faster.   
Information Technology (IT) is omnipresent, a wide variety of so called “smart” 
devices and “smart” appliances are now connected to the Internet and offer new 
services designed to make our lives easier. Owners of connected cars are able, for 
example, to get real-time traffic information and remotely access some of the car’s 
functions such as starting the engine. Connected cars can also automatically call 
rescue services in case of an accident. Our homes are also connected, thus allowing us 
to monitor them when at work, turn on the air conditioning or lights remotely, or 
alerting us in case of flood or break-in. We are in the era of the technologically 
connected life.  
The increased integration of computer systems into our lives and the respective data 
they store make information systems extremely valuable. Any disruption to these 
systems can cause financial loss and have dramatic consequences for society at large. 
Further, these information systems are becoming more complex and more exposed, 
thus increasing their vulnerability. Their value and inherent vulnerability make 
information systems advantageous targets for attackers. They have become the victim 
of computer-focused crimes [FUR02].  
To more adequately secure computer systems from external threats, security 
researchers aim to understand attackers and the different techniques they employ to 
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compromise computers and to achieve their goals. One fruitful approach is to use a 
target computer --called a honeypot-- that is not used by normal or authorized users. 
As general users do not access these computers, all activity towards them can be 
identified as malicious.  
1.1 Research Goals and Questions  
The cybersecurity community has made extensive efforts to identify and mitigate 
security flaws in information systems. Companies such as Microsoft or Google offer 
a variety of monetary rewards to anyone who identifies security flaws in their 
software and websites. Once a compromise is discovered, it is often difficult to 
identify the actions performed by an attacker on a system mostly because of a lack of 
monitoring.  
The main goal of this dissertation is to study the attackers’ behavior during the 
compromise phase, i.e., when an attacker has already exploited a security flaw and 
gained access to a computer system. The overarching research questions are:  
1) What are the main actions performed during the compromise phase? 
We hypothesize that an attacker will want to exploit the resources offered by the 
compromised system to engage in criminal activities on the Internet. We believe an 
attacker will install an attack tool and launch crimes from a compromised system.  
2) Are there factors deterring the attackers from exploiting the compromised 
systems?  
We believe that the attackers will want to maintain their access to compromised 
systems by hiding their attack sessions.  Therefore actively monitored systems will be 
less likely to be exploited.  
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To answer these research questions, we need to be able to identify 1) when the 
compromise occurs, 2) the different actions performed by the attacker during the 
different attack sessions, i.e., when an attacker connects to the compromised system 
to exploit it, and 3) the different criminal activities launched from the compromised 
system.   
We could analyze existing security information on compromised systems from an 
organization such as the University of Maryland, but often these datasets are not 
always available because of privacy concerns as well as capacity issues. Systems are 
not monitored as closely we need them to be in order to conduct analyzes.  
Another issue with institutional security datasets are the non-homegeneous nature of 
the computing environment. Different operating systems (OS) can be deployed, 
different software packages and services can be installed from one computer to 
another. As a consequence different populations of attackers can exploit different 
vulnerabilities and interfere with the factors being investigated.  
In order to conduct studies on attacker behavior during the compromise phase, we 
need to design a homogeneous, and controlled environment. This environment 
enables the required experiments designed to collect the required datasets.  
To address the two global research questions, we designed three experiments, each 
building on the lessons learned from the previous experiments.  
1.1.1 Experiment 1: An empirical study on attacks and attackers  
In the first experiment, described in Chapter 4, we needed to understand the nature of 
attackers’ skills, if we could differentiate attackers using a compromised honeypot, 
identify the purpose of the attack and determine if attackers share their access to 
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compromised honeypot with other attackers. In other words, the research questions 
associated with the first experiment are: 
a) How can we differentiate attackers on a compromised honeypot?  
b) How skilled are the attackers based on the observations of attack sessions?  
c) What is the purpose of the compromise?  
d) Do attackers share the access to their honeypots?  
Question a: While determining who launches a cyber-crime is challenging, once an 
attacker logs into a compromised honeypot, the keystrokes and attack types can be 
used to characterize the crimes.  This information can be used to determine identify if 
attackers who gain entry via brute force attacks are the same as those who log in by 
matching the IP addresses. In addition, we can determine if a single attacker uses 
several IP addresses to log-in or if multiple attackers are sharing a single 
compromised honeypot. 
Question b: Attackers may structure their attack such that they can control the 
compromised system remotely. They may connect to an Internet Relay Chat or they 
may create a backdoor port to create the remote access. We hypothesize that in either 
scenario skilled attackers will attempt to remove network restrictions. Therefore if we 
add network restrictions to our honeypots, we will attract skilled attackers.  
To assess attacker skill, we developed a skills-based profile based on ten criteria. We 
will explore the connection between the attacker’s skills based on the demonstrated 
execution of these ten criteria. We will then explore the relationship between the 




Question c: In order to understand why attacks are launched, we categorized them 
into different types of attacks based on the type of rogue software that is installed and 
the nature of the exploitation that results. We hypothesize that the honeypots will 
become a bot and join a botnet, a network of compromised hosts. The most 
commonly used protocol to control each bot is the Internet Relay Chat protocol (IRC) 
[RAT13]. We expect the attackers to install IRC-based bot tools.  
Question d: The authors in [FRA07] showed the existence of an underground market 
for compromised hosts. We expect the initial attacker who found the correct 
username and password of the honeypots, to share the credentials. We hypothesize 
that some of our honeypots will be accessed by different attackers.   
1.1.2 Experiment 2: Are Computer Focused Crimes Impacted by System 
Configuration  
In Chapter 4 we realized that an attacker’s reaction to honeypot configuration is an 
important aspect of better understanding an attacker. In the second experiment, 
described in Chapter 5, we provide several honeypot configurations to assess the 
attacker’s reaction to various configurations.  
The research questions for the second experiment focus on the nature of the crime as 
they related to various honeypot configurations: 
a) Does the presence of a warning banner effectively deter attackers from 
launching an attack from a compromised computer? 




c) Does the computer configuration impact whether the target is of choice or 
opportunity? 
d) Does the computer configuration impact whether the attack is coordinated or 
not? 
This study will only include attackers who gain access to the honeypots. We will 
focus on three specific dimensions of computer crimes: destructiveness, nature of the 
target, and level of coordination. These aspects will be considered while we test the 
usefulness of a banner as a deterrence mechanism and if the configuration of the 
computer is related to the type of crime committed.  
Question a: Because human attackers have rational decision-making processes that 
could prevent them from engaging in criminal online activities [PNG09], we 
hypothesize that attackers will be deterred by a banner and as a consequence there 
will be fewer crimes launched from honeypots that have a warning banner.  
Question b-c: The various computer configurations that may be more or less 
attractive to an attacker are memory, disk space and bandwidth. We hypothesize that 
attackers will launch different attacks based on the available resources; with more 
attacks expected from configurations with high levels of resources (large memory and 
disk space and high bandwidth). Specifically we expect large memory space, large 
disk space and high bandwidth: 
• to be associated with destructive activity; 
• to be associated with targets of choice; and 
• to be associated with coordinated attacks.  
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1.1.3 Experiment 3: Are Computer Focused Crimes Impacted by Surveillance  
In Chapter 6, we build on the work of the second experiment to add surveillance as a 
deterrence system. In the third experiment, we manipulated two aspects of 
surveillance: the presence of a warning banning announcing the presence of a 
surveillance system (banner present/not present) and embedded surveillance tools on 
the computer (present/not present).  
The research questions for the third experiment is: 
Question: Are computer focused crimes (after an attacker gains unauthorized 
access to a computer and uses the computer to launch an attack towards an 
external target) impacted by a surveillance warning banner and/or surveillance 
tools? 
The security community consistently claims that deterrence does not work on the 
Internet. This claim is rarely accompanied by empirical data to support it. This 
presents an opportunity to investigate of the claim directly by focusing on the 
announcement and existence of surveillance mechanisms on a compromised 
computer system. A more focused study on employee awareness of surveillance on 
their work computer reduced the intent of system misuse by those employees 
[ARC09]. Based on this result, we hypothesize that a banner announcing surveillance 
and a surveillance tool will discourage attackers from using the compromised system 
to launch crimes.  
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1.1.4 Experiment 4: Effects of Banners on the Commands Typed by Attackers: 
A Study of Differences across Countries 
In Chapter 7, we build on the work of the second and third experiments studying the 
effectiveness of banners to look at the differences in commands that are typed based 
on the attacker’s country of origin.  
In the fourth study we will empirically study the following research questions:  
a) Is there a variation in the probability that an attacker will enter commands 
depending on the country of origin from which an attack is launched?  
b) In the presence of a surveillance banner will attackers vary in their use of 
system activity commands based on their country of origin (as identified by 
the IP address)? 
Question a: Attackers from different countries may respond differently to a 
surveillance banner as factors such as cultural differences existing across nations, as 
well as differential assessments regarding the likelihood of punishment may result in 
varying responses to a particular sanction threat. While in one country, the presence 
of a surveillance banner may be a valid signal of a threat, and accordingly, attackers 
originating from that country would internalize a heightened risk of apprehension and 
punishment, reducing their adverse behavior in response.  However, in other countries 
the attackers may be aware that no punishment is actually associated with an attack. 
Furthermore, in other countries, the insinuation of a threat made via a banner may 
elicit defiance, thus increasing the likelihood of an attack. Therefore we hypothesize 
that we will see differences in the subsequent actions of an attacker based on their 
country of origin in the presence of a surveillance banner.  
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Question b: Despites the anonymity offered by the Internet, human attackers exhibit a 
rational decision-making process [PNG09]. They will attempt to maximize rewards 
while minimizing the risks of being detected. We hypothesize that U.S. attackers, 
which are more easily identifiable and prosecutable, will be deterred by surveillance. 
More specifically, U.S. attackers understanding a surveillance announcement banner 
would look for effective surveillance cues including monitoring tools. Therefore the 
actions after seeing a banner will be related to searching for surveillance cues before 
moving on to actions related to other aspects of criminal activity. 
1.2 Approach and Structure  
This dissertation addresses the questions described in Section 1.1 Chapter 2 provides 
the background literature review which motivated the research questions and 
hypotheses. Chapter 3 introduces the testbed built to collect the data required for 
empirical studies based on honeypots. More specifically we describe:  
1) the distributed honeypot network architecture deployed at the University of 
Maryland (UMD), which includes how data is being collected, and how this 
architecture is being monitored. 
2) the framework allowing the deployment of large numbers of honeypots.  
The honeypot-based framework, introduced in Chapter 3 was developed to support 
different honeypot-based experiments, aimed at understanding the attackers’ behavior 
on a system following a compromise. These experiments contributed toward 




In Chapter 4, we determine the relative skill levels of the attackers according to a set 
of ten criteria (e.g., the ability to hide their malicious activity, the appropriateness of 
the command typed, and the familiarity with the rogue software installed). We also 
classify the different malicious software uploaded and installed on the compromised 
honeypots according to the software’s identified purpose.  
Chapters 5 and 6 are more focused on the crimes committed by the honeypots 
following a “successful” compromise. We define the different computer crimes 
observed (e.g., brute-force attacks and denial of service attacks) and their 
characteristics (whether they were coordinated and/or destructive). Different stimuli 
such as a banner, surveillance processes, and pertinent system configurations were 
systematically modified within a randomized controlled trial to evaluate each 
stimulus’ impact on the crimes launched by the respective honeypots.  
The last empirical study presented in Chapter 7 focuses on the differences in 
attackers’ response to one aspect of deterrence based on their country of origin. 
Attackers were randomly assigned four different configurations combining a banner 
announcing the presence of a surveillance system and surveillance processes. By 
studying the country of origin we draw the focus on the possibility that attackers may 
respond differently to deterrence cues because of their cultural background but also 
because of the punishment likelihood that varies from one country to another.  
Attackers’ differential responses were characterized by comparing several metrics 
including the total number of sessions, the number of sessions with keystrokes, the 
number of first sessions with keystrokes, the duration of sessions with keystrokes, and 
the system activity commands in any sessions and in the first session. 
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Chapter 8 concludes this dissertation with the limitations, future directions and a 





Chapter 2 – Background  
Very few studies have been conducted in the area of computer security quantification 
and characterization. This section provides a literature review that motivates the 
research questions and the associated hypotheses for this research. Furthermore, this 
section provides an overview on honeypots, the testbed designed for the experiments 
used to answer our research questions. 
2.1 Honeypot-based Experiments  
Lance Spitzner defines honeypots as a security tool whose value lies in being probed, 
attacked, or compromised [SPI02]. In other words, these are highly monitored 
computer systems meant to attract attackers, analyze their modus operandi and profile 
attackers [RAM07]. Placed in production environments, honeypots take an active part 
in the security of a network by providing information on attacker and attack patterns. 
Niels Provos introduces two types of honeypots [PRO07]: high interaction honeypots 
(HIH) that involve the deployment of real operating systems (OSs) on real or virtual 
machines, and low interaction honeypots (LIH) that are computer software emulating 
OSs and services. 
It is important to understand that the traffic observed on honeypots is not legitimate 
and can thus be considered to be malicious. Levine et al. showed the usefulness of 
deploying honeypots across large enterprise networks [LEV03]. In their study, Snort 
[ROE99] was used to detect compromised computers across Georgia Tech’s network. 
DarkNOC [SOB11], a honeypot-monitoring tool, performs a similar detection using 
network flow records [NFD15] data on the University of Maryland’s network.   
 13 
 
Over the past several years, honeypot-based experiments have significantly 
contributed to a better understanding of the threat landscape.  
2.1.1 Attackers’ Behavior  
In [ALA06] and [BER09] the analyses primarily focused on the attackers’ behavior 
after compromise of the honeypots. Both studies leveraged high interaction honeypots 
using Secure Shell (SSH) as a point of entry. In both studies, simplistic passwords 
with a high probability of being guessed were implemented to facilitate the attackers’ 
access. In [ALA06], the authors collected the data from 38 SSH intrusions over a 
period of 131 days. Preliminary attack behaviors were observed, but the testbed in 
place did not permit outbound connections from the target device, which limited the 
attackers’ pool of available actions. In [RAM07], the authors built a similar testbed, 
but permitted outgoing traffic from the target device. The authors created a state-
machine of the attackers’ behavior based upon observations of data pertaining to the 
824 attacks collected. The honeypots were re-imaged every 24 hours during this 
experiment. In [BER09], the authors conducted a more extensive study wherein 1,171 
attacks sessions and 250 rogue software elements were collected over a data 
collection period of eight months.  
2.1.2 Binary Analysis 
Regarding binary analysis, [ABU06] leveraged the SGNET honeypot project to 
conduct in-depth analysis of polymorphic malware. The authors introduced clustering 
techniques based on static and behavioral characteristics analysis.  
On the dynamic analysis of rogue software, [BAY06] introduced a tool for 
dynamically analyzing the behavior of Windows executable files. This tool is 
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available through an online service for analyzing malware [ANU15]. However, only 
Windows binaries can be submitted for analysis. The same limitation applies to 
CWSandbox [CWS14] that uses another automated dynamic analysis tool that was 
introduced by its authors in [WILL07]. 
2.1.3 Keystroke Analysis  
Regarding keystroke analysis, [ABU06] considers the case of guessing typed text in 
an SSH connection by analyzing only the inter-arrival time of network packets. The 
authors showed that network latency has little influence on the results. The tools 
Chaos Reader [CHA15] along with SSH Analysis [SSH15] implement a recognition 
of commands typed through SSH interactive session using keystroke intervals 
collected previously from a telnet session.  Identification by keystroke analysis is 
tackled more broadly in [ILO03, MON97, JOY89], where the authors present 
different algorithms to perform keystroke recognition of users through an analysis of 
delays between keystroke and keystroke duration. Their approach consists of 
grouping keystrokes into pairs and observing the time interval between these pairs. 
2.1.4 Country of Origin 
On the country of origin for the attack, [KAA06] and [VIS11] use the data collected 
from low interaction honeypots where the malicious activities are limited to port 
scans and requests sent to fake services. [VIS11] shows the country of the attackers 
targeting their low interaction honeypots on a map using GeoPlot. In [KAA06], the 
authors studied the correlation of the country of origin of the attackers with the 
number of attacks per unit of time.  
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The authors in [STU12] collected and analyzed data from four distributed honeypots 
presenting a weak SSH configuration. The authors showed the countries of origin 
from the most observed attacks on the honeypots. They also introduced IP 
specialization by showing that the origin country of the initial brute force attack is 
different from the origin country of the subsequent attack sessions.    
In [PAU14] the authors presented RASSH, an emulation-based SSH honeypot 
capable of learning new behaviors during its interaction with attackers. The country 
of origin of the attackers is used when RASSH chooses an “insult action” to send a 
message to the attacker’s shell in his or her native language.  
The authors of [MAI15] studied the origin of attackers on two different Secure Shell 
honeypot networks located in two different research sites in China and Israel. More 
specifically, they looked at the attackers’ region (Europe, Asia, North/South America, 
and Middle East) for the initial brute-force attack and the first attack session. They 
compared the temporal trend of both attacks against both Chinese and Israeli target 
computers. The study revealed the geographical proximity of the attacker during the 
first attack session, i.e., Chinese honeypots were more likely to be accessed by 
attackers in Asia.  
2.1.5 Cybercrime  
Research has also been published in the field of criminology [KIT03, HUNT09] that 
focuses on defining the different categories of cybercrimes. These studyies are mainly 
based on anecdotal and other qualitative evidence as opposed to empirical studies 




2.2 Honeypot Background  
2.2.1 Problem Statement  
The Internet is composed of about 232 Internet Protocol (IP) addresses designating a 
network device, such as computers, on the public network. Each IP address does not 
receive the same attacks and is not targeted by the same attackers using the same 
technics.  
Individual honeypots or networks of honeypots, called honeynets, have been used to 
conduct various studies of attackers [ALM08, CUR04] and cybercrimes such as 
unsolicited electronic mails, phishing [DHA06], identity theft and denial of service 
attacks. In their current design, distributed honeypots are often built upon a low 
interaction tool such as honeyd [PRO03]. The distant locations only have to maintain 
a sensor that will send its logs to a central server.  
Another limitation is the number of honeypots that can possibly be deployed. Each 
honeypot requires one public IP in order to be a target on the Internet. The current 
version of the Internet Protocol has a limited number of available IP addresses for the 
whole world. Because of the omnipresence of the Internet in almost every aspect of 
our lives, more and more devices are connected to the public network. As a 
consequence, the pool of unallocated IP addresses is getting close to exhaustion. 
Nowadays, it is difficult and expensive to obtain IP ranges to either expand existing 
networks or add new ones, and an IP allocated to a honeypot is an IP not allocated to 
a legitimate Internet service. As a consequence it is difficult to dedicate IPs to 
honeypots. Furthermore, running high-interaction honeypots is resource consuming. 
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There is no all-in-one distributed honeypot solution allowing for the deployment of 
mixed and large environments of low and high interaction honeypots, centralized data 
collection and provision of safety mechanisms to maintain attack containment.  
To design a honeypot architecture that would meet the data collection requirements, 
we studied the state of the art of honeypots and honeypots networks. More 
specifically we looked at the existing architecture and software solutions for LIHs, 
HIHs, and distributed honeypots networks.  
2.2.2 Low Interaction Honeypots   
Several tools have been developed to emulate different OSs, services and networks. 
One of the most popular tools is Honeyd [PRO03]. Honeyd provides a simple way to 
emulate services, computers with specific OSs and networks of computers. Ad hoc 
scripts written by hand handle the interactions with the attackers. Authors in [LEI05] 
propose a method to automatically generate scripts for Honeyd.  
Other low interaction honeypots focus on specific services, e.g. Kippo [KIP15], 
Glastopf [GLA15] and Conpot [CON15]. The Kippo tool emulates a Secure Shell 
Server that records usernames and passwords attempted and can even provide a fake 
shell prompt along with a fake file system when an attacker successfully finds the 
predefined “successful” credentials. Glastopf emulates numerous vulnerabilities to 
collect data on attacks targeting web applications. Conpot collects data on attacks 
targeting industrial control systems. Honeypots are usually servers collecting attacks 
against Internet services whereas honey-clients collect malicious code provided by 
malicious services and executed on the client side. Thug [THU15] and PhoneyC 
[PHO15] are example of honey-clients. They browse the Internet collecting malicious 
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content from malicious web pages. Some other LIH tools such as Dionaea [DIO15] 
and Amun [AMU15] focus on collecting malware by emulating vulnerable services.  
Honeydrive [HON15] is a Linux distribution dedicated to running low interaction 
honeypots solutions such as Dionaea, Honeyd or Glastopf. About a dozen low 
interaction tools are pre-installed along with a full suite of security and network tools.  
2.2.3 High Interaction Honeypots  
Despite their ease of deployment LIHs suffer from their limited fidelity to the real 
service they emulate, which makes them easy to detect. Numerous studies have used 
HIHs, but because of the hardware and time resources they require HIHs are often 
designed to serve a specific purpose: collect the data necessary to answer a research 
question. In [ALA06, BER09, RAM07, SAL11, STU12] the HIHs expose SSH 
Servers with either weak passwords [ALA06, BER09, RAM07, STU12] or other 
vulnerabilities facilitating the attacker access to the honeypot [SAL11]. In [ALA06, 
STU12] the kernel was patched to collect the keystrokes and specific system calls.  In 
other studies, keystrokes loggers and system call tracers were employed to collect 
attackers’ keystrokes and track their actions [BER09, RAM07].  
In [VRA05], the honeypot architecture used Linux lightweight virtualization to 
deploy HIHs at a large scale. The downside of this method is the constraints on the 
guest OS: it has to be a modified Linux OS. As a consequence it is not possible to run 
various types of OSs. On the other end, in [JIA06] presents Collapsar, a honeypot 
architecture based on full hardware virtualization that allows the deployment of HIHs 
of various types.  
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2.2.4 Honeypot Networks  
Companies and researchers currently deploy honeypot networks at different scales. 
Also known as honeynets or also called honeyfarms, these honeypot networks can be 
limited to a few IP addresses on the local network or distributed systems in several 
locations such as the Leurre.com project [POU05], the Internet Motion Sensor 
[BAI05], SGNET [LEI08a, LEI08b], Collapsar [JIA06] or the honeynet initiative 
from CAIDA [VRA05]. 
Visoottiviseth et al. present a distributed honeypot framework using low interaction 
honeypots [VIS11] running the Honeyd daemon [PRO03]. More specifically, they de- 
scribe the working of the Honeyd logs centralization and their analysis [VIS11]. The 
framework only works with Honeyd log files. The level of interaction of our 
framework is also different since we are running LIHs in addition to HIHs. 
There are limited software solutions to deploy, maintain and manage networks of 
honeypots employing different levels of interactions. The main honeynet management 
solution is Honeywall [CHA04] developed by the Honeynet Project. Honeywall is a 
bootable CD-Rom that installs a Linux-based network gateway to manage and control 
honeypots as well as visualize and analyze honeynet logs. It is an all-in-one solution 
for small-scale honeypot networks. It provides routing, capture and analysis 
capabilities.  
Bifrozt [BIF15] is also a Linux-based firewall and network gateway configured to act 
as a transparent Secure Shell proxy allowing the capture of all the attackers 
interactions with the honeypot Secure Shell Server while blocking potential malicious 
outgoing traffic. Bifrozt only works with one honeypot running Secure Shell.  
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Chapter 3 – Experimental Testbed  
3.1 UMD Honeynet 
3.1.1 Introduction 
The honeynpot network hosted at the University of Maryland (called UMD 
Honeynet) was initially built in 2004 with unused IP addresses from the campus 
network. More recently, other organizations joined the initiative:  
• AT&T Labs, U.S.A.  
• The University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign (UIUC), U.S.A. 
• The Laboratoire d’Analyse d’Architecture des Systèmes (LAAS) in Toulouse, 
France 
• The Ecole Nationale des Sciences Appliquées (ENSA) in Marrakech, 
Morocco 
• The Technische Universität in Dresden (TUD), Germany  
• PJM Interconnection (PJM), U.S.A.  
Each organization contributes to the UMD Honeynet by providing ranges of public IP 
addresses. These IP ranges are routed transparently to the honeypot network hosted at 
UMD.  
3.1.1.1 Objectives 
The objective of the UMD Honeynet is to provide an infrastructure to support 
honeypot-based experiments. The network features centralized data collection and 
guarantees a realistic, but controlled and flexible environment to safely deploy 
experiments. The advantages of the present architecture are numerous: 
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• A single monitoring server collects and stores the Snort events, the flow data 
and the network traffic, providing visibility across a range of exposed 
networks. 
• The experiments are easy to deploy without the need to create tunnels or to 
setup specific network configurations. 
• The UMD Honeynet is scalable; new organizations can join the project by 
providing a range of IP addresses. 
• The centralization of the honeynet in one location guarantees a uniform 
configuration of the honeypots.  
In addition to the central data collection, ease of honeypot deployment and scalability, 
the UMD Honeynet presents a range of safety features, such as bandwidth limitation 
and firewall, which assist the containment of attacks launched by potentially 
compromised honeypots.  
3.1.1.2 History 
We are currently running the fourth generation of UMD Honeynet. The first version 
was deployed in November 2004 and had been used until the end of 2006. It was 
essentially built upon several chunks of the UMD Institute for Systems Research IP 
space. Most of the honeypots were high interaction systems running on physical 
hosts.   
The second generation was propelled by the growing interest in honeypots from the 
University of Maryland’s Division of Information Technology. The security and 
network teams helped to expand the size of our honeypot network: several entire 
unused subnets were made available to deploy low interaction honeypots.  
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Deployed in 2008, the third generation of the UMD Honeynet started to support the 
redirection of Internet traffic from a remote location to the UMD network. This 
feature has allowed external entities to join the dark network:  AT&T has been a part 
of the UMD Honeynet since 2008, UIUC since 2009, LAAS since 2010, and more 
recently ENSA, PJM and TUD since 2012.   
With the increasing number of public IP addresses, the UMD Honeynet became 
larger and more complex. The fourth generation, deployed in September 2009, 
completely revamped the architecture in order to face new challenges such as 
providing better protection, centralization and stronger reliability of data collection, 
and easier experiment deployment.  
3.1.2 Network Architecture 
  
Figure 1. Honeynet Architecture 
The current generation of the Honeynet provides a secure network architecture with 
about 2,000 public IP addresses, a core network at one gigabit per second, a 
bandwidth of one gigabit per second to the campus network and fifty-two terabytes of 
Network Area Storage for the data collection. Each organization contributing to the 
Honeynet provides a range of public IP addresses also called a subnet.   
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As shown in Figure 1, the Honeynet network architecture is composed mainly of a 
gateway, a data sensor and data repository.  
3.1.2.1 Honeynet Main Router  
The Honeygate is the Honeynet main router. This host is in charge of routing or 
bridging the incoming and outgoing Honeynet traffic. This device is also responsible 
for enforcing the Honeynet security policy by filtering the outgoing traffic. This 
policy protects the UMD network and the Internet against potentially compromised 
honeypots.  
3.1.2.2 Data Collector 
The host called Spy is responsible for the data collection from the entire Honeynet 
framework. Spy acts as a passive sensor; it collects data without interacting with the 
systems it monitors.  
3.1.2.3 Low Interaction Honeypots  
UMD Honeynet is currently hosting about 2,000 IP addresses. It is practically 
impossible to use all of these IP addresses in experiments. When an IP address is not 
in use, it is re-allocated to the farm of low interaction honeypots. Each subnet has its 
own low interaction honeypot (LIH) host to facilitate the configuration of the LIH 
tools and the log processing. Each LIH host is a virtual machine that runs Dionaea 
and a fake Secure Shell Server on top of a Linux OS.  
Dionaea  
Dionaea, a LIH tool used to emulate common vulnerable services, has been deployed 
on the different LIH hosts present on the honeypot network architecture. Dionaea 
captures a malicious payload submitted by attackers during the exploitation of 
exposed network services. Dionaea presents several advantages compared to a high 
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interaction honeypot (HIH): 1) it emulates many well-known vulnerabilities and 
protocols, 2) it is easier to maintain than a HIH, and 3) the level of interaction is 
sufficient to allow successful malicious payload injections. 
As shown in Figure 2, Dionaea’s default configuration exposes several well-known 
vulnerabilities of common Internet services such as http, ftp, smtp, MS SQL, MySQL, 
as well as Microsoft Windows and VOIP protocols. Because of the nature of the 
exposed vulnerabilities, Dionaea essentially captures Windows Portable Executable 
(PE) files [PEF15], the executable file format used on Windows platforms.  
Starting	  Nmap	  5.21	  (http://nmap.org)	  at	  2012-­‐11-­‐12	  22:24	  EST	  
Nmap	  scan	  report	  for	  XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX	  
Host	  is	  up	  (0.039s	  latency).	  
Not	  shown:	  986	  closed	  ports	  
PORT	  	  	  	  	  STATE	  	  	  	  SERVICE	  
21/tcp	  	  	  open	  	  	  	  	  ftp	  
25/tcp	  	  	  filtered	  smtp	  
42/tcp	  	  	  open	  	  	  	  	  nameserver	  
80/tcp	  	  	  open	  	  	  	  	  http	  
135/tcp	  	  open	  	  	  	  	  msrpc	  
443/tcp	  	  open	  	  	  	  	  https	  
445/tcp	  	  open	  	  	  	  	  microsoft-­‐ds	  
554/tcp	  	  open	  	  	  	  	  rtsp	  
1433/tcp	  open	  	  	  	  	  ms-­‐sql-­‐s	  
2222/tcp	  filtered	  unknown	  
3306/tcp	  open	  	  	  	  	  mysql	  
5060/tcp	  open	  	  	  	  	  sip	  
5061/tcp	  open	  	  	  	  	  sip-­‐tls	  
7070/tcp	  open	  	  	  	  	  realserver	  
Nmap	  done:	  1	  IP	  address	  (1	  host	  up)	  scanned	  in	  9.18	  seconds	  
Figure 2. Open ports in Dionaea 
Dionaea waits for attackers to inject malicious payloads known as shellcodes by 
exploiting one of the service’s vulnerabilities. The shellcodes are evaluated using 
libemu, a C library able to detect and execute shellcodes using the GetPC heuristics 
[POL10]. The shellcode profiling allows Dionaea to act upon three possible 
intentions: 1) providing a remote shell to the attacker by opening a network socket on 
the targeted system, 2) downloading a file from a remote location using ftp, http or 
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SMB protocols, or 3) executing an existing binary file on the local file system of the 
target host. Dionaea executes multi-staged shellcodes in a virtual machine using 
libemu to infer their final intent. 
Binary files can be captured in different ways: ftp and http downloads, and downloads 
occurring during the shellcode executions. They can have different formats. The 
UNIX command file [FIL15] allows the file format to be identified. Empty and ASCII 
files are automatically removed from the repository as well as the data format that 
describes unknown binary files. Dionaea names captured binary files after their MD5 
hashes and logs the submitted malware into a SQLite database. Each entry of the 
submission database contains:  
• The MD5 hash of the binary,  
• A capture timestamp,  
• The source and destination IP addresses,  
• The source and destination ports,  
• The protocol exploited,  
• The transport protocol (TCP or UDP), and 
• The URL used to download the binary file.  
We observed that the same binary file can be submitted several times by different 
originating hosts. 
Fake Secure Shell Server 
Secure Shell (SSH) is a network protocol used to access the shell (or command line 
interface) of a remote computer through a secure channel. This remote access service 
is often the target of attackers trying to guess usernames and passwords.  
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The fake Secure Shell server is a C program emulating the authentication phase of a 
SSH server. The attackers can connect to the fake SSH server and try different 
combinations of usernames and passwords. This LIH tool is designed to reject all 
authentication attempts. As shown in Figure 3, each attempted login name and 






Figure 3. SSH brute force attempts logs 
3.1.2.4 Honeymole Servers Farm  
Honeymole [HON15] is a tunneling program that creates a secure communication 
bridge between a Honeymole client and server. This tool allows us to forward the 
honeypot traffic from the external organizations to the UMD Honeynet.  
The client, hosted on the remote location network and the server, hosted on the UMD 
network, captures the required traffic to port the external entity honeypot IP addresses 
to the UMD Honeynet.  
3.1.3 Datasets  
The main switch used on the UMD Honeynet replicates the network traffic of the 
whole framework on a special port called a mirroring port. One of Spy’s network 
interfaces is connected to this mirroring port allowing it to collect data from the 
whole architecture without interacting with the monitored systems.  
Spy automatically collects and organizes the following data repositories for each 
subnet:  
• Raw network traffic  
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• Network flow records 
• Intrusion Detection System (IDS) alerts 
In addition to these datasets, Spy maintains a repository of malware and centralizes 
the logs of the Secure Shell login attempts. Both of these repositories are collected by 
the LIHs introduced in Section 3.1.2.3 of Chapter 3. 
3.1.3.1 Raw Network Traffic 
Raw network traffic is collected with tcpdump [TCP15], a command line packet 
analyzer that uses the libpcap [TCP15] to capture network traffic. A script launches 
the tcpdump tool in the background to collect the network traffic in a temporary file. 
Every hour, the script stops the network traffic collection, rotates the temporary file 
and restarts tcpdump. The newly rotated file is then used to create a new file 
containing the network traffic of each experiment deployed on the UMD Honeynet 
and each subnet. The rotated file is then given a new name and moved to the network 
traffic repository.    
3.1.3.2 Network Flow Records 
A network flow record summarizes the communication between two network end 
points (defined by the IP addresses and port numbers of the end points). Included are 
the time, duration, and numbers of bytes and packets, but not the payload information 
(i.e., content of the messages transmitted). Figure 4 shows the different components 
involved in the collection and storage of network flow records.  
The flow exporter fprobe [FPR15] has been setup on Spy to export Netflow version 9 
records. The exported flow records are then collected by a flow collector called 
nfcapd. nfcapd is part of the nfdump [NFD15] tools, a set of tools that collects and 




Figure 4. Network Flow Records Collection Architecture 
The network flow repository is entirely managed by NFSen [NFS15] a web interface 
for visualizing the network flow records. NFSen relies on the nfdump tools to 
configure and automatically launch the flow collector to organize the repository. It 
offers the ability to create profiles. These profiles are used to create different sets of 
network flow record files for each subnet and deployed experiment.  
3.1.3.3 Network Intrusion Detection System 
Snort is a Network Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [ROE99] designed to detect 
attacks by monitoring and analyzing the network traffic. IDSs use two methods to 
detect malicious traffic: signature-based detection where known malicious behaviors 
are described by a set of signatures and anomaly-based detection where heuristic 
algorithms are used to determine normal versus anomalous network traffic.  
Spy runs two instances of Snort. The live instance updates in real time a database of 
Snort events. The second instance is executed every night against the network traffic 
collected during the previous 24 hours. A text file of the alerts for each subnet is 
generated and archived in a repository.   
3.1.3.4 Malware and Secure Shell Repositories 
Every night, Spy fetches the malware and the Secure Shell login attempts from the 
different LIH hosts of the Honeynet. The malware repository is organized per subnet.  
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3.1.4 Security and Deployment Policy  
Because of the nature of the honeypots, operating them can be a risky activity. The 
compromise phase can be part of the honeypot-based experiment design or an 
unknown vulnerability can be exploited. An attacker can use one compromised 
honeypot to attack some other host on the Internet from a UMD IP address. To 
mitigate that risk, two policies ensure that good practices for honeypot deployment 
and proper security mechanisms are in place to maintain the network isolation rule.  
3.1.4.1 UMD Honeynet Global Security Policy  
Table 1 shows the global UMD Honeynet security policy enforced by Honeygate and 
the actions taken by the administrators to mitigate the risk of having one honeypot 
launching attacks and compromising other systems.  
Table 1. UMD Honeynet Global Security Policy 
Interaction   Likelihood   Risk Mitigation   Incident Response  
Low   Low  
Physical host must be 




Physical host must use a 




Firewall must block 
outgoing traffic from the 
physical host IP address  
Host Isolation (Block 
IP on Honeygate)   
 
Host restoration   
High   Medium  
Outgoing traffic must be 
rate limited to avoid 
compromises of other 




All   All  
Bandwidth limitation 
100Mbit/s   
Honeypots cannot reach 





By default, the various firewalls set up on the main gateway allow all traffic to enter 
the UMD Honeynet, but per the security policy, the outgoing traffic is filtered to 
avoid network congestion and to block any communication initiated by the honeypots 
targeting any network device on campus.  
3.1.4.2 Deployment Policy  
To maintain attack containment and UMD Honeynet isolation, the deployment policy 
tasks the experiment designer with a list of recommendations to implement and 
actions to execute before the launch of an experiment.  
1) Determine the level of interaction and likelihood of compromise 
The level of interaction will greatly influence the risk associated with the experiment.  
LIHs are less likely to be compromised, and thus represent a lower risk to operate.  
On the other hand, HIHs life cycle often includes a compromise phase where the 
attacker gets control of the system. Also, the attackers may exploit a vulnerability in 
the architecture and escape their containment area within high interaction honeypots.  
2) Determine the risks associated with compromise (experiment-specific risks)  
This step is consists of enumerating the possible problems associated with the 
experiment and their likelihood of occurrence. For example, Linux computers are 
often used to launch SSH brute-force attacks on the Internet after compromise. This 
list may evolve over the course of the experiments.  
3) Mitigation plan or experiment security policy  
The mitigation plan aims to create an experiment-specific security policy to limit all 
of the risks or problems previously identified. In the Secure Shell brute-force 
example, we can add a firewall rule to limit the outgoing Secure Shell traffic to only 
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five brute force attempts per minute per target. This would considerably limit the risk 
of compromising another Internet host. The mitigation plan or experiment specific 
security policy should be applied on both the Honeygate and at the experiment level. 
Applying the security policy on Honeygate provides an additional layer of security in 
case the protection mechanisms on the experiment are compromised or inactive.   
4) Remote management interface 
Each honeypot experiment should have a remote management interface connected to 
the Honeynet Management network. This is to maintain network isolation and 
separate malicious traffic and legitimate administration traffic.  
5) Experiment data backup  
The data collected by an experiment is considered to be critical and should be stored 
in a more secure server separated from the UMD Honeynet.  
6) Experiment kill-switch  
The experiment design should include a procedure to shutdown the experiment in 
case of emergency (testbed out of control).  
7) Experiment monitoring and compromise detection mechanism  
Details regarding the compromise detection and monitoring of the different 
components of the experiment should be included in the design.  
8) Obtain approval before launching an experiment 
Because of the sensitivity and risks associated with hosting honeypots, all of the 
details of the experiment design must be validated by the Division of Information 
Technology, Security and Policy Office at the University of Maryland.  
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3.2 Cybercrime Framework  
3.2.1 Introduction 
The framework described in this section has been developed to support different 
honeypot-based experiments designed to understanding the attackers’ behavior on a 
system following a “successful” compromise, i.e., when an attacker gains access to a 
honeypot. All the testbeds for this research have been grouped in one framework 
providing the core functionalities common to all experiments. Each experiment has 
been designed to satisfy the following constraints: 1) the honeypots must offer a 
frequently probed and vulnerable point of entry; 2) a large number of honeypots must 
be made available to the attackers at the same time; 3) different honeypot 
configuration types must be randomly assigned to attackers in order to identify the 
impact of the specified treatment condition, i.e. the configuration factor we want to 
test upon crime outcomes; 4) relevant data must be collected to characterize the 
attacks developed and the crimes committed by the honeypots following the initial 
compromise of the honeypot.   
Each honeypot-based experiment presents several characteristics such as the level of 
interaction, the point of entry, the vulnerability allowing the attacker to enter the 
honeypot and the “honey,” the artifact that will make the honeypot attractive to 
attackers.  
3.2.1.1 Level of Interaction  
For the purpose of this experiment we want to study the behavior of the attacker after 
a successful compromise. Our honeypot must be “compromised” and provide an 
environment as close as possible to a real systems. This can only be achieved with a 
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high-interaction honeypots, as low-interaction honeypots are not sophisticated enough 
to support all of the actions made by an attacker.  
3.2.1.2 Point of entry  
We need a point of entry that provides remote access to systems. Among the most 
commonly probed services on the UMD network, only three provide remote access 
functionalities: VNC (TCP/5900), Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) (TCP/3389) and 
Secure Shell Protocol (TCP/22).  
VNC or Virtual Network Computing is a tool allowing users to take control of a 
remote computer. The user interface, whether it is graphic or text, is displayed on the 
user’s remote computer. This protocol would require a video recording of the 
attackers’ session to capture all of his or her interactions with the honeypot. Videos 
are difficult and burdensome to process and analyze.  
Remote Desktop Protocol or RDP provides the same remote access experience as 
VNC for Microsoft Operating Systems such as Windows XP or Windows Server 
2008. It presents the same drawbacks as VNC.  
Secure Shell creates a secured communication channel to establish a connection to a 
remote host shell. This protocol is entirely text-based and the interactions are 
keystroke-based. The keystroke capture will provide the list of commands executed 
on the honeypot. For this experiment, SSH is the chosen point of entry.  
3.2.1.3 Vulnerability  
A common vulnerability introduced on SSH servers to facilitate the attackers’ 
honeypot compromise is the weak password. Several studies involving SSH-based 
honeypots introduced accounts with commonly attempted usernames and passwords. 
This method presents a few limitations:  
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• Several attackers can “compromise” the honeypots and apart from the IP 
address nothing can discriminate them.  
• An attacker may come back several weeks later and use the same credentials 
to gain access to the honeypot again.  
• Depending on their brute-forcing method and the dictionaries used, they may 
not find the right credentials.  
A better solution is to allow the attacker to access the honeypot after a random 
number of attempts and create the “successful” credentials on the compromised 
honeypot. This method was selected for our research. 
3.2.1.4  “Honey”  
Computer resources such as processing power or storage can be also considered as 
“honey.” Attackers can use the hard disk space for file sharing purposes. A Linux box 
can be turned into a web server and host a fishing website. The processing power that 
represents these hosts can be used for attackers to achieve other bigger mischiefs on 
the Internet.  
3.2.1.5 Datasets  
In order to study the attackers’ behavior we need to know all the commands they type 
during their SSH sessions. The data collector already captures the raw network traffic 
and the network flow records. These two datasets are useful to identify the attacks 
launched by the honeypots after their compromise.  
3.2.2 Framework Design 
To satisfy the different requirements in data collection and design, we developed the 
experimental platform shown in Figure 5. This testbed allows us to implement the 
SSH vulnerability, the keystroke capture and the security policy.  
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The study of the attackers’ behavior requires deploying several experiments with a 
similar design. Only the “treatment” received by the attackers changes from one 
experiment to another. The different treatments are motivated by the respective 
research questions inherent to each experiment.  
Each Cybercrime experiment uses three different types of hosts: a network gateway, a 
collector host and a set of machines, called OVZ hosts. All of these hosts are virtual 
machines running on the lab VMware cluster. Because of the specific network 
configuration that has to be shared across three different hypervisors, the virtual 
machines for the cybercrime projects are hosted on three specific VMware servers.  
 
Figure 5. Experiment Design 
The gateway for the system shown in Figure 5 is placed between the Internet and the 
other components of the framework, and accepts SSH connections on port TCP/22. 
The OVZ hosts run OpenVZ [OVZ15], a lightweight virtualization solution for Linux 
systems. OpenVZ allows us to run several honeypots per OVZ host in parallel. The 
collector is common to all the cybercrime experiment testbeds. This host centralizes 
the collected data and the processing.  
 36 
 
3.2.2.1 Collector and Management Host  
The cybercrime framework provides an environment that facilitates deployment and 
management of the cybercrime experiments. It also provides a consistent way to 
collect and process the data generated by the honeypots.  
Data collection, processing and storage  
The collector host is responsible for centralizing and organizing the data generated by 
the different monitoring tools used on the framework.  
This host receives:  
• The authentication events from all the honeypots 
• The key logger traces from all the OVZ hosts  
• The honeypot deployments from all the gateways 
A Perl script processes the raw data and uploads them in a database on a daily basis. 
The data processing script rebuilds the attackers’ sessions on the honeypots from the 
Syslog [SYS15], a computer log storage management program, authentication logs 
sent by the Honeypots. It also cleans the keystrokes data and matches them with the 
attackers’ sessions.  
Central Repository  
All of the scripts running on the cybercrime framework are stored in a repository on 
the collector host. The scripts are automatically distributed to the different 
components of all of the experiments. The framework is flexible enough to allow 
experiment specific scripts. In addition to the scripts, the configuration files and the 
honeypots base images are all stored on the collector host and are all automatically 




The collector host also monitors the health of the framework: it makes sure that each 
component is online and that all the monitoring tools are operating correctly. A daily 
email is generated and sent out to the cybercrime team. It contains information on the 
data collected as well as the health of each experiment.   
The collector host also runs the website that provides access to the live data and status 
of the framework.  
Maintenance 
The framework provides a set of scripts that performs the daily maintenance 
operations of the different components. These operations include the removal of 
honeypot containers reaching the end of their lifecycle and the automatic creation of 
new containers to allow further honeypot deployments. 
3.2.2.2 Network Gateway 
The gateway is attached to three different networks. One network interface is 
connected directly to the Internet and is configured with the 300 public IP addresses 
made available for the honeypots. The second interface is attached to a private 
network where all the honeypots containers are connected. The third network is used 
for management and data collection purposes. The gateway runs a Linux Ubuntu 
12.04 operating system. The Secure Shell server is a custom designed C program 
using the libssh [LIB15]. 
The fake SSH service returns a SSH successful authentication message to the 
attackers after a number of brute force attempts. This number is randomly selected 
between 100 and 200 at the very first login attempt by the attacker from a specific 
honeypot IP address. At this point each attacker is identified by his or her IP address.  
 38 
 
When the expected number of attempts is reached, the C program calls an external 
script that 1) records the deployment in a database on the collector server, 2) 
configures the next available honeypot container with the login credentials that 
“successfully” broke into the system, 3) creates a Network Address Translation rule 
(NAT) to associate the public IP address targeted with the private IP of the newly 
configured honeypot container and, 4) attributes and applies one of the configuration 
types of the corresponding experiment. Once the execution of the script is complete, 
the Secure Shell server establishes a Secure Shell connection with the newly 
configured honeypot and redirects it to the attacker.  
This overall sequence of brute-force entry and the resulting procedures discussed 
above can collectively be termed as a deployment wherein the intruder is successfully 
assigned to a honeypot with a randomly assigned type or treatment condition. The 
execution of the script and configuration of the honeypot container only takes a few 
seconds. In addition to running the fake SSH server and routing the Internet traffic to 
the honeypots, the gateway also limits the attacks targeting other Internet hosts to 
prevent their subsequent compromise. This is achieved by rate-limiting the outgoing 
traffic on specific protocols and ports. The firewall on the gateway limits:   
• SSH scans and brute force attempts; 
• UDP datagrams to prevent DoS attacks;  
• Web and RDP scans.  
 
3.2.2.3 OpenVZ Hosts 
While the gateway manages the traffic and deployment of the honeypots, these 
honeypots need to be constructed and directly maintained by additional hosts. As we 
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wanted to provide a UNIX environment to the attackers, OpenVZ was deployed on 
five CentOS 5.4 systems to perform the construction and maintenance tasks necessary 
for the honeypots to exist and function as intended. We used the stable release of the 
OpenVZ kernel 2.6.18-164.15.1.el5.028stab068.9 for the deployment.  
As mentioned previously, OpenVZ is a lightweight virtualization tool for Linux-
based OSs. An OS is fundamentally composed of two main elements: the kernel and 
the user space. The kernel controls the computer hardware and provides the 
applications executed by the users functions to interact with the hardware. The user 
space or application space is where all the users processes and software are executed. 
Each virtual machine on VMware or other full virtualization solutions will have 
virtual hardware (i.e., CPU, memory, network, hard drive) and will run a complete 
operating system with kernel and user space. On the other hand OpenVZ, the host OS 
will share its kernel and user space. Each container will be a sub-tree of the host 
operating system process list. Each container will have its own file system, but this 
file system will be a sub-directory on the host OS file system.  
The advantages of OpenVZ are threefold: first, OpenVZ allows running several 
lightweight Linux OSs in parallel on a single OVZ host. After stress-testing the OVZ 
hosts, we determined that we could easily run up to 60 containers per OVZ host at the 
same time. With 5 OVZ hosts, this solution gave the ability to run up to 300 
honeypots in parallel. Second, OpenVZ provides the tools to easily adjust the 
containers’ configuration including the IP address and the credentials. Moreover, the 
OpenVZ virtual network interface does not permit the change of IP address within the 
honeypot container. As a consequence, attackers are not able to change the honeypot 
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IP address following compromised entry. Lastly, attackers cannot interact with other 
honeypot containers or with the host OS. The attacker’s actions are restricted to his or 
her assigned container. Even with root privileges, each container is isolated from the 
other devices within the design and from the host OS running on each OVZ host, but 
we can access the containers (honeypots) file systems and process list.  
Each container or honeypot is built upon Fedora 12 operating system. Each container 
comes with two servers: Apache and Secure Shell Server.  
3.2.2.4 Datasets Definition  
In addition to the network flow records and the raw network traffic collected by the 
data collector, we also gather information relative to the attackers’ Secure Shell 
sessions that include the commands typed by the attackers.  
Deployments  
This dataset contains for each honeypots:  
• The deployment timestamp  
• The attacker’s IP address 
• The country of the attacker based on the IP address  
• The origin network number based on the attacker’s IP address  
• The targeted public address on the Honeynet network 
• The successfully “guessed” login and password  
• The honeypot type or treatment number 
Session  
In the session dataset, it is possible to find all of the Secure Shell sessions for each 
honeypot along with the following information:  
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• The username used by the attacker to access the honeypot  
• The login and logout times  
• The IP of the attacker  
• The country and network of origin of the attacker based on his or her IP 
address 
Keystrokes 
To capture the attackers’ keystrokes, we use a key logger from the Honeynet Project 
called Sebek [SBK15]. Sebek is a kernel module that extracts the keystrokes from the 
read system call. A modified version of the Sebek module has been deployed on each 
of the OVZ hosts. The module has been modified to support OpenVZ and add the 
Honeypot ID in the log. The keystroke collection generates two different outputs per 
sessions:  
• The raw keystrokes (Figure 6) 
• The keystrokes processed into lists of commands (Figure 7) 
For both datasets, Sebek provides a timestamp, a Virtual Environment ID (VEID) 
also known as honeypot (HP) ID and container (CT) ID, the OVZ host IP address, the 
user ID, the process ID, the file descriptor and i-node of the standard output, and the 
command name. The keystroke output provides an additional timestamp in 








[2014-­‐10-­‐05	   10:28:38	   Veid:1021	   Host:10.0.10.21	   UID:500	   PID:12998	   FD:0	   INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519318193697	  ]#w	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	   10:28:38	   Veid:1021	   Host:10.0.10.21	   UID:500	   PID:12998	   FD:0	   INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519318389729	  ]#[RETURN]	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	   10:28:38	   Veid:1021	   Host:10.0.10.21	   UID:500	   PID:12998	   FD:0	   INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519318655731	  ]#c	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	   10:28:38	   Veid:1021	   Host:10.0.10.21	   UID:500	   PID:12998	   FD:0	   INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519318817674	  ]#d	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	   10:28:38	   Veid:1021	   Host:10.0.10.21	   UID:500	   PID:12998	   FD:0	   INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519318859656	  ]#	  	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	   10:28:38	   Veid:1021	   Host:10.0.10.21	   UID:500	   PID:12998	   FD:0	   INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519318925694	  ]#/	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	   10:28:39	   Veid:1021	   Host:10.0.10.21	   UID:500	   PID:12998	   FD:0	   INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519319075653	  ]#t	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	   10:28:39	   Veid:1021	   Host:10.0.10.21	   UID:500	   PID:12998	   FD:0	   INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519319187660	  ]#m	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	   10:28:39	   Veid:1021	   Host:10.0.10.21	   UID:500	   PID:12998	   FD:0	   INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519319375652	  ]#p	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	   10:28:39	   Veid:1021	   Host:10.0.10.21	   UID:500	   PID:12998	   FD:0	   INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519319452646	  ]#[RETURN]	  
	  
Figure 6. Sebek Filter Keystrokes Output 
 
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	   10:28:38	   Veid:1021	   Host:10.0.10.21	   UID:500	   PID:12998	   FD:0	   INO:2	  
COM:bash	  ]#w	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	   10:28:39	   Veid:1021	   Host:10.0.10.21	   UID:500	   PID:12998	   FD:0	   INO:2	  
COM:bash	  ]#cd	  /tmp	  
	  
Figure 7. Sebek Filter Commands Output 
3.3 Initial Cybercrime Experiment  
The experimental setup shown in Figure 5 is the initial architecture of the cybercrime 
framework presented in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3. This experiment was used to collect 
the required data for the study in Chapter 4. This architecture contained a standalone 
experiment and consisted of one gateway and one OpenVZ host. At the time, the 
OVZ host could only handle forty honeypots in parallel. The architecture of the 
OpenVZ host is similar to the one presented in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, however the 
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design of the SSH gateway was different. The OS was a Linux Ubuntu 9.10 server 
installed with modified versions of OpenSSH [OPS15] Secure Shell server, PAM-
MySQL, a module handling user authentication against a MySQL database, NSS-
MySQL, a library providing users information from MySQL database, and a specific 
shell provided to attackers when their brute force attack succeeds. 
 
Figure 8. Initial Testbed Design 
OpenSSH was modified to reject Secure Shell login attempts on its public IP 
addresses until a predefined number of attempts. When this predefined threshold was 
reached, OpenSSH skipped password verification, created a new user with the latest 
credentials attempted by the attacker and called PAM, which was configured to use 
the modified PAM-MySQL module for user verification. The predefined threshold 
was randomly selected between 150 and 200. Moreover, to limit the number of 
deployed honeypots to three per attacker IP address, the modified version of Secure 
Shell server rejected any attempt from an IP address that has already deployed three 
honeypots. 
PAM-MySQL initial purpose is to verify user credentials using MySQL as backend. 
In the modified version, PAM-MySQL created user accounts for attackers and 
recorded on a MySQL database user information including: login, password, source 
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IP address, targeted IP address on the gateway, a user ID and the path of the specific 
shell on the gateway which handles the honeypot deployment. 
NSS-MySQL is required to read user information from the MySQL database. This 
component is required by OpenSSH to access user account information before 
granting access to a session. The module was modified to handle conflicting cases of 
user entries with a same user login. The distinction between these entries was based 
on the targeted IP address of the SSH connection. 
Attackers, who had been identified according to their IP addresses, could deploy up to 
three honeypots that were configured as follows: The first honeypot (HP1) had no 
network limitation, the second one (HP2) had the main IRC port blocked (port 6667, 
incoming and outgoing traffic), the third one (HP3) had every port blocked except 
HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, DNS, and SSH. 
The set of honeypots consisted of three configurations that enforced increasing 
network limitations including a first fully functional environment, a second 
configuration where only the IRC port is blocked, and a third configuration where 
only a few services were allowed (HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, DNS, SSH). Attackers could 
compromise these three honeypot configurations incrementally during one month (the 
honeypots were backed up and redeployed at the beginning of each month), starting 
with the first configuration being deployed on 40 public IP addresses. 
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3.4 Design Limitations of the Testbed 
3.4.1 Honeynet 
The UMD Honeynet presents several limitations in term of design. First, even though 
the Honeymole allows transparent traffic forwarding, the attacker could detect the 
network latency introduced when redirecting traffic to the UMD Honeynet. Second, 
not all organizations participating to the UMD Honeynet apply the same security 
policy. Some networks will be protected by firewalls or intrusion prevention systems 
whereas some others will not have any security. In addition, some organizations do 
not allow the deployment of high interaction honeypots.   
3.4.2 Cybercrime framework 
The design of the cybercrime framework contains several limitations on the studies 
presented in the following chapters. First, the OS is Linux. It is not guaranteed that 
attackers targeting Windows vulnerabilities will exhibit the same behavior. The point 
of entry is limited to Secure Shell. As a consequence, the population of the different 
studies will be limited to attackers targeting Unix systems via SSH. In addition, the 
use of a modified SSH server granting access to the honeypots after a random number 
of attempts between 100 and 200 limits also the population of attackers on our 
experiments. To summarize, the honeypots are accessible to attackers targeting 
Secure Shell servers running on Unix OS and attempting at least 100 to 200 
combinations of username and password during their brute-force attack.  
All the honeypots have UMD IP addresses. All the analyses performed using the 
datasets introduced before will be limited to one location. Moreover, a dedicated set 
of 1500 IP addresses were provided for the experiments. Finally, the configuration 
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applied to the honeypots should not reveal their nature and should be in line with the 
UMD policies and the law.  
3.5 Human Subjects Research 
The subjects in all the experiments deployed on the UMD Honeynet (that consists of 
low and high interaction honeypots) are attackers who cannot be identified. In 
addition, it is not possible to determine the exact number of subjects due to the 
automated nature of some attacks.   
After consulting with the IRB office, it was decided that these experiments did not 




Chapter 4 – An Empirical Study to Analyze Attacks and 
Attackers 
The study presented in this chapter was published in [SAL11]. I co-advised the two 
student interns developing the project. My contribution is about 35% for this project. 
I performed part of the data analysis and the writing of the result sections requiring 
network flow records, IRC traffic and IRC logs analyses.  
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present an empirical study to characterize attackers and attacks 
against targets of opportunity, i.e. when the victim host happens to be on the Internet 
and has been randomly selected. The experimental design used in this study was 
deployed on the initial cybercrime testbed described in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3.  
4.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In this chapter we describe the experiment to study the attackers’ characteristics and 
behavior after successful compromise to empirically address the following research 
questions: 
a) How skilled are the attackers based on the observations of attack sessions?  
b) How can we differentiate attackers on a compromised honeypot?  
c) What is the purpose of the compromise?  
d) Do attackers share the access to their honeypots?  
Discerning who is launching computer-focused crimes, i.e., crimes committed on the 
Internet, is difficult. We divided the attack process between the initial brute force-
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attack against Secure Shell accounts and the intrusion step when the attacker logs in 
using the “successfully” guessed username and password. For brute force attacks, we 
can only rely on the attacker’s IP address. However, once the attacker logs into the 
compromised honeypot, we can also use the keystrokes and the attack types to try to 
characterize computer-focused crimes further. We analyzed whether the attacker who 
launched the brute force attack is the same attacker as the one who logs in based on 
the IP address and whether a single attacker using several IP addresses logs in or 
multiple attackers share the same compromised honeypot. 
A number of compromised Internet hosts can become part of a bot network launching 
crimes. According to [GOE07], these bots may connect to IRC servers to allow the 
attackers to control them remotely.  Attackers may also set up a backdoor port to 
access the compromised machine remotely [LEV03]. We hypothesize that when 
blocking IRC and/or backdoors, skilled attackers will attempt to remove the network 
restrictions. Therefore, by adding network restrictions, we hypothesize that we will 
attract skilled attackers. 
To expand our knowledge of attacker profiles, we characterized the attackers’ skills 
by introducing a list of ten criteria. We discuss the link between the attacker’s skill 
and particular actions including hiding his/her malicious activities, changing the 
password or checking for the presence of other users. We also discuss the relationship 
between the attacker’s skill and the attacker’s capacity to successfully launch an 




To understand why attacks were launched we categorize them into different classes 
according to the rogue software installed and exploited. As explain previously, a 
number of the honeypots will become a bot and will take part of a network of 
compromised hosts called botnet. IRC is the most commonly used protocol to control 
the different bots [RAT13]. Therefore we expect the attackers to mainly install IRC-
based bot tools.  
Finally, we expect a number of the honeypots to be shared with different attackers. It 
is possible that some of the honeypots will be part of an underground market for 
compromised hosts [FRA07].  Therefore, we expect the honeypots to be accessed by 
different attackers.  
4.3 Method 
To answer these questions we used the data collected from May 17, 2010 to October 
31, 2010 with the experimental design described in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3.  
For this study we analyzed network flow records and attackers’ keystrokes processed 
into lists of commands, and we use the Honeynet Project’s Honeysnap tool [HON15] 
and Wireshark [WIR15] to collect the rogue software installed by the attackers on the 
honeypot. 
Two analyses were performed on the keystrokes. The first one was to detect copied 
and pasted text in attackers’ sessions to show how much attacks are automated. The 
second one is an approach to evaluate how many different users exploit the same 
honeypot. 
To detect copy and pasted, we calculated the average delay between keystrokes for 
each command typed. A copy and pasted command is generally performed in two 
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steps: 1) the user copies and pastes the command in his/her shell, 2) the user hits the 
return key to launch the action. We removed the last keystroke interval between the 
last keystroke of the command and the return because of a possible excessive delay 
that could give the wrong results. To detect these commands containing copy and 
pasted text, we use a threshold of 100 milliseconds of average delay interval between 
keystrokes. This threshold corresponds to the maximum speed of a skilled typist who 
can type up to 120 words per minute (i.e., 10 characters per second). We assumed that 
a human being could not go beyond such typing speed. 
We noted that attackers often mixed interactive commands and copy and pasted text, 
especially when they use long paths or URLs. The attack session shown in Figure 9 
illustrates this behavior. Text in italic indicates commands containing copied and 
pasted text and recorded average time interval are shown on the left-hand side. 
[28	  µs]	  	  cat	  /usr/share/man/man1/.error	  
[>100	  ms]	   cat	  /proc/cpuinfo	  
[>100	  ms]	   history	  -­‐c	  
[>100	  ms]	   w	  
[>100	  ms]	   ps	  -­‐x	  
[>100	  ms]	   cat	  /proc/cpuinfo	  
[42	  µs]	   wget	  http://download.microsoft.com/…	  
[>100	  ms]	   ls	  
[>100	  ms]	   rm	  -­‐rf	  W2Ksp3.exe	  
[>100	  ms]	   cd	  /usr/sbin	  
[28	  µs]	  	  wget	  http://sbebe.110mb.com/img	  
Figure 9. Attack Session Commands 
4.3.1 Attackers and Crimes Identification 
4.3.1.1 Attacker Identification 
A critical step to understand the threat landscape is to correctly identify attackers. 
Most of the time, an assumption is made by mapping each IP address to a single 
attacker. However, it is more realistic to assume that attackers can use multiple IP 
addresses to more adequately hide their traces. In order to go beyond this assumption, 
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we defined multiple indicators to build attacker profiles that we then use to try to 
uniquely identify human individuals behind each attack. In addition to the IP address, 
these indicators are: 
• Attacker AS routing number and attacker’s geographic location: to potentially 
detect if an attacker comes from a single ISP that has changed the client IP 
address over the time window of our experiment. 
• Attacker specific actions: three subcategories are considered. 
o Rogue software origin: a same attacker often downloads his/her tool 
from a same location while compromising a target. 
o Techniques to perform specific actions: for example, attackers who try 
to erase their traces can employ multiple commands. However, they 
usually use the same method from one attack session to another. 
o Files accessed: many attackers install rogue software in hidden or 
complex locations. If two sessions access this kind of file, it is usually 
a hint about the attacker’s identity.  
o Comparison of keystroke profiles that we describe further in the 
remainder of this section.  
The goal of keystroke analysis is to help differentiate attackers. According to 
[SON01], delays due to the network for SSH connections in comparison to delays 
between human keystrokes can be neglected. Our analysis of keystrokes is based on 
this assumption. Extensive research exists on keystroke profiling [ABU06, MON97, 
JOY89]. We considered, in particular, the study presented in [MON97] because it 
introduces an approach adapted to our goals, which consists of user authentication 
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and user recognition by analyzing data collected from various users typing on their 
workstations. The approach consists of grouping the recorded text following the most 
used syllables in English. Then, the graph of keystroke latencies (i.e., time between 
successive keystrokes) and durations (i.e., length of time keys are pressed) as a 
function of the syllables reveals the user’s keystroke profile. In our case, we recorded 
session keystroke latencies from attackers’ commands that are not copied and pasted 
text and we compared the delays of each matching pair of keystrokes between all the 
attack sessions recorded on a honeypot. 
Our experiment differs from [MON97] because contrary to their experiment where 
the authors evaluated the efficiency of recognizing a user through his/her keystrokes, 
we don’t know in advance from which user the session keystrokes originates. 
Therefore, keystrokes profiles are considered in our experiment as an indicator among 
other parameters (IP address, AS number, attacker’s techniques to perform specific 
actions, files accessed and rogue software downloaded) to differentiate attackers. 
Moreover, contrary to their experiment, the quantity of keystrokes used to perform 
the comparison directly depends on the number of commands the attacker typed. In 
certain cases the recognition through keystrokes is not possible due to the lack of 
recorded keystrokes for a session. 
4.3.1.2 Attacker Skill 
To assess the attacker’s skill over the entire recorded attack sequence, we discussed 
two approaches. The first one consists of asking an analyst to review each attacker 
session and to attribute a score. The second one introduces several criteria that 
correspond to various actions performed by attackers. We postulate that a variety of 
criteria fulfilled by an attacker indicates a relatively higher skill level. As a result, we 
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compute the skill level as a function of the criteria fulfilled. While the first approach 
is subjective, the second may be limited due to the definition of the criteria. We opted 
for the second approach because it enables others to easily replicate our experiment. 
We developed ten criteria based on four generic questions to evaluate the 
competences of the attacker. These questions are: 
1) Is the attacker careful about not being seen? The fact that an attacker does not 
want to be noticed indicates that the attacker knows that such behavior increases the 
chances to maintain access to the target. It also indicates that the attacker knows how 
to reduce his/her traces. We identified four approaches in the criteria: erasing the files 
that attackers imported on the target from the Internet (Criterion 4, Table 2), deleting 
the logs that contain traces of the attacker’s activity (Criterion 1), restoring the logs 
not to catch the attention of a user who could notice that the logs are missing 
(Criterion 2) and checking the presence of other users during the attack (Criterion 3). 
2) Does the attacker pay attention to the environment of the honeypot before 
committing a crime? Learning about the compromised host and its environment 
(especially the network environment) is often important to carrying out the crime 
successfully. Therefore, we created Criterion 5, whether the attacker checks the 
environment. In addition, checking the presence of other users (Criterion 3), which is 
one of the criteria used to evaluate the attacker’s discretion, also contributes to 
answering this question. 
3) How familiar is the attacker with the rogue software he/she is using? Some 
attackers attempted to use specific rogue software unsuccessfully. For example, a 
rogue software having network functionalities that is installed on a target where the 
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corresponding network port is blocked (Criterion 10) indicates a poor knowledge of 
the software or a lack of expertise to detect blocked ports. On the contrary, editing the 
configuration file(s) (Criterion 6) before the installation shows that the attacker is 
aware of what he/she is doing and is not just reproducing an attack without 
understanding it. We can also link to the question the fact that the attacker changed 
the system to make the rogue software work (Criterion 7). 
4) Is the attacker protecting the compromised honeypot? Even once an attacker 
compromises a honeypot, brute force attacks continue to be launched against it. Since 
the attacker gained access through a brute force attack, it means that the attacker 
account credentials (login and password) are somehow weak. Therefore, we 
introduced two criteria to take in account if the attacker was protecting his or her 
account, changing the password and creating a new user account (Criteria 8 and 9). 
These ten criteria are evaluated with a value between 0 and 1 and summed over the 
entire period of the experiment, leading to an overall attacker’ skill level between 0 
and 10 for the global attacker’s activity. We are able to identify all the sessions from 
a specific attacker through the profile analysis described previously (Section 4.3.1.1).  
Table 2 lists the different criteria with their definitions and the method used to 
evaluate them. 
Criteria 1, 2 and 3 are evaluated using ratios between numbers of sessions involving a 
given attacker. More precisely, we take into account whether these actions have been 
performed during each session or not, because the corresponding action(s) are more 
efficient if they are performed every time the attacker connects to the honeypot. For 
example, to be the most efficiently hidden, an attacker needs to hide at each session, 
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or if the attacker wants to verify who else is using the target, the attacker has to check 
the presence of other users at every session. The score for these criteria is the ratio of 
the number sessions where the attacker fulfilled the criteria over the total number of 
sessions, leading to any number between 0 and 1. 
Table 2. Attacker Skills Criteria 
Criterion 
ID Criteria Name Definition Assessment 
1 Hide Deletion of log files or deactivation of logging 
Ratio of the number of sessions where 
the attacker hid 
2 Restore Deleted Files Restoration of deleted files 
Ratio of the number of sessions where 
deleted files were restored 
3 Check Presence Observation of users Ratio of the number of sessions where presence has been checked 
4 Delete Downloaded File 
Deletion of downloaded 
rogue software after usage 
0 if downloaded file is not deleted in any 
session, 1 otherwise 
5 Check System Observation of system configuration or state 
0 if the system has never been checked in 
any session, 1 otherwise 
6 Edit Configuration File 
Edition of rogue software 
configuration file 
0 if configuration file is not edited in any 
session, 1 otherwise 
7 Change System 
Modification of system 
configuration or state to 
have a working attack 
0 if the system has never been modified 
in any session, 1 otherwise 
8 Change Password Change user password 0 if the password was never changed in any session, 1 otherwise 
9 Create New User Creation of new user 0 if no new user is created in any session, 1 otherwise 
10 Rogue Software Adequacy 
Adequacy of rogue 
software 
0 if less than half of the installed rogue 
software is adequate, 1 otherwise 
 
Most other criteria (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9) are considered for the global activity of the 
attacker. The criterion is evaluated as either 0 or 1, depending if the attacker did the 
corresponding action(s) at least once among all sessions. Indeed, these actions do not 
need to be performed in each session to give an indication of the attacker’s skill level.  
The remaining criterion is the rogue software adequacy (Criterion 10). The idea is to 
assess whether the rogue software requirements match the target configuration. For 
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each rogue software, we know its type from the rogue software analysis (see Section 
0) and the honeypot on which it has been run. Depending on the honeypot 
configuration, the rogue software is noted as adequate or not. We attribute 1 if more 
than half of the attacker’s rogue software is adequate and 0 otherwise. This choice 
does not penalize too much an attacker who installed inadequate software, realizes it, 
and installs another more adapted one. And gives 0 to an attacker that insisted in 
installing several inadequate rogue software.  
4.3.1.3 Attack Tools Identification 
To identify the tools installed by attackers to commit crimes from the compromised 
honeypots, we developed an application in Java that automates a part of the analysis 
and stores the results in a database. This application performs two tasks, the static 
analysis and the dynamic analysis of a given attack tool.  
Information obtained by static analysis includes: the name of the file that was 
downloaded on the honeypot (filename), the URL address from where it was 
downloaded (url_origin), the IP address corresponding to the URL (ip_origin), the 
time of the download (download_time), the session in which the software was 
downloaded (session_id), the file type (file_info), the file size (filesize), the number of 
files after unpacking if it is an archive (nb_files), the roguesoft_id of other rogue 
software already in the database that are similar (matching_files) and finally the files 
affected by the rogue software during execution and that were identified to be likely 
used as configuration files (configuration_files).  
Information obtained by dynamic analysis includes: the ports that are being opened 
during an execution of the rogue software (open_ports), the files that are being 
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accessed (files_open), the log of the network traffic generated (log_iptables), and the 
processes created (new_processes). 
This dynamic analysis consists of replaying attacker sessions involving the rogue 
software in a sandbox identical to the honeypot environment. At this point, human 
intervention is required to reproduce the sequence of commands entered by the 
attacker after he/she downloaded the rogue software. A full automation of the 
execution would have been possible if attackers were not making any mistakes while 
typing commands and if keystrokes were perfectly recorded. However, having to 
execute rogue software manually helps identify them. Once we have reproduced the 
attack, the modifications to the sandbox resulting from the rogue software execution 
are saved and analyzed. 
The information gathered statically and dynamically is reviewed to identify the type 
of rogue software. Ports opened during the execution give information on the protocol 
linked to the rogue software acting as a server. If no port has been opened, then this 
type of information can be retrieved from the network traffic traces in case the rogue 
software was used as a client. The files accessed during execution are usually a 
relevant clue to identify a specific type of rogue software. Similarly, a particular 
process called during execution can reveal the type of malware. 
It can happen that rogue software belongs to several categories (e.g., an archive 
containing several pieces of malware). In those cases, by replaying attackers actions, 
we only consider the observed usage(s) of the rogue software to determine the 
category, or categories, it belongs to.  
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Different versions of rogue software are identified as distinct rogue software through 
the static analysis. However, they will belong to the same category if the dynamic 
analysis reveals that the attacker’s purpose while using it was the same. 
The same rogue software used with different configurations are also distinguished. 
The matching_files field in the static analysis helps identify identical or similar files 
used by attackers. 
The information gathered during this analysis process about attackers’ tools and their 
behavior are stored in a database. This database helps to understand the scope of 
attacks. We note that unlike traditional malware analysis services like VirusTotal 
[VIR15], our approach is not exclusively based on a comparison with a repository of 
already known dangerous files. Running both static and dynamic analyses often 
reveals the purpose of the attack tools instead of only giving a general idea about the 
dangerousness of the file. 
4.4 Results and Analysis   
This section first presents overall results, then focuses on the attacks characteristics. 
As previously mentioned, three types of honeypots were deployed: HP1 is fully 
functional, HP2 has the IRC port blocked for incoming and outgoing traffic, and HP3 
has all ports blocked besides HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, DNS, and SSH. Moreover, the 
network is configured so that only attackers who gained access to HP1 can reach 
HP2, and once access is granted to HP2 attackers can reach HP3.  
4.4.1 Results 
The experiment was conducted from May 17, 2010 to October 31, 2010. At the 
beginning of each month, the honeypots were recycled. During the experiment, 106 
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honeypots were successfully deployed, 56 HP1, 30 HP2 and 20 HP3. Table 3 shows 
the distribution of sessions per honeypot type and the number of computer 
compromise sessions (non-empty sessions). 
Table 3. Distribution of Session per Honeypot Type 
 Number of sessions Number of non-empty sessions 
All honeypots 312 211 (68%) 
HP1 160 110 (69%) 
HP2 105 74 (70%) 
HP3 47 27 (57%) 
4.4.2 Attackers’ Origin 
We first considered the origin of the attackers by analysing IP addresses related 
information: the IP address itself, the AS number related to this IP and the country of 
origin.  
It has been shown that attackers can be divided in different groups: those who 
conduct reconnaissance by brute-force scanning hosts, and those who attempt to 
actually gain control of hosts by compromising them [ALA06]. We verified this 
statement by comparing the origins of both groups in the case of the SSH experiment. 
Figure 10 shows the percentage of attackers who performed brute-force scanning but 
who did not compromise the computer (i.e., even if they found the login/password 
combination, they didn’t use a shell), the percentage who did both, and the percentage 
who only compromised the target (i.e., they knew the login/password combination 
and got a shell at the first login attempt). Figure 10.a shows the results when we 
assume that a single IP address is associated with a single attacker. Figure 10.b shows 
the results when we assume that the attacker could have used another IP address that 
belongs to the same organization, identified by its AS number. Both figures confirm 
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previous results because the majority of attackers are clearly divided into two groups 
and only a small fraction of attackers are associated with both brute-force scanning 
and compromising hosts.  
We also note that these results should be taken with caution because a given attacker 
could easily appear to connect from different IP addresses, different AS numbers and 
different countries.  
 
Figure 10. IP Addresses (a) and ASN (b) Distributions of Attackers 
4.4.3 Attackers’ Characteristics 
In this section we introduce the results about attackers’ differentiations and attackers’ 
skills. Once the attacker has compromised the honeypot, we used keystrokes profiles 
and the attackers keystroke logs to characterize the attack. 
4.4.3.1 Identifying Attackers Through Keystroke Profile 
Once the attacker compromised the target, the interactive shell sessions provide 
keystrokes to build profiles and keylogs. We applied a new approach of keystrokes 
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Figure 11 and Table 4 introduce an example of keystrokes analysis for three sessions 
of a given honeypot. According to the IP addresses, the attacks come from the USA 
(session 1), Israel (session 2) and Romania (session 3). Figure 11 shows the delays 
between pairs of keystrokes as a function of the characters composing the pair. 
Values in Table 4 indicate the average delays interval between matching pairs of 
keystrokes for the three sessions. The smaller the value is, the closer the profiles are. 
In light grey we observe that profiles 1 and 2 are closer than profiles 1 and 3 or 2 and 
3 are. Thus, the attacker from session 3 is likely to be different from the attacker in 
session 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 11. Time Intervals between Keystrokes for a Sample of Matching Pairs  
 
In this case, further manual analysis of the attackers’ key logs sessions allowed 
distinguishing two different attackers: in session 1 and 2 the attacker used identical 
rogue software and executed the command “unset	  HISTFILE” at the beginning of 
both sessions whereas no similar actions were performed in session 3.This method 
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honeypot. Starting from 73 distinct IP addresses exploiting the honeypots over the 
five and a half months, we concluded that these were actually 39 different attackers. 
We note that we favored expert judgment over a traditional clustering technique to 
analyze those results, because the lack of ground truth prevented us from identifying 
correct thresholds to build clusters from the different characteristics reviewed. 
 
Table 4. Table of average keystroke delays  
Session ID 1 (USA) 2 (Israel) 3 (Romania) 
1 (USA) 0 
57.7 
(121 matching pairs 
of keystrokes) 
197.5 
(15 matching pairs 
of keystrokes) 
2 (Israel) X 0 
163.8 
(20 matching pairs 
of keystrokes) 
3 (Romania) X X 0 
 
4.4.3.2 Characteristics of Attacker Sessions based on Attacker Skills 
Based on the skill ranking technique introduced in Section 4.2, Figure 12 shows the 
distribution of attackers’ skill levels from 0 (no skill criterion observed) to 10 (all 
skill criteria observed) for the different honeypots. Figure 12 seems to indicate that 
the configuration of the honeypot is not linked to the attackers compromising it. This 
leads to the conclusion that deploying honeypots with very different configurations 
does not ensure the observation of different types of attackers.  
Having defined attackers’ skills using ten criteria, we show the percentage of 
attackers who conducted each action in Figure 13. We see that more than 90% of the 
attackers checked the system and the presence of other users on the target. Almost 





Figure 12. Distribution of attackers by skill levels  
 
This number is surprising as we expected that one of the attackers’ main goals is to 
remain undetected. Less than 60% of the attackers installed correctly rogue software. 
Note also that new user accounts are created for only about 15% of the attackers.  
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Figure 13. Percentages of Attackers Fulfilling Skill Criteria 
 
Most of the attackers used copy and pasted commands in their session. To further 
expand the analysis, Figure 14 represents the percentage of copied/pasted commands 
by skill level. One can observe that the most advanced attackers are more likely to 
paste directly command lines. One might expect that copied and pasted commands 
comes from less skilled attackers (a.k.a. script kiddies). However, to limit their 
visibility, it makes sense that skilled attackers prepare their attacks and limit the 
amount of time on the compromised host launching the crime via the copy and paste 




























































































































are simply using copied and pasted commands to execute a sophisticated attack 
without understanding it.  
 
Figure 14. Percentages of Copied/Pasted Commands per Skill Level 
 
To identify what actions are the most representative of the attacker’s skill level, we 
calculate the skill distributions for groups of attackers who were observed performing 
specific actions. Figure 15 show the distributions for creating a new user (Figure 15.a), 
hiding his/her actions (Figure 15.b), changing his or her password (Figure 15.c), 
correctly launching rogue software (Figure 15.d) and finally checking the presence of 
other users (Figure 15.e). 
On Figure 15.a, we clearly notice that the population of attackers that created a new 
user has a higher average skill level (7.7) than the entire attacker population average 
(5.4) as shown on Figure 12.a. This observation increases our confidence in selecting 
“Create new user” as a criterion for the skill level. As shown on Figure 15.b, Figure 
15.c and Figure 15.d, similar cases can be observed to a lesser extent for a majority of 
the other criteria. However, Figure 15.e shows that the average skill level of attackers 
that checked presence (5.5) is very close to the global average. This, as well as the fact 
that 95% of the attackers performed this action, shows that this action is performed by 
any type of attacker. 
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4.4.4 Compromise Purpose 
This section introduces the results about the third research question that motivated 
this study, the compromise purpose. Table 5 presents the list of categories of rogue 
software resulting from the analysis described in Section 0. This analysis allowed 
concluding on the type of software for 90% of the rogue software collected. The 
remaining 10% could not be identified because they could not be correctly extracted 
from the network traces, either because of a prematurely stopped download or 
because of a broken network trace. 
Table 5. Type of file or rogue software used by attackers 
IRCbot Software used to enroll a compromised host in a botnet that uses the IRC protocol to communicate 
Bouncer IRC IP address spoofing software for the IRC protocol 
Backdoor Software allowing the attacker to come back on the host by another means 
Scanner IP address or port scanning tool to look for potential vulnerability(ies) 
Attack tools File(s) download by the attacker to assist him or her during the attack (File editor, hiding script…) 
Flooder Software used to flood other IP address(es) with a large volume of packets (denial of service) 
Privilege escalation Tool to try to gain root privileges on the host 
Download testing 
files 
Big files used by attacker to test the speed of the 
Internet connection of the host 
Library Libraries added by attackers to make other rogue software work. 
VoIP exploit Tool to exploit vulnerabilities in VoIP software 




We observe that this list contains many categories that were expected based on the 
results found in [BER09], including IRC bots and IRC bouncers. In addition, we 
found some unexpected software, including a server for audio streaming. 
By replaying every attack in a sandbox, we were able to gain an understanding of the 
compromise purpose. In Figure 16, we see that installing IRC bot and IRC bouncers 
are still the most frequently occurring software categories. It is also interesting that the 
third most common software was for attackers to test the network bandwidth or the 
connectivity by downloading test files.  
  
Figure 16. Number of Downloaded Files per Category and Honeypot Type 
 
In order to compare the rogue software installed per honeypot type, we regrouped 
them into two groups as shown in Table 6:  
• Coordination tools: This group includes IRCbot, bouncer IRC and backdoor  
• The attack tools: This group includes the other rogue software categories 
shown in  Table 6 (besides “Audio server” and “Unidentified”). 
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Using these two groups we applied a χ-square test to compare the differences in the 
number of rogue software downloads between the honeypot types HP1 and HP2. The 
low number of rogue software installed on honeypot type HP3 did not permit us to 
include it in this analysis. 
Table 6. Rogue software groups per honeypot types 
Software group   HP1   HP2   HP3  
Coordination Tools   43   33   3  
Attack Tools   35   12   6  
 
With a p-value of 0.045, the χ-square test shows that the number of downloaded 
rogue software, for the two considered groups, is not independent of the type of 
honeypot (when considering HP1 and HP2). 
One of the goals of our experiment was to study the attacker’s behavior over a long 
period of time. The attackers retain access to their honeypot for up to one month. It 
allowed us to observe the time intervals between sessions occuring on a same 
honeypot after the initial deployment triggered by a successful brute-force attack. We 
found that on average, attackers exploit the brute-forced host after 12 hours. 
However, for 30% of the honeypots, the fourth attack session occurred, on average, 
13 days after the deployment. This result is important to justify the extended period of 
time that we allocated to honeypot exploitation. Limiting honeypot life time to 24 
hours [BER09, RAM07] would have significantly reduced the scope of our data 
collection. We also noted that the first session corresponds to the installation and the 




Figure 17. Average Time between Sessions and Number of Honeypots  
 
Another objective was to be able to determine whether or not and how often 
compromised hosts are shared among attackers. For the 60 honeypots that were 
targeted by the 39 attackers identified in Section 4.4.3, 20% of them shared 
honeypots. Nine honeypots (15%) were exploited by more than one attacker. We 
found that seven honeypots had been exploited by two different attackers, one 
honeypot by three different attackers and one honeypot by five different attackers. 
This raises the important issue about how the access to honeypots was shared and 
why. Even though 77% of the attackers changed the password, 15% shared the access 
with at least one other attacker.  
Figure 18 shows the timeline of activity for eight of the nine honeypots that were 
shared. Each diamond on Figure 18 represents a session and each shade of grey a 
unique attacker. These eight honeypots present the particularity of all having an IRC 
bot installed during their lifetime. IRC logs were analyzed from these bots in order to 
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We discovered that five of the eight honeypots used two identical IRC servers. We 
also found credential information being shared on IRC channels.  
These results are important to show that attackers seem to be organized to 
compromise and exploit honeypots. However, we note that we observed this type of 
shared access for only a minority of honeypots. 
 
Figure 18. Timeline of Attacker Access to the Shared Honeypots 
4.5 Limitations 
The limitations of the experiment are the following. First, since the attackers and 
computer-focused crimes evolve, we expect these results will change over time.  
Second, we have only looked at an SSH entry point with different network 
configurations. We will need to consider other entry points as well as other 
configurations to assess how attackers react to them (e.g., large disk space).  
 72 
 
Third, our empirical results cover a single organization. While we do not believe that 
the location will have had a significant impact on our results since these are targets of 
opportunity that were found using automated tools to gain access, it would be 
interesting to replicate our experiment in other organizations to compare the results.  
Fourth, the keystroke analysis technique assumes that the path followed by the 
packets carrying attacker’s commands is static and does not change over the course of 
the attacker sessions. We believe this assumption holds for the majority of attackers, 
but it would be interesting to validate it.  
Fifth, the experimental setup constrained the honeypots to be reset at the beginning of 
each month. This may have cut off attacks occurring towards the end of the month. 
Furthermore, the honeypots types (HP1, HP2 and HP3) were not assigned randomly. 
A better design would randomly allocate a honeypot type every time an attacker 
obtains a honeypot.  
Sixth, we are not sure attackers perceived the network restrictions and tried to correct 
them in order to set up their backdoor or IRC bot.  
Lastly, the number of sessions and honeypots deployed are too low to draw many 
strong conclusions from this study.   
4.6 Conclusions 
An empirical research study was conducted in order to gain insights on attackers and 
the type of crimes launched from the honeypots. The experiment focused on targets of 
opportunity where attackers face targets with different network capabilities. We 
introduced novel approaches to characterize the attacker and the attack. In particular, 
we discussed how to use keystrokes profiles analysis and attacker behavior to have 
 73 
 
strong evidence that attackers are different. We also introduced criteria to assess 
attackers’ skills. We used a variety of different data to conduct our analysis: IP 
address, AS routing number, network traffic, key logs, keystrokes profile, attack 
sequence, and rogue software downloaded. 
We found that the main motivation behind the compromise was to install IRC-based 
botnets. We collected evidence to show that  15% of attackers shared honeypot access 
with at least one other attacker. This represents nine honeypots, seven of which had 
their password changed. This reveals that attackers appear to be organized and share 
credentials. Changing password was a frequent action for attackers (77% of attackers 
updated the target computer password). Only skilled attackers created a new user 
account, but most attackers checked the presence of other users. We also noticed that 
the configuration of the compromised honeypot did not seem to impact the type of 
attacker attacking it. 
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Chapter 5 – Are Computer Focused Crimes Impacted by 
System Configurations?  
The study presented in this chapter was published in [SOB12]. It marked the 
beginning of a collaboration with faculty and students of the Criminology and 
Criminal Justice Department at the University of Maryland.  
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4, we listed the assessment of the attackers’ reaction to honeypot 
configuration changes as future work. The experimental setup of the study described 
in this chapter provides different honeypot configurations. Several limitations were 
raised concerning the experimental design of the work described in Section 3.2 of 
Chapter 3:  
• Attackers were assigned a honeypot configuration sequentially (HP1 for the 
first honeypot deployed, HP2 for the second and HP3 for the third). A better 
design would employ randomization of the honeypot configuration.  
• The number of honeypots was too low in order to perform a strong statistical 
analysis.  
• Not all the attackers had access to their honeypot(s) for 30 days since the 
honeypots were recycled at the beginning of every month.   
To address these limitations, the experiment used to collect the data was built using 
the cybercrime framework described in Chapter 3.  
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More specifically, we concentrated on crimes committed by attackers who gain 
access by finding the correct combination username/password on SSH to a computer 
running UNIX. Once an attacker has access to the computer, he/she can build the 
attack over a period of 30 days. We focused specifically on the crime(s) the attacker 
commits, i.e., the attacks launched from the computer the attacker gained access to 
towards any external computer. 
5.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In this chapter we discuss computer-focused crimes and address the following 
research questions: 
a) Does the computer configuration impact whether the crime is destructive or 
not? 
b) Does the computer configuration impact whether the target is of choice or 
opportunity? 
c) Does the computer configuration impact whether the attack is coordinated or 
not? 
Network flow records and attackers’ keystrokes were used for this study. Network 
flow records helped identify the difference crimes committed by the attackers. 
Keystrokes, processed into lists of commands, were used to identify the attackers’ 
actions. Details on these data were provided in Section 3.2.2.4 of Chapter 3. 
Many dimensions of a computer-focused crime can be studied. The focus is on three 
specific dimensions: 1) whether the crime was destructive or not, 2) whether the 
victim of the crime was a target of choice or a target of opportunity, and 3) whether 
the attack was coordinated or not. Flooding attacks are characterized as destructive, 
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while scanning activity or brute force attacks are non-destructive. Flooding attacks 
and phishing campaigns are examples of targets of choice. Scanning activity or brute 
force attacks can be considered as targets of opportunity. Coordinated attacks can be 
identified by the exchange of some IRC communication before or during the attack. 
This study is divided into two parts. First, we assess the effectiveness of a warning 
banner in deterring the attackers to launch crimes. More specifically the warning 
banner from the NIST 800-53’s system use notification control (AC-8) 
recommendation.  
Deterrence is based on the fear of threat punishment refraining a criminal to engage in 
a criminal activity [CUS93, GIB75, PAT87]. Criminal activities involving computer 
misuse are punished by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 up to 10 years of 
imprisonment [KER09]. According to [GEE75], deterrence effectiveness depends on 
the communication mechanism used to inform the offenders of potential detection 
and punishment. Studies on such mechanisms showed warning signs are an efficient 
way to carry the deterrence message [CLA97, CUS93]. Mixed results have been 
observed in the physical world on the deterrent effect of warning signs. A study on 
unsafe driving indicated that they were effective [RAM00] whereas in [GRE85], they 
had no effect on cable television signal theft. Several theoretical studies argued on the 
effectiveness of warning on the Internet. Because of anonymity of the Internet 
prevents the authorities to identify, locate and prosecute authors of crimes, the 
deterrence has less effect [BLA01, HAR96]. However, authors of crimes do not have 
to be identifiable for the deterrence to work [GOO10] as they exhibit a rational 
decision-making process during attack sessions [PNG09].  
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Because of their rational decision-making process that could prevent them from 
engaging in criminal online activities [PNG09], the possible effectiveness of 
deterrence on the Internet and the effect of warning signs in the physical work, we 
hypothesize that attackers will be deterred by the standard NIST banner and as a 
consequence discouraged from launching crimes from the honeypots.  
Another goal of this study is to empirically assess whether the configuration of the 
computer compromised by the attacker impacts the type of crime committed. Authors 
in [CHA11] demonstrated that malicious activities on a computer could be detected 
by monitoring abnormal resources usage when the user is away from his/her 
computer. With this study we determine that CPU, network and disk access are 
computer resources used by malicious software. Since all the instructions interpreted 
by the CPU reside in the main memory of the computer, all programs executed by a 
system will reside in memory at some point [COL03], it is safe to assume that 
malicious activities use memory as well. Not all crimes require the same computer 
resources; we hypothesize that attackers will launch different attacks depending on 
the available system resources (disk, memory and bandwidth).  
To explore the two different hypotheses, we will consider the following computer 
configurations: 1) whether a warning message was provided to the attacker when 
he/she gained access to the target computer, 2) the size of the hard drive, 3) the size 
of the memory, and 4) the size of the bandwidth. For each of these configurations we 
will study the number of crimes that are (non)-destructive, attacks that are (non)-
coordinated, and victims that are targets of choice/opportunity. 
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5.3 Experimental Design  
To answer these questions we used the data collected from October 10, 2011 to April 
30, 2012. 
Attackers, who have been identified according to their IP addresses, are randomly 
attributed one of the sixteen honeypots configurations introduced in Table 7. These 
configurations combine:  
• Low (512 Mbytes) and high (2.25Gbytes) memory space, 
• Low (5 Gbytes) and high (30 Gbytes) disk space, 
• Low (128 Kbits/s) and high (512 Kbits/s) bandwidth, 
• Banner or no banner displayed after a successful SSH login (see Figure 19). 
Table 7. Honeypots Configuration 
Configuration   Memory   Disk Space   Bandwidth   Banner  
1   High   High   High   No Banner  
2   Low   High   High   No Banner  
3   High   Low   High   No Banner  
4   Low   Low   High   No Banner  
5   High   High   Low   No Banner  
6   Low   High   Low   No Banner  
7   High   Low   Low   No Banner  
8   Low   Low   Low   No Banner  
9   High   High   High   Banner  
10   Low   High   High   Banner  
11   High   Low   High   Banner  
12   Low   Low   High   Banner  
13   High   High   Low   Banner  
14   Low   High   Low   Banner  
15   High   Low   Low   Banner  




At the time of the design of this experiment, the low and high values were chosen to 
reflect a computer with limited hardware resources that could impact the execution or 
download of programs vs. a powerful machine that will permit fast Internet access 
and execution of memory and disk consuming programs.  
 
Figure 19. Banner Displayed 
5.4 Results 
The results come from data collected during the period of October 10, 2011 to April 
30, 2012. A total of 939 honeypots were deployed. Figure 20 shows the distribution 




Figure 20. Number of Deployed Honeypots 
5.4.1 Analysis of Number of Crimes per Honeypot Type 
This chapter focuses on the committed crimes, i.e., attacks launched from the 
honeypots to some external computer. Specifically, an attacker commits a crime using 
the compromised honeypot when communicating in a particular way with some 
targets outside the organization network. These communication patterns are shown in 
the network flow records, different patterns characterizing different crimes. The 
period of time during which we see these patterns defines the crime. A total of 245 
crimes (i.e., attacks launched from honeypots towards external computers) were 
committed, representing an average of 0.261 crimes per honeypot deployed, 
reflecting in fact a large disparity of the number of committed crimes per honeypot. 
We found that most honeypots contained one crime (15 honeypots) or two crimes (8 
honeypots). We also found three honeypots launched respectively 26, 43 and 83 
crimes. Figure 21 shows the distribution of the number of honeypots on which were 
observed a given number of crimes. As expected, we also found some disparity of the 
























































Figure 21. Number of Honeypots and Number of Crimes 
 
Figure 22. Number of Crimes per Honeypot Type 
If we calculate the crime rate (i.e., number of crimes observed divided by the number 
of honeypots deployed) per 100 honeypots deployed for each honeypot configuration 
with and without a warning banner, we obtain the results shown in Table 8.  
Among the six highest crime rates, three include a warning banner and three do not 
include one. The highest rate does not include a warning banner but the second one 
does. Four out of the top six highest crime rates and three out of the four top ones are 











































highest rates, four are linked to low memory size. But among the four highest ones, 
only two are linked to low memory size.  
Table 8. Crime Rate per Honeypot Type 
Memory   Disk Space   Bandwidth   Warning   No Warning  
High   High   High   7.14   131.75  
Low   High   High   79.71   4.35  
High   Low   High   4.41   40.00  
Low   Low   High   34.29   0.00  
High   High   Low   0.00   3.39  
Low   High   Low   51.47   21.05  
High   Low   Low   0.00   1.49  
Low   Low   Low   0.00   4.41  
5.4.2 Classification of Observed Crimes 
The 245 observed crimes can be classified into the following five main groups. 
C1: Reconnaissance activities (68 instances on 23 honeypots): The attacker 
downloaded and launched a tool scanning wide ranges of IP addresses to discover 
specific services such as Secure Shell Servers (SSH). During our investigations we 
discovered that Web and SSH services were particularly targeted. Each packet has a 
different source port. However, the destination port is always the same. The network 
flow pattern is also characterized by the TCP SYN flag [GAD08]. 
C2: Flooding attacks (161 instances on 15 honeypots): The attacker downloaded 
and launched a tool generating a large amount of User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
packets towards one specific IP address [XU09]. We observed two types of UDP 
flooding attacks. Different source and destination ports for each packet, and a large 
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number of packets and bytes sent characterize the first type. The second type is 
characterized by a random high number as source port and the port number of well-
known services including SSH (22), DNS (53) and web (80). During the whole 
attack, packets are sent using the same source port to the same destination port. A 
simple aggregation of the network flows summarizes this activity in one line. The 
attack is less visible than the first type where millions of records will be shown for an 
equivalent attack.  
C3: Brute force attacks (5 instances on 2 honeypots): A brute force attack consists 
in guessing the credentials of an already known service. Several short connections to 
the targeted service characterize this attack [ALS07]. We detect a brute force attack 
when we identify several flows with different source ports, the same destination IP 
address and port, and the TCP flags SYN, FIN and RESET.  
C4: Phishing attacks (4 instances on 4 honeypots): Few honeypots have been setup 
to host fishing websites to steal credentials or other personal information by providing 
a fake website which looks almost exactly like the legitimate one [IRA08]. A 
phishing website is coordinated with emails to attract the users to the trap. In addition 
to the network flows, for phishing attacks, keystrokes logs were analyzed to detect the 
modification and installation of a phishing website.  
C5: SPAM Sender (7 instances on 2 honeypots): The attacker downloaded and 
launched a tool sending unwanted electronic messages [DHI07]. When unsolicited 
mails are sent, the network flows show high volume of bytes exchanged between mail 
servers and the honeypots. 
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Applying a criminological approach, we will examine in more details three aspects of 
the crime: 
• Whether the crime was destructive or not, 
• Whether the crime focused on a target of choice or opportunity, 
• Whether the attack was coordinated or not. 
We now need to classify the five attack types we have observed based on the crime 
aspects discussed in this chapter: level of destructiveness, target of 
choice/opportunity, and coordinated/non-coordinated attack. 
5.4.3 Destructiveness 
Destructiveness indicates the potential damage that can occur for the victim. The 
different attacks have been classified depending on their level of destructiveness.  
Reconnaissance activities (C1) are not destructive since only one probe packet is sent 
to a server to determine whether the port is open or not. It is the interest of the 
attacker to keep the service running since it might be used to gain access to the 
targeted system later.  
Flooding attacks (C2) are typically destructive. The large volume of UDP packets can 
affect the targeted system as well as the network equipment. The damages can cause a 
single computer or an entire network to go down.  
The login attempts associated to the brute force attack (C3) are not causing any 
damage to the system. This malicious activity is considered to be non-destructive. 
The objective is to access a system using a specific service. This service has to be 
running if the attacker wants to take advantage of it.  
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A phishing attack (C4) resulting in the deployment of a website is also non-
destructive. It aims at collecting users’ information.  
A SPAM campaign (C5) can quickly overload a mail server. The attackers want to 
target as many users as possible. It is not in their interest to interrupt the mail delivery 
of their phishing or commercial messages. Thus this attack is not considered as 
destructive in this study.  
5.4.4 Target of Choice or Opportunity  
A target of opportunity is a system that happens to be within a wide range of targets. 
A target of choice is a particular system or network selected by the attacker.  
Reconnaissance activities (C1) are generally observed on wide ranges of IP addresses. 
The program probing for open ports is usually given entire subnets to analyze 
targeting several systems and organizations. A brute force attack (C3) often comes 
after the reconnaissance phase. It uses the results of the scan to determine which hosts 
to target. Thus, victims of brute force attacks can also be considered to be targets of 
opportunity.  
The victims of UDP flood attacks (C2) can be classified as targets of choice. These 
attacks only target one specific IP address. The victims of phishing websites (C4) and 
SPAM campaigns (C5) are also targets of choice. Phishing attacks target one specific 
organization including banks, mail providers and their customers. Such an attack 
requires specific knowledge about the organization to deceive its users and obtain 
credentials. SPAM campaigns, which are either advertising a phishing website or a 
product, are targeting specific categories of people.  
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5.4.5 Coordinated/Non-Coordinated Attack 
Finding out whether an attack is coordinated is more complicated. We define a 
coordinated attack when several other hosts are contributing to the same attack. Even 
though this cannot be determined with certainty, it is possible to identify the 
honeypots generating Internet Relay Chat (IRC) traffic. IRC is known to be used by 
Botnet to command and control several compromised hosts [ZHU07]. We postulate 
that any crime for which we observe IRC traffic right before the start of the crime or 
during the crime provides evidence of a coordinated attack. On the contrary to levels 
of destructiveness and targets of choice/opportunity, we cannot systematically link a 
type of crime to a coordinated/non-coordinated attack. A detailed analysis of each 
crime is needed.  
Table 9 summarizes the crimes observed to the levels of destructiveness and whether 
the victim is a target of choice or opportunity. 
Table 9. Characterization of Observed Crimes 
Crime   Destructiveness   Target Choice/Opportunity  
Reconnaissance   No   Opportunity  
Flooding Attacks   Yes   Choice  
Brute force   No   Opportunity  
Phishing Website   No   Choice  
SPAM   No   Choice  
5.5 Warning Banner Impact Analysis 
We investigated the impact of the warning banner on the destructiveness of the crime, 
the type of victim (choice or opportunity) and the type of attack (coordinated or not). 
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5.5.1 Does the Warning Banner Impact Whether the Crime is Destructive or 
Not? 
In the previous section, we categorized the 245 observed crimes into destructive and 
non-destructive crimes. In this section, we analyze whether the level of 
destructiveness is linked to the warning banner.  
Table 10 shows the number of destructive and non-destructive crimes observed for 
the honeypot configurations with a warning banner and without a warning banner.  
Table 10. Computer Configuration vs. Level of Destructiveness 
 Destructive   Non-Destructive  
Warning   65   56  
No Warning   96   28  
 
For each computer configuration, we apply a χ-square test to see whether the warning 
banner impacts whether the crime is destructive or not. We find a P-value of 9.3E-5. 
So we reject the hypothesis of independence. We conclude that the existence of the 
warning banner and whether the crime is destructive are not independent. 
5.5.2 Does the Warning Banner Impact Whether the Target is of Choice or 
Opportunity? 
In this section, we analyze whether the victim is a target of opportunity or choice is 
linked to the warning banner. 
Table 11 shows the number of observed crimes where the victim is a target of 




Table 11. Computer Configuration vs. Target of Choice/Opportunity 
 Opportunity   Choice  
Warning   47   74  
No Warning   26   98  
 
We apply a χ-square test to see whether the warning banner impacts whether the 
victim is a target of opportunity or choice. We find a P-value of 2.2E-3. So we reject 
the hypothesis of independence. We conclude that the existence of the warning 
banner and whether the victim is a target of opportunity or choice are not 
independent. 
5.5.3 Does the Warning Banner Impact Whether the Attack is Coordinated or 
Not? 
In this section, we analyze whether the attack is coordinated or not is linked to the 
existence of a warning banner. 
Table 12 shows the number of crimes observed where the attack is coordinated or not 
for the honeypot configurations with a warning banner and without a warning banner. 
Table 12. Computer Configuration vs. Coordinated/Non-Coordinated Attack 
 Coordinated   Non-Coordinated  
Warning   70   51  
No Warning   39   85  
 
We apply a χ-square test to see whether the warning banner impacts whether the 
attack is coordinated or not. We find a P-value of 3.22E-5. So we can reject the 
hypothesis of independence. We conclude that the existence of the warning banner 
and whether the attack is coordinated or not are not independent. 
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5.6 Computer Resources Impact Analysis 
In this section we investigate the impact of the computer configuration on the 
destructiveness of the crime, the type of victim (choice or opportunity) and the type 
of attack (coordinated or not). 
5.6.1 Do The Computer Resources Impact Whether the Crime is Destructive or 
Not? 
In the previous section we categorized the 245 observed crimes into destructive and 
non-destructive crimes. In this section, we analyze whether the level of 
destructiveness is linked to the computer resources.  
Table 13 shows the number of observed destructive and non-destructive crimes for 
each of the computer resources configuration: low/high memory size, low/high disk 
space, and low/high bandwidth.  
Table 13. Computer Configuration vs. Level of Destructiveness 
 Destructive   Non-Destructive  
Low Memory   89   24  
High Memory    72   60  
Low Disk Space   69   60  
High Disk Space   92   24  
Low Bandwidth   28   46  
High Bandwidth   133   38  
 
For each computer configuration option, we apply a χ-square test to see whether the 
computer configuration impacts whether the crime is destructive or not. For each 
case, we find a P-value between 6.9E-05 (low/high memory size) and 1.5E-09 
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(low/high bandwidth). So in all cases we reject the hypothesis of independence. We 
conclude that the computer configuration (for the considered values of memory sizes, 
disk space and bandwidth) and whether the crime is destructive are not independent. 
5.6.2 Does The Computer Configuration Impact Whether the Target is of 
Choice or Opportunity? 
In this section, we analyze whether the victim is a target of opportunity or choice is 
linked to the computer resources. 
Table 14 shows the number of observed crimes where the victim is a target of 
opportunity or choice for each of the computer resources configurations: low/high 
memory size, low/high disk space, and low/high bandwidth.  
Table 14. Computer Configuration vs. Target of Choice/Opportunity 
 Opportunity   Choice  
Low Memory   24   89  
High Memory    49   83  
Low Disk Space   51   78  
High Disk Space   22   94  
Low Bandwidth   42   32  
High Bandwidth   31   140  
 
For each computer configuration option, we apply a χ-square test to see whether the 
computer configuration impacts whether the victim is a target of opportunity or 
choice. For each case, we find a P-value between 0.0067 (low/high memory size) and 
1.3E-09 (low/high bandwidth). So in all cases we reject the hypothesis of 
independence. We conclude that the computer configuration (for the considered 
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values of memory size, disk space and bandwidth) and whether the victim is a target 
of opportunity or choice are not independent. 
5.6.3 Does The Computer Configuration Impact Whether The Attack is 
Coordinated or Not? 
In this section, we analyze whether the attacks is coordinated or not is linked to the 
computer resources. 
Table 15 shows the number of observed crimes where the attack is coordinated or not 
for each of the computer configurations: low/high memory size, low/high disk space, 
and low/high bandwidth.  
Table 15. Computer Configuration vs. Coordinated/Non-Coordinated Attack 
 Coordinated   Non-Coordinated  
Low Memory   31   82  
High Memory    78   54  
Low Disk Space   76   53  
High Disk Space   33   83  
Low Bandwidth   27   47  
High Bandwidth   82   89  
 
For each computer configuration option, we apply a χ-square test to see whether the 
computer configuration impacts whether the attack is coordinated or not. We found a 
P-value of 0.09 corresponding to low/high bandwidth. The other P-value were 1.7E-
07 and 6.7E-07, respectively for low/high disk space and low/high memory size. So 
we cannot reject the hypothesis of independence for bandwidth size. However, in the 
other cases, we can reject the hypothesis of independence. We conclude that the 
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computer configuration (for the considered values of memory size and disk space) 
and whether the attack is coordinated or not are not independent. 
5.7 Discussion 
The different empirical studies led to the following conclusions: 
1. The existence of the warning banner and 1) whether the crime is destructive, 
2)  whether the victim is a target of opportunity or choice, and 3) whether the 
attack is coordinated or not, are not independent. 
2. The computer configuration (for the considered values of memory size, disk 
space and bandwidth) and 1) whether the crime is destructive and 2) whether 
the victim is a target of opportunity or choice, are not independent. 
3. The computer configuration (for the considered values of memory size and 
disk space) and whether the attack is coordinated or not are not independent. 
Even though it might seem counter-intuitive that warning banners have no dissuasive 
effect on the crimes, i.e., attacks launched from the honeypots towards external 
computers, one explanation might be that attackers who are committing a crime still 
decided to engage in crimes despites the warning banner. More precisely, these 
attackers appear to have decided to ignore the banner and downloaded their attack 
tools, and deployed the attack and finally launched it. So, if banners do not have an 
effect on the crimes, we might expect them to have an effect on the attacks. Some 
attackers who would have been tempted to launch an attack might rethink this and 
stop the attack. Such behavior has been confirmed in another study on the deterrent 
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effect of the warning banner, published in [MAI14], where we showed that when 
looking at the attack sessions, the warning banner does reduce their duration.  
The result regarding high bandwidth was expected. These results confirm that 
attackers are indeed searching for bandwidth. The fact that low disk space favors non-
destructive crimes should be understood as non-destructives crimes being committed 
independently on the disk space.  
The results regarding the memory size are more intriguing. We should not conclude 
that attackers are interested in low memory size. Instead these results show that 
attackers are much more interested by bandwidth and disk space than they are by 
memory size. 
This chapter presents some empirically driven conclusions that help to identify the 
attack threat. Additional studies are needed to revisit/confirm the conclusions we 
found. 
5.8 Limitations  
One limitation of this study is the location of the data collected. The dataset was 
obtained by honeypots deployed at the University of Maryland. It is important to 
replicate these experiments at different locations and at different times.  
A time period of 30 days was provided to attackers for developing and launching their 
attacks. A study should focus on this duration and its impact on the observed crimes. 
The honeypots did not contain specific “honey” to attract attackers. They were basic 
computers with various configurations of disk space, bandwidth and memory size. A 
study including different types of “honey” would be interesting to see whether similar 
conclusions can be derived.  
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Attackers gained access to the honeypots using SSH as an entry point. Providing such 
entry point might favor particular attackers and attacks. It would be interesting to 
compare the results we obtained with outcomes of studies that provided other access 
points to attackers. 
The warning banner also presents several limitations. We have no guarantee that  
attackers read the warning banner or understood it since the message displayed is in 
English. Attackers from non-English speaking countries may not understand the 
message announcing the punishment threat. In order to prevent the attackers from 
detecting the nature of the compromised hosts, the honeypots behavior should be 
close to a regular UMD operated system. The means to convey the warning, i.e. the 
banner following the NIST recommendation 800-53, was chosen based on the UMD 
policy and not reveal the nature of the honeypots. For example, a banner announcing 
counter attack threats would be against the UMD policy, unlawful and suspicious.   
The present study does not provide any insight on the attacker. We concede that we 
cannot guarantee that each attacker using the framework is human.  Conversely, we 
cannot guarantee that each attacker using the framework is an automated bot.  
5.9 Conclusions 
This chapter focused on three specific dimensions of computer focused crimes: 1) 
whether the crime was destructive or not, 2) whether the victim of the crime was a 
target of choice or a target of opportunity, and 3) whether the attack was coordinated 
or not. We empirically assessed whether the configuration of the computer 
compromised by the attacker impacts the type of crime committed. We considered the 
following computer configurations: 1) whether a warning message was provided to 
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the attacker when he/she gained access to the target computer, 2) the size of the hard 
drive, 3) the size of the memory, and 4) the size of the bandwidth. For each of these 
configurations, we studied the number of crimes that are (non)-destructive, attacks 
that are (non)-coordinated, and victims that are targets of choice/opportunity. 
The three empirical studies led to the following conclusions.  
1. The existence of the warning banner and 1) whether the crime is destructive, 
2) whether the victim is a target of opportunity or choice, and 3) whether the 
attack is coordinated or not, are not independent. 
2. The computer configuration (for the considered values of memory size, disk 
space and bandwidth) and 1) whether the crime is destructive and 2) whether 
the victim is a target of opportunity or choice, are not independent. 
3. The computer configuration (for the considered values of memory size and 
disk space) and whether the attack is coordinated or not are not independent. 
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Chapter 6 – Are Computer Focused Crimes Impacted By 
Surveillance Warning Banners or Surveillance Tools?  
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5, we studied the impact on the crimes committed by attackers on different 
honeypot configurations as well as the effect of one aspect of deterrence: a warning 
banner. In this chapter we focus on another aspect of deterrence: surveillance.  
6.2 Research Question and Hypothesis 
We investigate one aspect of cybercrime deterrence: the announcement and existence 
of surveillance mechanisms. More specifically, we ask the following research 
question:  
Are computer focused crimes (i.e., after an attacker gains unauthorized 
access to a computer, the use of this computer to launch an attack 
towards an external target) impacted by a surveillance warning banner 
and/or surveillance tools? 
We analyzed the following data: 1) network flow records to identify the different 
crimes committed by the attackers, and 2) the keystrokes processed into lists of 
commands to study the attackers’ actions. Details on these data were provided in 
Section 3.2.2.4 of Chapter 3.  
The authors in [CLA97] introduce three different types of surveillance mechanisms 
aimed at preventing crime by increasing offenders’ perception of threat detection. 
Formal surveillance is when a person or a system is dedicated to surveillance. 
Dedicated individuals such as cops or surveillance technologies such as closed-circuit 
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television (CCTV) or monitoring tools deployed by IT security professional, are 
examples of formal surveillance. Individuals perform natural surveillance during their 
daily activities whereas a designated employee such as a parking attendant carries out 
surveillance by place managers.  
In our study, we will focus on formal surveillance. A review of the research on the 
effectiveness of formal surveillance in the physical work showed mixed results. 
Formal surveillance reduced the number of car thefts in guarded parking lots 
[LAY92, HES95, BAR96] whereas CCTV was ineffective in preventing violent and 
property crimes in city centers, public housing communities and public transportation 
facilities [WEL08].  
The security community has been claiming that deterrence does not work on the 
Internet. Unfortunately, such a claim is rarely accompanied by empirical data to 
support it. This work allows for an investigation of this claim directly by focusing on 
the announcement and existence of surveillance mechanisms on a compromised 
computer system.  
A study has shown that awareness of surveillance tools on employees’ computers 
reduces the intent of system misuse by employees [ARC09]. Based on this result we 
hypothesize that a banner announcing surveillance banner and a surveillance tool will 
discourage attackers from using the compromised system to launch crimes.  
We present findings from a field experiment we conducted over a period of 19 
months, which is concentrated on computer-focused crimes [FUR02]. The goal of this 
chapter is to assess whether these crimes are impacted by a surveillance warning 
banner and surveillance tools.  
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The impact of a surveillance banner or surveillance tools is analyzed in terms of the 
following metrics: the number of crimes committed, the timing of the first crime 
related to the timing of initial compromise, the temporal distribution for all crimes 
following an initial compromise, and the specific crime rates pertaining to the most 
frequently observed crimes. 
For the purpose of this experiment, a farm of four honeypots were randomly assigned 
to attackers as follows: Type 0) no surveillance banner nor tools, Type 1) a 
surveillance banner but no surveillance tools, Type 2) no surveillance banner but 
surveillance tools, and Type 3) a surveillance banner and surveillance tools.  
6.3 Experimental Design  
Attackers, who have been identified according to their IP addresses, are randomly 
attributed one of the configuration types listed in Table 16. The configuration 
randomly assigned to the honeypot container involves a two (banner vs no banner) x 
two (processes vs no processes) design:  
• The display of a banner after a SSH login informing the user that the system is 
under surveillance (Figure 23),  
• The presence of surveillance tool processes (Figure 24)  
Figure 24 shows two different surveillance processes. One is called zabbix_agentd, 
which is the agent of Zabbix an open source monitoring solution. The other is a script 
named “monitor.” “monitor” updates and saves a file every minute containing the 
disk usage, the system uptime, the available memory, the users’ logins and the 
running processes. The attacker has access to these files.  
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Table 16. Honeypot Configuration Types 
Honeypot Type   Surveillance Banner   Surveillance Processes  
0   No   No  
1   Yes   No  
2   No   Yes  
3   Yes   Yes  
 
 
Figure 23. Surveillance Banner Displayed 
 
Figure 24. Result of the ps	  ax command 
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6.4 Results and Analysis  
The results reported come from data collected during the period of 19 months from 
April 2012 to October 2013. A total of 2914 honeypots were deployed.  
6.4.1 Results 
Figure 25 shows the number of honeypots deployed over time. On average 153.4 
honeypots were deployed per month with a standard deviation of 67.7 honeypots per 
month. 
 
Figure 25. Number of Honeypots Deployed over Time 
Figure 26 shows the distribution of the number of honeypots deployed over time for 
each of the four honeypot configuration types employed within the current design. A 
total of 710 honeypots of Type 0, 763 of Type 1, 694 of Type 2 and 747 of Type 3 
were deployed. We observe that even though the overall number of honeypots 
deployed varies over time, the repartition among the four types remains consistent 
since we allocated the treatment conditions randomly. 
For Type 0, the average number of honeypots that were deployed per month is 37.4 
honeypots with a standard deviation of 15.7. The averages and standard deviations for 





















support that randomization was successfully applied at the point of deployment. As 
such, any identified differences across treatment groups that follow can be attributed 
to the applied treatments, as all other characteristics pertaining to the attacker (both 
observed and unobserved) should be balanced in expectation across the four groups. 
 
Figure 26. Number of Honeypots Deployed over Time by Honeypot Type 
6.4.2 Combined Crimes Committed 
This chapter focuses on the crimes committed following successful entry to the 
respective honeypot, i.e., attacks launched from the honeypots towards external 
computers. Specifically, an attacker commits a crime using the compromised 
honeypot when communicating in a particular way with some targets outside the 
organization network. A total of 611 crimes were committed, representing an average 
of 0.210 crimes per honeypot deployed.  
Figure 27 shows the distribution of the number of crimes committed per honeypot. 
Among the honeypots that have committed crimes, we observe that most honeypots 
contained one crime (50 honeypots – 58.1%), two crimes (10 honeypots – 11.6%), or 
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with most of the honeypots containing less than 4 crimes and 1 crime serving as the 
modal category. However, one honeypot was involved in 41 crimes, one in 59 crimes, 
one in 72 crimes and even one in 183 crimes. These 183 crimes resulting from a 
single honeypot were reconnaissance attacks against specific ports and targets; we 
have flagged this data point as an outlier. Another honeypot committed 72 crimes; 
these crimes consist of 52 DoS attacks (against 52 distinct targets) and 20 
reconnaissance attacks. Since the majority of these crimes are targeted DoS attacks, 
we will not flag this data point as an outlier, and retain this observation for all further 
analyses. Henceforth, we will often present results with and without the flagged 
outlier of 183 reconnaissance attacks committed on one honeypot. 
 
Figure 27. Number of Honeypots and Number of Crimes 
Figure 28 and Figure 29 show the number of crimes (with and without the outlier) 
committed over the 19 months of data collection. When including the outlier, an 
average of 32.2 crimes/month with a standard deviation of 51.8 crimes/month were 
observed. When excluding the outlier, these values decrease to an average of 22.5 
crimes/month and a standard deviation of 32.5 crimes/month. Even though the 
number of crimes varies over time, there is no obvious trend suggesting a difference 
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to verify that the population of attackers targeting the honeypots is not qualitatively 
changing over time. We are making sure that the differences we may observe are due 
to the applied treatment and not a change of attackers over time. The Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller trend test [DIC79, CHE95] is a commonly used test for that purpose 
[ELD01]. When applying the Augmented Dickey–Fuller trend test on the ratio of the 
number of monthly crimes divided by the number of monthly honeypots deployed, 
we find no statistically significant trend or unit root. We also analyze the number of 
crimes committed per honeypot configuration observed over time.  
 
Figure 28. Number of Crimes over Time (With Outlier) 
 




































Figure 30 and Figure 31 show, for each treatment condition, the number of crimes 
(with and without the outlier) committed over time. For Type 0, when including the 
outlier, an average of 14.5 crimes/month with a standard deviation of 42.6 
crimes/month were observed. When excluding the outlier, these values decrease to an 
average of 4.84 crimes/month and a standard deviation of 8.29 crimes/month. 
The averages and standard deviations for types 1, 2, and 3 are respectively 6.47/15.7, 
4.53/6.04 and 6.68/16.8. For each honeypot type, there is no obvious trend suggesting 
a difference of attacker behavior towards the honeypots based on the number of 
crimes. When applying the Augmented Dickey–Fuller test on the ratio of the number 
of monthly crimes divided by the number of monthly honeypots deployed, for each 
honeypot configuration, we find no statistically significant trend or unit root. This 
analysis lends support that, based on the number of crimes committed (overall and for 
each honeypot configuration type), the data collection duration of 19 months did not 
lead to a difference of attacker behavior. 
 

























Figure 31. Number of Crimes per Honeypot Type over Time (Without Outlier) 
Table 17 contains the number of deployed honeypots and the number of committed 
crimes for each honeypot configuration. We observe that the number of crimes varies 
between honeypot configurations. If we calculate the crime rate (i.e., number of 
crimes observed divided by the number of honeypots deployed and multiplied by 
100) per 100 honeypots deployed for each honeypot configuration, we observe that 
the surveillance banner and surveillance tools seem to have a deterrent effect. This is 
confirmed with a chi-square test with a p-value of 0.00014.  
Table 17. Crime Rates (With Outlier) 
HP   # HPs deployed   # Crimes   Crime Rate  
Type 0   710   275   38.7  
Type 1   763   123   16.1  
Type 2   694   86   12.4  
Type 3   747   127   17.0  
Total   2914   611   21.0  
 
As previously seen, we have an outlier among the honeypots of Type 0 where one 
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shown in Table 18. Since the crime rates across conditions varies between 12.4 and 
17.0, the surveillance banner and tools do not appear to have an impact on the overall 
crime rate. Indeed, the p-value rises to 0.79 with the exclusion of the outlier, which 
suggests the previous finding was driven exclusively by the presence of an outlier in 
the control condition.  
For the four honeypot configurations, we applied a Kruskal-Wallis H test on the 
number of committed crimes per honeypot. When including the outlier, we obtain a 
p-value of 0.932. Without the outlier, the p-value becomes 0.98. In both cases, we fail 
to reject the null hypothesis that the honeypot configuration does not have an impact 
on the number of crimes committed on a honeypot. 
Table 18. Crime Rates (Without Outlier) 
HP   # HPs deployed   # Crimes   Crime Rate  
Type 0   709   92   13.0  
Type 1   763   123   16.1  
Type 2   694   86   12.4  
Type 3   747   127   17.0  
Total   2913   428   14.7  
 
We also analyzed the time of the first crime committed on each honeypot. The 
Kruskal-Wallis H test led to a p-value of 0.717. Thus, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the honeypot configuration does not have an impact on the timing of 
the first crime committed on each honeypot. 
Table 19 shows for each honeypot configuration the number of honeypots deployed 
as well as the number of honeypots that were used for committing at least one crime 
(i.e., use of this honeypot to launch an attack towards an external target). The type of 
honeypot configuration does not seem to have a significant impact since the ratio 
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varies between 2.2% and 3.7%. Indeed the p-value of the chi-square test is 0.90. 
When considering all the honeypots deployed, 2.95% were used to commit a crime. 
This number is very low since the honeypot does not contain any true ‘honey’ (e.g., 
credit card number, social security number copies of passport, bank documents) and 
its only value should theoretically lay in using it to launch attacks against other 
targets. Observing that this happens in only about 3% of the cases is an intrinsically 
noteworthy finding. Additionally, one should note that this percentage is consistent 
across the different honeypot types. 
Table 19. Crime Ratio 
HP   # HPs deployed   HPs with at least one crime   Ratio  
Type 0   710   25   0.0352  
Type 1   763   17   0.0223  
Type 2   694   26   0.0375  
Type 3   747   18   0.0241  
Total   2914   86   0.0295  
 
To better understand such low crime rates, we indicate in Table 20 the number of 
honeypots that were involved in malicious activity (i.e., were used by the attacker) 
based on the observation of any keystroke activity. The ratios in Table 20 indicate, for 
each honeypot configuration, the percentages of honeypots containing some 
malicious activity. We observe that the percentages vary between 63% and 64.2% 
(overall 63.8%). This narrow range in the proportion of honeypots containing at least 
some malicious activity across the four types is in line with a priori expectations 
given the appropriate implementation of randomization. These numbers show that 
about one third of the honeypots that were compromised (where credentials were 
obtained) were not even used in any development of an attack. Attackers did not use 
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them without knowing their potential value. This might indicate that attackers have a 
large pool of compromised computers and do not use all the ones they broke into. 
Table 20. Malicious Activity Ratio 
HP   # HPs deployed   HPs with malicious activity   Ratio  
Type 0   710   456   0.642  
Type 1   763   481   0.630  
Type 2   694   448   0.645  
Type 3   747   474   0.634  
Total   2914   1859   0.638  
 
Two other important metrics are introduced for the present analysis pertaining 
explicitly to those honeypots that contain some malicious activity: the probability that 
at least one crime has been committed (i.e., X>=1) and the rate at which these 
honeypots engaged in crime. For each of the honeypot configurations, these numbers 
are provided in Table 21. 
We observe that the probability that at least one crime has been committed varies 
between 3.5% and 5.8% across the honeypots configurations. As depicted in Table 
21, Type 1 and Type 3 have slightly lower percentages than Type 0 and Type 2 with 
Type 2 having the highest percentage of the four conditions with 5.80%. So the 
honeypot configuration type does not seem to have an impact on the probability that 
at least one crime has been committed, as the chi-square test produces a p-value of 
0.83. The overall probability of at least one crime on these honeypots is 4.6%, which 
is an otherwise surprising observation, as one would expect the probability of 
committed crimes from the honeypots to be higher given the aforementioned lack of 
honey on these systems. 
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Table 21. Committed Crimes 
HP    Prob. at Least One Crime Committed   Rate of Crimes Committed  
Type 0   25/456 (5.48%)   275/456 (0.603) (with outlier)  92/456 (0.202) (without outlier)  
Type 1   17/481 (3.53%)   123/481 (0.256)  
Type 2   26/448 (5.80%)   86/448 (0.192)  
Type 3   18/474 (3.80%)   127/474 (0.268).  
Total   86/1859 (4.63%)   611/1859 (0.329) (with outlier)  428/1859 (0.230) (without outlier)  
 
When considering the rate of crimes committed per honeypot with malicious activity, 
we observe that the rate is 0.603 crimes committed per honeypot for Type 0 while 
including the outlier. This rate falls to between 0.192 and 0.268 crimes per honeypot 
in the presence of a surveillance banner or surveillance tools. As such, one might 
conclude that surveillance mechanisms evoke a deterrent effect within this sample, 
and this conclusion is affirmed by a chi-square test with the p-value approaching zero. 
However, upon removal of the outlier, Type 1 and Type 3 honeypots have higher 
rates of crimes committed per honeypot than the control group.  
The overall rate becomes 0.23 crimes committed per honeypot with malicious 
activity, and the chi-square test is no longer statistically significant with a p-value of 
0.59, and thus does not support the conclusion that surveillance evokes a deterrent 
effect on the rate of crimes committed.  
As discussed in the previous section, the surveillance mechanisms under assessment 
consist of a banner retaining surveillance content and two surveillance tools. The 
banner appears upon entry each time the hacker accesses the system. However, we 
cannot prove that the attacker saw it, read it, nor understood it (e.g., the attacker might 
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not be familiar in English). For the tools, we also have no guarantee attackers have 
identified them. When analyzing the session content and looking for the “ps” 
command that indicates which processes are running, we found the following 
honeypots had used “ps” at least once: Type 0, 2/25 (8.0%), Type 1, 2/17 (11.8%), 
Type 2, 9/26 (34.6%) and Type 3, 4/18 (22.2%), leading overall to 17/86 (19.8%). So 
only for 20% of the honeypots that have committed a crime “ps” was used to check 
which processes were running on the system. Moreover, this does not prove that 
attackers found the presence of the surveillance tools but only that attackers were 
interested in the running processes. These findings have the potential to downward 
bias any potential statistically significant effects that might otherwise be observed with 
regard to the effect of surveillance means on crime outcomes. E.g., the surveillance 
processes only have the potential to elicit an effect on attacker behavior amongst this 
20% subsample that actually brought up the list of processes. 
We define a coordinated crime as any crime during which several other hosts are 
contributing to the same criminal event. Even though this cannot be determined with 
certainty, it is possible to identify the honeypots generating Internet Relay Chat (IRC) 
traffic. IRC is known to be used by Botnet to command and control several 
compromised hosts [ZHU07]. We postulate that any crime for which we observe IRC 
traffic right before the start of the crime or during the crime provides evidence of a 
coordinated crime. 
Table 22 shows the total number of honeypots with at least one crime as well as the 
number of honeypots containing some IRC traffic for each honeypot type. We 
observe that overall, 80% of the crimes were coordinated. When focusing on specific 
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honeypot types, the percentage of coordinated crimes varies between 67% and 88%. 
However, this disparity is not found to be statistically significant across conditions as 
the chi-square test returns a p-value of 0.36. The preponderance of coordinated crimes 
is stark given the lack of sophistication inherent to the observed crimes that would 
otherwise not warrant this observed level of coordination. 
Table 22. Coordinated Crimes 
HP   # HPs with at least one crime   Coordinated   Ratio  
Type 0   25   20   80.00  
Type 1   17   14   82.35  
Type 2   26   23   88.46  
Type 3   18   12   66.67  
Total   86   69   80.23  
6.4.3 Classification of Observed Crimes  
During data collection, we observed four of the five types of crimes described in 
Section 5.4.2 of Chapter 5:  
• Reconnaissance activities: 389 instances over 79 honeypots  
• Denial of Service attacks: 180 instances over 10 honeypots. In addition to the 
two different types of Denial of Services attacks observed in a previous study 
we noticed the unusual use of transport protocols such as Combat Radio User 
Datagram Protocol characterizes: One honeypot used 240 different transport 
layer protocols.  
• Brute force attacks: 40 instances over 12 honeypots  
• Phishing attacks: 2 instances over 2 honeypots    
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Since phishing attacks were only observed twice during the data collection period, we 
will remove them and will focus on the most frequently committed crimes: 
reconnaissance, DoS and brute force attacks. 
6.4.3.1 Reconnaissance Attacks 
We first assess whether we observe a trend for the number of reconnaissance attacks 
over the 19 months of data collection. When applying the Augmented Dickey–Fuller 
trend test on the ratio of the number of monthly reconnaissance attacks divided by the 
number of monthly honeypots deployed we find no statistically significant trend or 
unit root in the data. We also applied this test on the same ratio for the data collected 
for each honeypot type and also found no statistically significant trend or unit root in 
the data. Table 23 and Table 24 contain the number of deployed honeypots and the 
number of reconnaissance attacks (with and without the outlier) for each honeypot 
type. We calculate the crime rate for reconnaissance attacks (i.e., number of crimes 
observed divided by the number of honeypots deployed and multiplied by 100) per 
100 honeypots deployed for each honeypot type. We observe a stark effect for the 
surveillance mechanisms on the crime rate while including the outlier, but this effect 
disappears when excluding the outlier. The p-values from chi-square tests confirm 
these observations with 1.56E-11 (with outlier) and 0.30 (without outlier). Thus, when 
excluding the outlier, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the honeypot type does 





Table 23. Reconnaissance Attacks Rates (With Outlier) 
HP   # HPs deployed   # Reconnaissance Attacks  
Reconnaissance 
Attack Rate  
Type 0   710   259   36.5  
Type 1   763   27   3.54  
Type 2   694   50   7.20  
Type 3   747   53   7.095  
Total   2914   389   13.3  
 
Table 24. Reconnaissance Attacks Rates (Without Outlier) 
HP   # HPs deployed   # Reconnaissance Attacks  
Reconnaissance 
Attack Rate  
Type 0   710   76   10.7  
Type 1   763   27   3.54  
Type 2   694   50   7.20  
Type 3   747   53   7.095  
Total   2914   206   7.07  
 
For the four honeypot types, we applied a Kruskal-Wallis H test on the number of 
reconnaissance attacks per honeypot and obtained a p-value of 0.542 (with outlier) 
and 0.704 (without outlier). Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the 
honeypot type does not have an impact on the rate of reconnaissance attacks launched 
from each honeypot. 
We also analyzed the time of the first reconnaissance attack launched on each 
honeypot. The Kruskal-Wallis H test led to a p-value of 0.696. Thus, we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis that the honeypot type does not have an impact on the timing of 
the first reconnaissance attack launched from each honeypot. 
Finally, we analyzed the time associated with each reconnaissance attack launched 
from each honeypot. For the sake of brevity, these data are not displayed here, but are 
available upon request from the author. The Kruskal-Wallis H test led to a p-value of 
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0.102 (with outlier) and 0.08 (without outlier). Thus, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the honeypot type does not have an impact on the timing of the 
reconnaissance attacks launched from each honeypot. 
In sum, we fail to find a statistically significant effect of surveillance mechanisms on 
relevant metrics associated with reconnaissance activity launched from the honeypots. 
6.4.3.2 Denial of Service Attacks 
We first assess whether we observe a trend for the number of DoS attacks over the 19 
months of data collection. When applying the Augmented Dickey–Fuller trend test on 
the ratio of the number of monthly DoS attacks divided by the number of monthly 
honeypots deployed we find no statistically significant trend or unit root. We also 
applied the test on the same ratio for each honeypot configuration and also found no 
statistically significant trend or unit root.  
Table 25 contains the number of deployed honeypots and the number of DoS attacks 
for each honeypot type as well as the crime rate for DoS attacks. We observe a stark 
effect for the surveillance banner and surveillance tools on the crime rate pertaining 
to DoS attacks. This is confirmed with a chi-square test with a p-value of 0.0047. 
Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that the honeypot configuration does not have an 
impact on the rate of DoS attacks launched from each honeypot. However, we should 
note that this effect is in a direction contrary to a priori expectations as DoS attacks 
are only observed for those honeypots containing surveillance mechanisms with no 




Table 25. DoS Attacks Rates 
HP   # HPs deployed   # DoS Attacks   DoS Attack Rate  
Type 0   710   0   0.0  
Type 1   763   95   12.45  
Type 2   694   33   4.755  
Type 3   747   52   6.96  
Total   2914   180   6.18  
 
For the four honeypot configurations, we applied an Kruskal-Wallis H test on the 
number of DoS attacks per honeypot and obtained a p-value of 0.108. Thus, we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that the honeypot type does not have an impact on the 
number of the DoS attacks launched from each honeypot. 
We also analyzed the time of the first DoS attack launched on each honeypot. The 
Kruskal-Wallis H test led to a p-value of 0.652. Thus, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the honeypot type does not have an impact on the timing of the first 
DoS attack launched from each honeypot. 
Finally, we analyzed the time associated with each DoS attack launched from each 
honeypot. The Kruskal-Wallis H test led to a p-value of 2.10E-07. Thus, we reject the 
null hypothesis that the honeypot type does not have an impact on the timing of the 
DoS attacks launched from each honeypot. 
In sum, the assignment to the four honeypot types included in this analysis appears to 
have an effect on the rate at which attackers engage in DoS attacks.  However, this is 
an augmentative effect wherein surveillance mechanisms increase, and in fact 
produce, the DoS attack rates as compared to the control condition. This runs counter 
to deterrence-based expectations and should be explored further in future analyses. 
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6.4.3.3 Brute Force Attacks 
We first assess whether we observe a trend for the number of brute force attacks over 
the 19 months of data collection. When applying the Augmented Dickey–Fuller trend 
test on the ratio of the number of monthly brute force attacks divided by the number 
of monthly honeypots deployed we find no statistically significant trend or unit root. 
We also applied the test on the same ratio for each honeypot configuration and also 
found no statistically significant trend or unit root.  
Table 26 contains the number of deployed honeypots and the number of brute force 
attacks for each honeypot type. If we calculate the crime rate (i.e., number of crimes 
observed divided by the number of honeypots deployed and multiplied by 100) per 
100 honeypots deployed for each honeypot type, we do not observe a clear effect for 
the surveillance banner and surveillance tools on the respective crime rate. This is 
confirmed with a chi-square test with a p-value of 0.243. Thus, we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that the honeypot configuration does not have an effect on the rate of 
brute force attacks launched from each honeypot. 
Table 26. Brute Force Attacks Rates 
HP   # HPs deployed   # Brute Force Attacks  
Brute Force Attack 
Rate  
Type 0   710   15   2.11  
Type 1   763   1   0.131  
Type 2   694   2   0.288  
Type 3   747   22   2.94  
Total   2914   40   1.37  
 
For the four honeypot types, we applied a Kruskal-Wallis H test on the number of 
brute force attacks per honeypot and obtained a p-value of 0.238. As such, we fail to 
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reject the null hypothesis that the honeypot type does not have an impact on the rate 
of brute force attacks launched from a honeypot. 
We also analyzed the time of the first brute force attack launched on each honeypot. 
The Kruskal-Wallis H test produced a p-value of 0.33. Thus, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the honeypot type does not have an impact on the timing of the first 
brute force attack launched from each honeypot. 
Finally, we analyzed the time associated with each brute force attack launched from 
each honeypot. The Kruskal-Wallis H test produced a p-value of 0.024. Thus, we 
reject the null hypothesis that the honeypot type does not have an impact on the 
timing of the brute force attacks launched from each honeypot. 
In sum, we generally fail to find a statistically significant effect of a surveillance 
banner and surveillance processes on brute force attacks according to the highlighted 
metrics. The lone exception to this is with regard to the timing of the first brute force 
attack, which warrants further study. 
6.5 Discussion 
From a statistical point of view, most of the results presented are tantamount to null 
effects. However, the simple fact that not all of the above tests resulted in null effects 
suggest that there may be a mechanism at play connecting the presentation and 
application of surveillance content with attacker behavior. This opens the door to 
further research to better understand this procedure and whether deterrence is 
applicable given the finding regarding DoS attack behavior produced from those 
honeypots retaining surveillance content. 
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In another study focusing on attack sessions and keystrokes, we observed that the 
presence of a surveillance banner reduced the probability of commands being typed in 
the first attack session. In addition, the presence of keystrokes in the following attack 
sessions was conditioned by the presence of the surveillance banner and keystrokes in 
the first session. This study has been published in [MAI14].  
The framework we developed could handle up to 300 deployed honeypots at the same 
time. We often did not reach the limit of these 300 honeypots. The goal of the long 
data collection period was to ensure a high number of honeypot deployments and 
ideally a high number of observed crimes. We show in this chapter that only about 
3% of the honeypots committed at least one crime; Even though 2,914 honeypots 
were deployed, only 86 of them were involved in committing at least one crime. 
Many were involved in committing several crimes leading to a total of 611 crimes 
committed during the data collection period. When applying statistical tests, we 
observed that most led to a null effect. In some case very few crimes had been 
committed (e.g., 1 brute force attack for Type 1 honeypot configuration). This raises 
an issue with regard to what constitutes an adequate sample size for analyzing such 
rare events. Even a data collection period of over 19 months with a framework 
handling a potentially larger farm of honeypots might not be sufficient from a 
statistical point of view. The impetus behind the development of empirical studies is 
to obtain a better understanding of the attack threat. As such, it may be found 
permissible to derive some conclusions and substantive interpretations in spite of the 




One limitation of the study is that data were collected on one specific network. We do 
not claim that these results are generalizable to other networks, as the same study on a 
different network might lead to different results and conclusions. This is a common 
limitation for field experiments wherein the external validity is often limited, but is 
countered by the high internal validity inherent to randomized experiments that 
enable the identification of potentially causal effects.  
Another limitation is that we do not claim these results will remain true over time. 
This study was conducted over a specific period of time, and as such, may retain 
limited retrospective and prospective application. The attack behavior can rapidly 
change, which necessitates that our findings should be revisited by future research. 
The data collection period is rather long: 19 months. One concern is that the crime 
behavior might have changed during that time. This is why we ran some trend tests 
for the overall number of crimes (for all honeypots and for each of the honeypot 
configuration types) as well as for the most frequently observed crimes 
(reconnaissance, DoS, and brute force attacks) (for all honeypots and for each of the 
honeypot configuration types). In each case, we did not find any statistically 
significant trend or unit root in the data. These observations help mitigate the 
potential bias inherent to this limitation related to the long data collection period.  
The present study does not provide any insight on the attacker. We concede that we 
cannot guarantee that each miscreant using the framework is human.  Conversely, we 
cannot guarantee that each miscreant using the framework is an automated bot. The 
keystroke dataset contains the delays in milliseconds between each keystroke. Large 
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and irregular intervals would lend themselves toward a human typing the commands. 
Short and regular intervals would suggest that the session is controlled by an 
automated script. We find evidence of both types, but note that this does not 
definitively prove a session was conducted by a human or a bot. We use this as 
support that there are likely a nontrivial number of bots and a nontrivial number of 
humans within our dataset. This is relevant within this context for providing the 
aggregate effect of such a policy implementation on a real-world computer network. 
This still increases the probability of a type II error within the present analysis due to 
this lack of differentiation between computer and human users, but that does not 
diminish the relevance of these analyses due to this serving as an effective test of a 
social-science driven policy.  
The configurations applied to the honeypots also present some limitations. As 
previously mentioned, we have no guarantee that the attackers read the banner or 
understood it since the message displayed is in English. Attackers from non-English 
speaking countries may not understand the message announcing the surveillance. 
Moreover, we also do not know whether attackers checked for the monitoring tools 
even when they listed the processes running on the honeypot.  
In order to prevent attackers from detecting the nature of the compromised hosts, the 
honeypots behavior should be close to a common UMD operated system. The means 
to convey surveillance, i.e. the banner announcing the surveillance processes, and the 
monitoring tools were selected based on several constraints. For example, a banner 
with counter attach threats is against the UMD policy. A message announcing the 
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monitoring tools in the middle of a session is not a usual behavior for a computer 
system.  
6.7 Conclusions 
This chapter focuses on one aspect of cybercrime deterrence: the announcement and 
existence of surveillance mechanisms. More specifically, we investigate whether 
computer focused crimes are impacted by a surveillance warning banner or 
surveillance tools. 
A farm of four honeypots was configured as follows: Type 0) no surveillance banner 
nor tools, Type 1) a surveillance banner but no surveillance tools, Type 2) no 
surveillance banner but surveillance tools, and Type 3) a surveillance banner and 
surveillance tools. Following a brute force attack on Secure Shell, attackers were 
randomly assigned to one of these treatment conditions and were granted access to 
the target system for 30 days. Computer focused crimes were identified through the 
network flows. The impact of a surveillance banner and/or surveillance tools was 
analyzed based on the number of crimes, time of the first crime, time distribution for 
all crimes and the crime rates for the most frequently observed crimes. 
We observed that none of the honeypot configurations had a statistically significant 
impact upon these metrics when considering all crimes, but that some impact was 
measured for some of the most frequently observed crimes.  
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Chapter 7 –  Effects of a Banner on the Commands Typed 
by Attackers: Differences across Countries   
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 discussed the effect of a surveillance banner and surveillance mechanisms 
on the attacks launched by a target computer following a successful compromise by 
attackers. We observed that surveillance had no impact on the number of crimes, time 
of the first crime, time distribution for all crimes and the crime rates for the most 
frequently observed crimes when considering all crimes but that some impact was 
measured for some of the most frequently observed crimes. 
7.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses  
In this chapter we aim to empirically study the following research questions:  
c) Is there a variation in the probability that an attacker would enter commands 
depending on the country of origin from which an attack is launched?  
d) Do attackers from different countries vary in their use of system activity 
commands in the presence of a surveillance banner? 
For this study we analyzed 1) the data from the session and deployment tables to 
identify the country of origin of all the sessions per honeypots, and 2) the keystrokes 
processed into lists of commands to study the attackers’ actions. We provided details 
on these data in Section 3.3.2.4 of Chapter 3. 
Theoretical and empirical research from a variety of social science disciplines ranging 
from psychology to criminology to business ethics continues to show that the effects 
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of sanctions are not constant across individuals in a given population [ARC09], 
[LOU12], [THO3]. A review of the current research shows that in the physical world, 
criminals often display different responses to deterrence mechanisms.  
In this chapter, we investigate whether a surveillance banner alters the behavior of 
attackers based on their country of origin (based on the observed IP address). Using 
several metrics, such as commands typed by attackers, to measure attackers’ behavior 
we explore whether attackers originating from the United States, China, Romania, 
Republic of Korea, and Germany display significant differences in specific session 
characteristics during an attack based on whether or not they were exposed to a 
surveillance banner. 
We specifically focus on the possibility that attackers from different countries may 
respond differently to a surveillance banner as factors such as cultural differences 
existing across nations, as well as differential assessments regarding the likelihood of 
punishment may result in varying responses to a particular sanction threat.  
For example, in one country, the presence of a surveillance banner may serve as a 
valid signal of a threat, and accordingly, attackers originating from that country 
would internalize a heightened risk of apprehension and punishment, reducing their 
adverse behavior in response. However, in another country, a banner may be 
perceived in an opposing manner. For instance, attackers originating in countries 
geographically separated from the target may perceive a lower likelihood of 
apprehension and therefore, may not be deterred by a threat.  
Moreover, in certain countries, rather than eliciting a deterrent effect, a banner may 
instead generate feelings of defiance and a willingness to oppose the threat posed by 
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an authority. Consequently, the banner may increase the propensity of an attacker to 
engage in adverse behavior [SHE93].  
Despites the anonymity offered by the Internet and because of their human nature, 
attackers exhibit a rational decision-making process [PNG09]. They will attempt to 
maximize rewards while minimizing the risks of being detected. Because of the 
proximity of the attackers originating from the United States, we hypothesize that 
U.S. attackers, more easily identifiable and prosecutable, would be deterred by 
surveillance. More specifically, U.S. attackers understanding a surveillance 
announcement banner would look for effective surveillance cues including monitoring 
tools.  
7.3 Experimental Design  
Attackers, who have been identified according to their IP addresses, are randomly 
attributed one of the configuration types listed in Table 27. The configuration 
randomly assigned to the honeypot container involves a two (banner vs no banner) x 
two (processes vs no processes) design:  
• The display of a banner after a SSH login informing the user that the system is 
under surveillance (Figure 32),  
• The presence of surveillance tool processes (Figure 33)  
Figure 33 shows two different surveillance processes. One is called zabbix_agentd, 
which is the agent of Zabbix an open source monitoring solution. The other is a script 
named “monitor”. “monitor” updates and saves a file every minute containing the 
disk usage, the system uptime, the available memory, the users’ logins and the 
running processes. The attacker has access to these files.  
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Table 27. Honeypot Configuration Types 
Honeypot Type   Surveillance Banner   Surveillance Processes  
0   No   No  
1   Yes   No  
2   No   Yes  
3   Yes   Yes  
 
 
Figure 32. Surveillance Banner Displayed 
 
Figure 33. Result of the ps	  ax command 
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7.4 Results and Analysis 
7.4.1 Results 
This analysis focuses on data collected over a 31-month period from March 31, 2012 
until October 29, 2014. During this period of analysis, 5,231 deployments occurred 
along with a total of 49,149 sessions from 103 different countries. The database used 
the countries and country codes from the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) 3166. For some IP addresses, the mapping to a country was not 
possible due to geo-localization restrictions, resulting in a blank country of origin for 
that session. These sessions are categorized as Unknown. The geo-localization 
database also flagged the known anonymous public proxy servers, these sessions are 
also categorized as Unknown.  
As mentioned in [STU12], the IP address used during the brute-force phase before the 
honeypot deployment often originates from different countries compared to the ones 
used during attack sessions. Our results also show such differences regarding the IP 
address origins. In addition, the brute-force, also known as dictionary, attack is often 
automated and thus no attacker can actually read the surveillance banner at this stage. 
Consequently, the surveillance banner can only be seen starting with the first session 
when the attacker logs onto the honeypot after its deployment. We focused on the 
sessions’ origin countries, not the deployment origin countries.   
The number of sessions per country ranges from 19,653 (United States) to one 
(Azerbaijan, Ghana, Latvia, New Caledonia, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, 
Seychelles, United Arab Emirates, and American Samoa). Table 28 shows the five 
countries with the highest originating session counts: the United States, China, 
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Romania, the Republic of Korea and Germany. The next highest number of session 
corresponds to the category Unknown. The other countries account for fewer sessions. 
For the remainder of the chapter, we will focus on the five countries with the highest 
number of sessions. 
Table 28. Number of Sessions per Country (Top 5) 
Country   Number of Sessions  
United States   19,653	  
China   13,420	  
Romania   3,845	  
Republic of Korea   1,395	  
Germany   1,267	  
7.4.2 Analysis  
We focused our analysis on the impact of the surveillance banner, as very few 
attackers issued the correct commands that would display the surveillance processes 
and reveal the existence of surveillance tools. For the following study, we merged 
honeypots types 0 and 2 (No Banner), and honeypot types 1 and 3 (Surveillance 
Banner).   
7.4.2.1 Total Number of Sessions  
We first started to look at the number of sessions per country and per honeypot 
configuration, i.e., with surveillance banner or without a surveillance banner. We 
believed that the surveillance banner deters the attackers and that it impacts the 
number of sessions. We expected to see fewer sessions on the honeypots displaying 
the surveillance banner than the ones not displaying any kind of text. It translates into 
the attacker not coming back on the honeypot after seeing the surveillance banner.  
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Table 29 shows the total number of sessions for the honeypots with and without a 
banner for the five considered countries. We want to assess whether deterrence has 
the same effect for these five countries. Therfore, we applied a χ-square test to assess 
whether the impact of the banner on the number of sessions depends on the country. 
With a p-value of 1.E-99, the χ-square test shows that the number sessions on the 
honeypots displaying a banner or not displaying a banner is independent of the 
country.  
From Table 29, we see that the deterrence effect would lead to a smaller number of 
sessions when a banner is being displayed. This is the case for the United States and 
the Republic of Korea. However, the opposite is observed for China, Romania and 
Germany. 
Table 29. All Sessions 
Country    Banner    No Banner  
United States (19,653)	   9,395	   10,258	  
China (13,420)	   7,204	   6,216	  
Romania (3,845)	   1,966	   1,879	  
Republic of Korea (1,395)	   442	   953	  
Germany (1,267)	   863	   404	  
 
7.4.2.2 Number of Sessions with Keystrokes  
Depending on the presence of a banner, the number of sessions is not independent 
from where the attack was launched. In addition, the banner may impact the actions 
done by the attackers during these attack sessions. Our dataset contains the keystrokes 
typed by the attacker during the attack session. Our assumption is that the banner 
impacts the presence of keystrokes during an attack session. We believe that if 
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deterred by the surveillance banner, the attacker would not type anything and leave 
the system to avoid detection.  
We counted the number of sessions with keystrokes, i.e. attack sessions where the 
attacker issued commands to his or her honeypot after deployment. Table 30 shows 
for each of the top five countries the number of sessions with keystrokes split 
between honeypots displaying or not displaying a banner.  
Table 30. All Session with Keystrokes 
Country  
(sessions with keystrokes)  
Banner  
(sessions with keystrokes)  
No Banner  
(sessions with keystrokes)  
United States (494)	   236	   258	  
China (730)	   349	   381	  
Romania (1713)	   871	   842	  
Republic of Korea (34)	   16	   18	  
Germany (288)	   146	   142	  
 
We applied a χ-square test to assess whether the impact of the banner on the number 
of sessions with keystrokes depends on the country. With a p-value of 0.58, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that number of sessions with keystrokes is independent of 
the country.  
From Table 30, we see that the deterrence effect would lead to a higher number of 
keystroke sessions for honeypots without a banner. This is the case for the United 
States, China and the Republic of Korea but not for Romania and Germany. Thus, 
these results show that the surveillance banner does not have a systematic deterrence 
effect on whether or not the attackers type during the attack sessions. 
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The attacker may not be deterred anymore when he or she realizes the honeypot is 
still compromised, i.e., the host is still online and the compromised user account has 
still the same password. It may indicate that the system is not under surveillance and 
thus the attacker can actually perform malicious activities on the compromised 
honeypot and ignore the banner. For this reason, we also looked at the first attack 
sessions only.  
Table 31 shows for each of the five countries the number of first sessions with 
keystroke with banner and without banner. Since the observations are lower than 5 for 
the Republic of Korea, we need to exclude these results when applying a χ-square 
test. Therefore, we applied a χ-square test to assess whether the impact of the banner 
on the number of first sessions with keystrokes depends on the country for the United 
States, China, Romania, and Germany. With a p-value of 0.68, the χ-square test, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that number of first sessions with keystrokes is 
independent of the country.  
From Table 31, we see that the deterrence effect would lead to a higher number of 
first sessions with keystrokes for honeypots without a banner. This is the case for the 
United States and Romania but not for China, the Republic of Korea and Germany. 
Thus, these results show that the surveillance banner does not have a systematic 
deterrence effect on whether or not the attackers type during the first attack sessions. 
Even though the differences are small, these results seem to point towards a 
difference in behavior between attacks from the United States and China. 
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Table 31. First Sessions with Keystrokes 
Country  
(1st session w/keystrokes)  
Banner  
(1st session w/keystrokes)  
No Banner 
(1st session w/keystrokes)  
United States (86)   40	   46	  
China (50)   27	   23	  
Romania (192)   92	   100	  
Republic of Korea (4)   3	   1	  
Germany (30)   17	   13	  
 
7.4.2.3 System Activity Commands  
An attacker who receives a banner announcing the presence of a surveillance system 
may decide to look if it is indeed true and maybe disable it. He or she might want to 
check if someone is logged in to watch him or her or if the stolen account has ever 
been used. We concentrated the analysis of the keystrokes on the following 
commands:  
• ps: This command shows the processes currently running on the system.  
• top: This command also shows the processor usage in real time per processes.  
• who: This command displays the current logged in users on the system.  
• ls: This command lists the files present in a directory.  
If someone else is using the system, the who command may return one or more other 
users logged into the system. Also, someone actively using a system leaves traces. A 
home directory with no files clearly indicates that the user is not really active and 
barely uses the system.  
Table 32 presents, for all five countries, the number of sessions with system activity 
check commands displaying a surveillance banner and the one without banner.  
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Table 32. All Sessions with System Activity Commands 
Country  
(sessions with commands)  
Banner  
(sessions with commands)  
No Banner  
(sessions with commands)  
United States (211)	   100	   111	  
China (103)	   62	   41	  
Romania (859)	   420	   439	  
Republic of Korea (19)	   6	   13	  
Germany (212)	   105	   107	  
 
We applied a χ-square test to assess whether the impact of the banner on the number 
of sessions with system activity commands depends on the country. With a p-value of 
0.10, the χ-square test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that number of sessions with 
system activity commands is independent of the country.  
The results of the banner and no banner configurations comparison for each country 
show a positive difference (i.e., higher number of sessions for honeypots having a 
banner compared to the ones without one) between the configuration with banner and 
the one without banner for the sessions from China only. According to the results it 
seems that attackers from China check for the system activity when a banner is 
presented upon login. This result is interesting since the cyber security community 
usually assumes that attackers who launched an attack outside the United States 
would not be influenced by any deterrence approach.  
For the same reasons as the keystrokes analysis, we then focused on the first attack 
session. Table 33 contains the number of the first sessions with system commands 
displaying a banner and the ones not presenting a surveillance banner. Since the 
observations are lower than 5 for the Republic of Korea, we exclude these results 
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when applying a χ-square test. Therefore, we applied a χ-square test to assess 
whether the impact of the banner on the number of first sessions with system activity 
commands depends on the country for the United States, China, Romania, and 
Germany. With a p-value of 0.17, the χ-square test, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that number of first sessions with system activity commands is independed on the 
country.  
Expected results are higher for the banner configuration than the no banner ones. This 
is indeed the case for the observed attacks from China. However, the opposite is 
observed for the United States, Romania, and Germany. These results are surprising 
since we would have expected the United States and China to have the opposite 
results. For the attacks initiated in the United States, attacks were expected to be 
influenced by the banner.  
Table 33. First Sessions with System Activity Commands 
Country  
(1st session w/commands)  
Banner  
(1st session with 
w/commands)  
No Banner  
(1st session with commands)  
United States (29)	   11	   18	  
China (20)	   13	   7	  
Romania (93)	   45	   48	  
Republic of Korea (1)	   0	   1	  
Germany (18)	   6	   12	  
7.5 Limitations 
As previously mentioned, we cannot guarantee that all attackers read the banner or 
understood it. Also, we cannot differentiate with certainty a bot from a human being.  
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To prevent the attackers from detecting the nature of the compromised hosts, the 
honeypots behavior should be close to a regular UMD operated system. The means to 
convey the surveillance, i.e. the banner announcing the surveillance processes, and 
the monitoring tools were selected based on several constraints. For example, a 
banner with counter attach threats is against the UMD policy. A message announcing 
the monitoring tools in the middle of a session is not a usual behavior for a computer 
system.  
The cybersecurity community has often avoided presenting results based on the IP 
address since many IP addresses can be spoofed. Authors in [STU12] did show that 
attackers launching brute force attackers and then compromising a honeypot use two 
different IP addresses. The experiment described uses randomized assignment of 
honeypots, which should mitigate some external factors like the use of spoofed IP 
addresses. Other limitations of the experiment are the duration (31 months), and the 
location (single location of a US public university).  
7.6 Conclusions 
The presented study used data collected over 31 months from two honeypot 
configurations assigned to attackers: Control (no banner) or banner condition. 
Following a brute force attack on SSH, attackers were randomly assigned a 
configuration and were granted access for 30 days. We focused on the commands 
typed by attackers and disaggregate the dataset based on country of origin of the 
attack, concentrating on the most frequent countries (i.e., United States, China, 
Romania, Republic of Korea, and Germany). 
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We explored various metrics: total number of sessions, number of sessions with 
keystrokes, number of first sessions with keystrokes, system activity commands typed 
in any session or in the first session. We applied χ-square tests to assess the impact of 
the presence of the banner and the country from where the attack came from. 
In the number of attack sessions, we could reject the hypothesis that the impact of the 
banner is independent for the five countries. In addition, for all sessions, the use of a 
banner altered behavior originating in China, Romania and Germany. When focusing 
on specific commands that provide information on the attacked computer (i.e., ls, 
who, top, ps), the banner only has an impact on all sessions for attacks from China. 
As expected we observed mixed results. The presence of the banner mainly did not 
have an effect.  
While the current study contributes to literature of deterrence on the Internet, this 
study led to many questions that should be examined by future research that will 
require additional experiments. For instance, future research should examine 
questions such as, would other deterrence approaches lead to the same results than the 
banner? Why did some attacks from China lead to counter-intuitive results? How can 
we more precisely characterize the attacks from different countries? Are attacks 
global (since we are now all interconnected) or local (based on the cultural 




Chapter 8 – Conclusions 
8.1 Summary  
Chapter 3 described the distributed honeypot network architecture deployed at the 
University of Maryland as well as the honeypot framework developed for the 
cybercrime project. This framework was used to support different honeypot-based 
experiments, aimed at understanding the attackers’ behavior on a system following a 
“successful” compromise.  
The empirical study presented in Chapter 4 determined the relative skill levels of the 
attackers according to a set of ten criteria. We also classified the different malicious 
software uploaded and installed on the compromised honeypots according to the 
software’s identified purpose. We showed that the main motivation behind attack is to 
install IRC-based botnets. We collected evidence to show that about 15% of attackers 
shared honeypot access with at least one other attacker. We noted that changing 
password was a frequent action for attackers (77% of attackers updated the target 
computer password). Only skilled attackers created a new user, but most attackers 
checked for the presence of users on the system. We also noticed that the 
configuration of the target did not seem to impact the type of attacker launching the 
attack. 
Chapters 5 and 6 were more focused on the crimes committed (i.e., launched attacks) 
by the honeypots following a compromise.  More specifically in Chapter 5 we 
focused on three specific dimensions of computer focused crimes: 1) whether the 
crime was destructive or not, 2) whether the victim of the crime was a target of choice 
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or a target of opportunity, and 3) whether the attack was coordinated or not. We 
empirically assessed whether 1) the size of the hard drive, 2) the size of the memory, 
3) the size of the bandwidth, and 4) the presence of a warning message impacted the 
type of crime committed. The different empirical studies led to the following 
conclusions: 
• A warning banner is non dissuasive for any of the observed crimes, 
• High bandwidth favors any of the observed crimes besides non-destructive 
crimes, 
• High disk space favors destructive crimes, crimes against targets of 
choice, and crimes involving coordinated attacks, 
• Low disk space and high memory space favor non-destructive crimes, and 
• Low memory size favors destructive crimes, crimes against targets of 
opportunity, and crimes not using coordinated attacks. 
Chapter 6 highlighted one aspect of cybercrime deterrence: the announcement and 
existence of surveillance mechanisms. More specifically, we investigated whether 
computer focused crimes are impacted by a surveillance warning banner or 
surveillance tools. A farm of four target computers was configured as follows: Type 
0) no surveillance banner nor tools, Type 1) a surveillance banner but no surveillance 
tools, Type 2) no surveillance banner but surveillance tools, and Type 3) a 
surveillance banner and surveillance tools. The impact of a surveillance banner and/or 
surveillance tools was analyzed based on the number of crimes, time of the first 
crime, time distribution for all crimes and the crime rates for the most frequently 
observed crimes. We observed that none of the target configurations had a 
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statistically significant impact upon these metrics when considering all crimes, but 
that some impact was measured for some of the most frequently observed crimes.  
Chapter 7 presented a study on the impact of a surveillance banner on the attackers’ 
behavior on the honeypot and, more specifically, the differences of behavior 
depending on the attacker’s country of origin. Five countries were studied based on 
their frequency: China, Germany, Republic of Korea, Romania and United States.  
Various metrics were employed to identity variations in the attackers’ behavior: total 
number of sessions, number of sessions with keystrokes, number of first sessions with 
keystrokes, system activity commands typed in any session or in the first session. It 
was determined that the surveillance banner had no statistically significant effect, 
however when focusing on specific commands that provide information on the 
attacked system (i.e., ps, ls, who, top), we noticed that the display of such a banner 
has an impact on the number of sessions for attacks from China.   
8.2 Contributions  
8.2.1 Technical Contributions  
Chapter 3 presented a distributed honeypot network architecture designed to support 
honeypot-based research experiments.  Factors that were considered in the design 
included: 
• Central, organized and secured data collection  
• Safety mechanisms to contain attacks and isolate Honeypots from 
management and regular networks  
• Routing methods to forward remote location honeypot traffic  
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• Good practices to design and deploy honeypot-based experiments via a 
security and deployment policy  
The cybercrime framework also described in Chapter 3 allowed the deployment of 
similar experiments involving high interaction honeypots, each experiment randomly 
exposed attackers to different treatment. This framework design introduced a novel 
method to:  
• Deploy up to three hundred honeypots per experiment due to a lightweight 
virtualization method  
• Ease attackers’ access to the honeypots independent from the dictionary they 
use during the brute-force phase.  
The framework also provides a central data collection and storage database.  
8.2.2 University of Maryland Security  
Both honeypot-based architectures provide valuable information on the attackers and 
the respective attacks they launch from compromised systems. First, it is not always 
possible to perform a forensic analysis on campus systems to understand how the 
device was compromised and to identify the nature of the malicious software 
implanted on it.  Since we have a good knowledge of a “clean” honeypot and we keep 
an image of the honeypots, it is easy to find malware and the modifications made on 
the system. Second, from the keystroke dataset and the network flow analysis we can 
extract:  
• IP of the attackers: These IPs can be flagged as malicious and blocked if the 
traffic generated interferes with the correct operation of the University’s 
network and systems.  
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• URL used by the attackers to download malicious software on the honeypot 
can be also collected and used to populate the Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IPS), a network security device blocking attacks, list of malicious links. The 
IPS can then flag compromised UMD computers attempting to download 
malicious software.  
• Network flow records of the attacks launched by a compromised honeypot or 
specific malicious activity from the framework. We then try to identify these 
attacks in the UMD netflow records.  
8.2.3 Science of Cybersecurity  
The empirical studies in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 showed that the warning and surveillance 
aspects of the deterrence have mainly no significant effect on the attackers’ behavior. 
Despites these negative results, the studies followed a rigorous scientific approach to 
test our hypothesis: we formulated research questions and designed methodologically 
rigorous experiments to generate sufficient data to perform strong statistical analyzes.  
8.3 Limitations  
The primary limitations of the presented studies reside in the validation. The 
validation requires both the replication and reproduction of the results. To replicate 
the results the same experimental design and methodology should be used in another 
location. Reproducing the results implies developing another experiment to collect 
the data and another methodology to analyze them.  Both replication and reproduction 
require 1) the deployment of sensitive and risky experiments, and 2) the sharing of 
security data.  
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In addition, the re-analysis of the results may not be possible as the security context is 
constantly changing. New attacks and vulnerabilities appear every day.   
8.4 Future Work 
One problem that is not totally addressed by this work is the replication of the 
experiments in another location. Despite the current ongoing collaborations with 
different universities and companies, the number of external IP addresses is not 
sufficient to replicate the experiments at the same scale. We will need to develop 
collaborations so that the studies described in Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7 can be replicated 
and the results compared.  
To completely cover the deterrence theory, we will need to test the effect of barriers 
on the attackers and attacks. We suspect that introducing obstacles to the compromise 
and exploitation of the honeypots may impact the behavior of attackers.  
A growing number of attacks are now automated. We currently use the timestamps to 
identify sets of commands that have been typed “too quickly” and some other 
keystrokes characteristics such as UP-ARROW or BACKSPACE. This method 
presents a few limitations of its own: it is possible that attackers use a tool that 
replicates sessions, in that case UP-ARROW and such will be replicated as well. 
Network delays can impact the timestamp and prevent the detection of automated 
sessions. In that area, additional work is necessary to identify other characteristics of 
automated sessions independent from the keystrokes timestamps.  
Future work will consist in developing new experiments in close collaboration with 
various fields in the social sciences such as criminology, economics, or psychology. 
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8.5 Conclusion  
Over the last five years I have been involved in several research projects that can be 
grouped according to three aspects: 
• A collaboration with City University in London on antivirus detection, 
regression and label changes, 
• The development of a network of honeypots to support large scale 
empirical studies on malicious data, and 
• The design, implementation, and result analysis for several empirical 
studies in collaboration with criminologists. 
The first research project (not described in this manuscript) led to 3 published papers 
[GAS12, GAS13a, GAS13b], two of which were in highly competitive conferences 
[GAS13a, GAS13b]. The second research project led to one publication (as first 
author) [SOB11]. The third research project led to two journal articles [MAI13, 
MAI14] and two papers in highly competitive conferences [SAL11, SOB12]. 
In this dissertation, we have shown how to successfully develop empirical 
experiments in cybersecurity. This has been made possible through the collaboration 
with the Security Team at the Division of Information Technology.  
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Appendix A: CyQLNet 
CyQLNet is a network architecture aiming at providing a safe computing 
environment for the researchers and collaborators of the Cybersecurity Quantification 
Laboratory (CyQL). The network infrastructure is designed to isolate and protect the 
research resources (data and servers) from the external world but also from the 
honeypot network operated by the research team while simultaneously providing a 
means to easily access and manage the data generated by the honeypots.  
A.1 Network Architecture  
 
Figure 34. CyQL Network Architecture 
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As shown in Figure 34, CyQLNet consists of six different networks distributed across 
three different locations. A rack in the datacenter location is housing all of the servers 
as well as some storage devices (See Figure 35). The location in Engineering Lab 
Building (EGL) is the physical lab with the research team’s workstations. The 
Computer and Space Science location is dedicated to storage devices. All of these 
sites are connected through the University network using secured encrypted 
communication channels. The gateways EGL-GW and CSS-GW establish a tunnel 
with AVW-GW. AVW-GW forwards transparently the traffic from the different 
networks using the tunnels.  
 
Figure 35. Datacenter Server Rack 
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A.1.1 Core Network  
The core network hosts the lab general-purpose server and the management interfaces 
of the critical infrastructure devices including switches, network attached storage 
devices, gateways and server remote access control. It’s a private secured network 
that is not directly accessible from the Internet.  
A.1.2 Core Network DMZ  
By definition, a DMZ or demilitarized zone is a sub-network that hosts services 
accessible from an external network such as Internet. In our case, the DMZ network is 
used to provide access to internal web applications from the Internet without having 
Internet hosts interacting directly with the servers on the Core Network. The DMZ 
hosts a web server and a server used to exchange data with outside organizations or 
hosts.  
A.1.3 Honeynet  
This network is dedicated to host the public interface of honeypot-based experiments. 
The machines connected to this network can receive the Internet traffic of different 
organizations. Its infrastructure is described in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3.  
A.1.4 Honeynet Management Network  
The UMD Honeynet deployment policy described in Section 3.1.4.2 of Chapter 3 
recommends each experiment have a separate private management interface. This 
interface allows the experiment administrator to access and perform maintenance 
operations on the honeypots involved. It also permits the download of data collected 
by the honeypots for backup or processing.  
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Because of their nature, the Honeypots can get compromised and the attacker(s) can 
use them to access the internal network. The firewall rules on the main gateway 
prevent any hosts on the Honeypot Management Network from accessing the other 
networks and the Internet. Anything that is connected to the Honeynet network and 
that has a private management interface will be connected to this network. The 
Honeypot Management Network acts as an insulation layer while allowing the 
experiment users to manage their honeypot and download their data.  
Using a separate interface presents another advantage. Any traffic observed on the 
Honeynet is considered as malicious. The attackers might detect the honeypot access 
for management purpose. In addition, the Honeynet traffic would have to be filtered 
to remove any “legitimate” traffic from the data collection.  
A.1.5 Virtual Private Network   
As previously mentioned, most of the networks operated by CyQL are private, and 
thus not accessible from the Internet except for the DMZ.  
Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology is used to create a secured tunnel between 
a remote host (or network) and the main network gateway (AVW-GW) across a 
public network such as the campus network and the Internet. Once established, the 
VPN tunnel allows the remote host or network to access the private networks.  There 
are two different VPN services available to access the internal networks of CyQL.  
• The Lab Users VPN profile permits access to a specific set of servers within 
the Core and Honeypot Management Networks.  




A.2 Network Components   
A.2.1 Gateways  
a) AVW-GW and AVW-GW-2  
AVW-GW is the main gateway for CyQLNet. It interconnects all the networks except 
the Honeynet. It provides Internet access to the networks hosted in the datacenter if 
permitted by the firewall.  
AVW-GW-2 is a spare gateway. It is a replicate of the main gateway ready to take 
over in case of failure of AVW-GW.  
PfSense [PFS15] is based on FreeBSD Operating System and customized to run as a 
firewall and router. It is entirely manageable through a web interface and offers 
advanced firewalling and routing functionalities allowing us to connect different sites 
and isolate the Honeynet.  
AVW-GW provides different network services such as:  
• IPSec VPN tunnels to interconnect the different locations of CyQLNet.  
• VPN services to allow remote access of the networks  
• A time server to help synchronize clocks on the different servers of CyQLNet 
• Automatic IP address configuration on the Core and Honeypot Management 
Networks  
• Provides Domain Name Services on the Honeypot Management Network  
Access Control List  
One of the key functionalities of the gateway is its ability to forward traffic from one 
network to another if permitted by the access control list shown Table 34. The ACLs 
presented in Table 34 only show the global traffic filtering. A number of firewall 
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rules allow a more fine-grained access control based on host IP addresses and 
services ports.   
Table 34. AVW-GW Access Control List 
Source   Destination   Action  
Core Network   *    Allow  
Honeypot Management Network   *   Deny  
Core Network DMZ   *   Deny  
EGL Lab Network   Core Network   Allow  
EGL Lab Network   Honeypot Management Network   Allow  
EGL Lab Network    Core Network DMZ   Allow  
EGL Lab Network   CSS Storage Network   Deny  
EGL Lab Network   Internet   Allow  
CSS Storage Network   *   Deny  
VPN Administrator   *   Allow  
VPN Lab Users   Core Network   Deny  
VPN Lab Users   Honeypot Management Network   Deny  
VPN Lab Users   Core Network DMZ   Allow  
VPN Lab Users   CSS Storage Network   Deny  
VPN Lab Users   EGL Lab   Allow  
 
b) EGL-GW and CSS-GW   
Both gateways are running the same version of PfSense as AVW-GW and establish 
tunnels with AVW-GW to interconnect the distant networks across the UMD 
network.  
EGL-GW provides Internet access to the lab workstations and to the different 
networks allowed by the ACLs shown in Table 34. CSS-GW only allows traffic from 
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specific servers in the Core Network to the storage devices. Since Internet is not 
necessary in this location, it is disabled. 
CSS-GW and EGL-GW provides Domain Name Services (DNS) and IP auto 
configuration.  
c) Honeygate  
Honeygate is the main gateway for the Honeynet. It also runs PfSense. Its 
functionalities are described in Section 3.1.2.1 of Chapter 3. 
A.2.2 Switches  
All of the network devices are connected to two switches. These switches are using 
Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) to partition one network into several logical 
networks. Depending on the switch port, a VLAN ID tag is added to each frame sent 
by a device on the network. This VLAN ID indicates which network partition the 
frame belongs to. Each VLAN is a distinct network, a device on VLAN 1 can only 
communicate with the other devices on VLAN 1. It is not possible to jump from one 
network to another.  
The VLAN configuration is done port by port on the switches. Most of the times, the 
VLAN tag is added to the frame once it enters one of the switches and removed when 
it leaves the switch. Some of the switches ports are called “trunk ports”. These ports 
are assigned two or more VLANs. The devices attached to these trunk ports are 
configured to support VLANs and to communicate on different networks. Both 
switches (avw-sw-1 and avw-sw-2) are connected to each other using trunk ports and 




Table 35. Virtual LAN Definition 
VLAN ID   Description  
2   Core Network  
3   Core Network DMZ  
4   Honeynet   
5   Honeypot Management Network  
6   UMD Network   
A.3 General Purpose Server  
A.3.1 Zeus  
Zeus is one of the main servers of the Core Network. It provides core services for the 
whole network including authentication, directory and file sharing services. It is 
running Linux Ubuntu Server 10.04 Long Term Support.  
a) Active directory  
Active Directory (AD) is a Microsoft product used to authorize, authenticate and 
manage users and computers on a Windows Domain. AD is usually operated on a 
Windows Domain Controller Windows Server operating system. In our case, we use 
Samba, a re-implementation of the main Windows file and printer sharing protocols 
on UNIX systems. Samba version 4 can act as a Domain Controller and provide 
Active Directory Services for Windows and Linux servers. To do so, a Domain 
Controller part of an Active Directory relies heavily on the following services:   
• Domain Name Services (DNS): A DNS server is in charge of translating a 
machine name such as www.umd.edu into an IP address usable to contact a 
host on an IP network. 
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• Kerberos: Kerberos is an authentication protocol using secret-key 
cryptography. It provides strong authentication of client and services using 
tickets.  
• LDAP: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol is used to connect to, search 
and modify a directory. A directory stores and organizes the different network 
entities such as services, hosts, users and groups.  
On the CyQL Network, the Active Directory is used to centrally manage the 
authentication. As a consequence, each user has one credential that he or she can use 
to log into workstations, servers and applications.  
In addition to the authentication, the Active Directory is used to authorize access to 
workstations, servers or applications. Authorizations are based on group 
memberships. This allows us to control who can use a specific server, workstation or 
services. It is also used to give users additional privileges on some servers or 
workstations (ability to become administrator of the machine).  
b) File Sharing Service 
Three different shared directories are available on Zeus and mounted automatically 
on Windows and Linux workstations and servers.  
• Home Directories: Each user has a secured space to store documents and other 
files.  
• Projects Directory: A common space for each research projects.  





c) Servers Resources Monitoring 
We use Munin [MUN15] to collect data on the critical system resources such as disk, 
memory, network and processor usage. It generates graphs representing a year worth 
of data points for each of the monitored resources. Munin is used to identify the root 
cause of performance issues and help with the hardware upgrade decision-making 
process.  
d) Backup  
Zeus runs BackupPC [BAC15] to backup user files of the File Sharing Service as well 
lab a set of specific directories on the lab servers. BackupPC does not require the 
installation of a client on each server. It uses Rsync, a file transfer tool, over Secure 
Shell protocol and public key authentication to access the remote hosts directories to 
duplicate.  
BackupPC creates the backup files on a network storage disk NFS share mounted on 
Zeus. In its current configuration, backupPC performs and incremental backup every 
night (only the files that changed will be backed up again) and a full backup once a 
week. We currently keep up to seven days of backups. A deleted file can be recovered 
for up to seven days but after that delay, it is removed from the backup.  
The directories to backup as well as the servers can be easily added through the web 
interface. The web interface also provides access to the backed up files and their 
different versions.  





e) Servers Central Management  
The administrator account on Zeus can establish remote administrator sessions via the 
Secure Shell protocol with every lab computer and server using public key 
authentication, a password-less method to authenticate users. In addition to being able 
to get a remote shell without providing a password from the administrator session on 
Zeus, this mechanism allows us:  
• To push new configuration files to all the servers automatically  
• To perform maintenance operations automatically by running script on remote 
hosts.   
A.3.2 Poseidon 
This server is dedicated to heavy data processing and large database hosting. When a 
script is time-consuming and requires more resources than a regular desktop, 
Poseidon is used in order to execute it. The user allowed to access that machine 
uploads the script or tool along with the data required for the processing task. 
Poseidon has a fast access to the data generated by the Honeynet.  
A.3.3 Zephyr  
Zephyr hosts all the lab web applications common to all research projects. Most of 
these applications are actually accessible from the Internet via the Proxy server. Two 
types of web applications are hosted on Zephyr. CAS [CAS15] and SCM-Manager 
[SCM15] are Java-based applications ran by Apache Tomcat and OpenProject is a 




a) Central Authentication Services (CAS)  
CAS is a single sign-on web portal used to authenticate lab users on all the web-based 
applications. When accessing one of the lab web applications, the user is required to 
authenticate with CAS once. The user can access other applications without proving 
his or her identity again.  
CAS contacts Zeus Active Directory services to verify the authenticity of the user’s 
login name and password.  
b) Source Control Management (SCM) Manager  
Software and script developers often use source control software to manage the 
different revisions of their code. These tools are used to create code repositories. 
They keep track of the different versions or revisions of the source code. Each 
revision will be associated with a timestamp and the author of the change. Usually, 
the different versions can be compared, restored and sometimes merged. 
These code repositories can be shared with different developers. We use SCM 
Manager to provide for the lab users:   
• A web interface to create and visualize the different code repositories 
• An URL that can be used by the different source control tools to access the 
repositories remotely 
• Authentication and authorization mechanisms to control the access to the 
different repositories. SCM-Manager uses Active Directory groups to grant 
users to repositories.  




c) OpenProject  
The web-based application OpenProject [OPE15] is an open source project 
management tool. Each research project will have a dedicated workspace providing 
tools such as Wiki (for documentation), file sharing, source code repository access, 
timeline tracking or task tracking. The tools can be added to a project according to the 
team members’ needs. For large projects, it is possible to create sub-projects within a 
project workspace. OpenProject relies on the lab Active Directory Services to 
authenticate and authorize users to access the different project workspaces. Group 
membership will dictate which projects a user can access and modify.  
A.3.4 Zabbix Appliance  
Zabbix [ZAB15] monitors the different critical resources and applications of each 
computer system (physical and virtual) such as free disk space, memory, processor 
usage and the state of the different services provided by the server. Zabbix server, 
running on the Zabbix Appliance virtual machine, contacts the Zabbix agents 
installed on all the servers monitored by the tool to gather data on specific system 
resources and services. The server then saves the data in a database and triggers an 
alert if all the conditions for a specific situation are met. Most of the time, when a 
system resource becomes low or an application goes offline, an alert is sent to the 
administrator. Another email is sent when the situation has been solved. 
The visualization of the alerts as well as the configuration of Zabbix server is made 
possible through Zabbix web interface. This interface is entirely customizable; the 
data collected by the server can be presented in a table, graph or even a map. It is also 
possible to customize the data that can be gathered by the server as well as the 
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method to collect them. For example, Zabbix can use network management protocols 
such as SNMP (simple network monitoring protocol) to get a numerical value or a 
string indicating the status of a network device that is not running the agent.  
A.3.5 DMZ Servers  
a) Guard 
Guard is a temporary file storage area used to receive or send data from or to an 
external entity. For example, a UMD network server exports the event logs of a 
security device for the purpose of a research project every day. These logs are 
uploaded on Guard at midnight. Later, Poseidon downloads them and erases them 
from Guard.  
Guard only allows Secure Copy Protocol (SCP) sessions, a transfer protocol over the 
Secure Shell Protocol.  Regular SSH sessions are not permitted except from Zeus.  
b) Proxy   
Proxy is an intermediate server used to access the lab web applications from the 
Internet. It allows us to protect the core servers. These servers are not directly 
accessible from the Internet and as a consequence less vulnerable to web attacks.  
The proxy contacts the servers running the web applications only when the users have 
been authenticated. Proxy can be the victim of an attack. The damages would be 
limited to this machine and would not affect the internal servers.  
A.4 VMWare Cluster  
Nowadays, the Information Technology industry relies more and more on 
virtualization. Thanks to cloud technologies, virtual servers can be created or 
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destroyed according to the demand of computing resources. In the past, a physical 
machine was dedicated to provide one core function, and was not used at 100% of its 
capacity. Virtualization makes it possible for several hosts to share the same hardware 
reducing the costs of equipment and minimizing maintenance. Advanced 
virtualization software also makes it easy to create, duplicate or move virtual 
machines.  
The CyQL Network virtual environment is based on VMware vSphere ESXi 
[VMW15] (ESXi host), a bare-metal hypervisor, and vCenter, a central management 
tool for ESXi.  
Vmware ESXi runs its own dedicated operating system optimized to only support the 
core features of the virtualization software. On the host itself, Vmware ESXi provides 
only basic network configuration options. An ESXi host can be standalone and an 
application called vSphere client is used to manage the host and the virtual machines.  
An ESXi host can be part of a cluster managed by vCenter. When connected to a 
vCenter server, the vSphere client allows the management of the different ESXi hosts 
participating in that cluster and the different virtual machines.  
vCenter can provide advanced functionalities such as high availability, load 
balancing, shared storage or shared virtual network interfaces. It is possible to 
manage fully virtualized datacenters with this tool.  
In our case, even though all of the hypervisors are attached to vCenter, the network 
interfaces and the storage are configured locally on each ESXi server. In addition to 
its central management console role, vCenter allows us to move or duplicate a virtual 
machine from one server to another server.  
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In the current configuration of the Vmware Cluster, we count three types of 
hypervisors dedicated to host specific virtual machines:  
• Management Hypervisors: dedicated to servers of the core network  
• UMD Honeynet Hypervisors, dedicated to host honeypot virtual machines.  
• Cybercrime Hypervisors, dedicated to the Cybercrime project virtual 
machines. These virtual machines require a different network configuration.  
As previously mentioned, the network configuration is local to each hypervisor. 
Depending on the type of hypervisor the virtual machine is hosted on, it will be 
possible to connect it on different networks. This is done to preserve networks 
isolation. Honeypots virtual machines should be connected to the UMD Honeynet and 
Honeynet Management networks and not on any other network. Table 36 shows the 
list of hypervisors and their respective network configuration.  
Table 36. Hypervisors Network Configuration 









Management	         
Homer	         
Hercules	         
Cybercrime	         
Babylon	         
Armagedon	         
Titan	         
Honeynet	         
Colosseum	         




A.5 Data Storage Devices  
The storage devices are network hard drives used to duplicate the data collected by 
the different honeypot projects. The disks are split between two locations to ensure 
redundancy of the data in case of the complete loss of storage devices in one of the 
locations.  
A.5.1 Disk Configuration  
a) Access  
The data stored on the different network disks are accessible through the UNIX file 
sharing protocol called Network File System (NFS). Each storage device will export 
or share a directory that will be mounted on the servers of the core network.  
Because of the critical data these disks may host, the storage devices are only 
accessible by the main data collection server and Zeus. All the backup processes are 
all initiated by either of these two hosts.  
b) Fault Tolerance    
All the storage devices have one or more disks. Disk failure is a relevant concern. To 
prevent data loss, two different levels of Redundant Array of Independent Disks 
(RAID) mechanism are used to combine multiple drives into one logical disk for the 
purpose of data redundancy:  
• RAID 1 or mirroring, when the drives are in pair and mirrored. Disk 2 is an 
exact copy of disk 1.  
• RAID Level 5, when the data is organized in blocks and these blocks are 
distributed across different along with an additional parity block. This RAID 
 160 
 
level works with 3 and more drives and can withstand one drive failure at a 
time.  
As shown in Table 37, the use of redundancy is disk space consuming. For a total of 
52 TB of hard drive storage, 18 TB are used for the purpose of redundancy.  
The disk drives could be combined together. This configuration is called RAID 0 or 
JBOD (Just a Bunch of Disks). The disks are merged into one logical drive and the 
data blocks are spread across the two drives. This RAID level presents a serious 
drawback: if one drive fails, all of the data are lost.  
Each disk drive could be used independently but distributing the data across the 18 
different disks would difficult to manage. Also if one drive fails, up to 4TB of data 
can be lost.  
Table 37. Storage RAID Levels 
Device   Disk Configuration   Total Size   RAID Level   Effective Size  
Zion   5 x 4 TB   20 TB   RAID 5   14 TB  
Yosemite   5 x 4 TB   20 TB   RAID 5   14 TB  
Susquehanna   2 x 1 TB   2 TB   RAID 1   1 TB  
Chesapeake   2 x 1 TB   2 TB   RAID 1   1 TB  
Shenandoah   2 x 2 TB   4 TB   RAID 1   2 TB  
Assateague   2 x 2 TB   4 TB   RAID 1   2 TB  
Total    52 TB    34 TB  
A.5.2 Backup Policy and Data classification  
To identify how data storage and backup should be handled, a data storage and 
backup policy has been defined. Each dataset is classified according to a level of 
criticality. This level of criticality will dictate how and where to store the data. 
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a) Level of criticality “High” 
Data that we will not be able to recreate if lost. For example, datasets generated by an 
experiment.  
• This data should be stored on a server with RAID Level 1 minimum  
• This data should be duplicated on two other storage devices, in two different 
locations  
• This data should be backed up twice a day.  
b) Level of criticality “Medium” 
Data that we can re-create but the process can be time consuming. For example, 
scripts analyzing the data collected by an experiment.  
• This data should be stored on a server with RAID Level 1 minimum  
• This data should be duplicated on another storage device, in a different 
location than the server storing that data initially  
• This data should be backed up every day at night after business hours   
User files, source code repositories, servers configurations, non-critical databases and 
OpenProject data fall under that category.  
c) Level of criticality “Low” 
Large volume of data generated by analysis scripts or downloaded again.   
• This data should be stored on a server with RAID Level 1 minimum  
• Data duplication is optional  





Appendix B: UMD Honeynet   
B.1 Traffic Filtering  
The Honeygate host is designed to be the UMD Honeynet’s single point of entry. Per 
this design, every single packet received from the Honeymole tunnels, the UMD 
internal network and the UMD border network goes through this gateway. Even 
though this may be seen as a single point of failure, this design permits traffic shaping 
and filtering to 1) shut down the Honeynet in case of emergency, 2) block an IP 
address in the event of an uncontrolled compromise and 3) limit the action of a 
controlled compromise on the Internet and the UMD network. 
Honeygate also maintains a blacklist of IP addresses that should be blocked. These 
addresses can belong to the Honeynet, but they can also be Internet IP addresses. As 
shown in Figure 36, there are two main points off traffic inspection on Honeygate:  
• In front of each network feed (traffic providers such as Honeymole, border 
network and UMD Network) where we only block the IP addresses from the 
blacklist.  
• In front of the Honeynet network interface where we block traffic targeting 
the UMD network and the blacklisted IP addresses.  
An IP address can be blacklisted for several reasons:  
• A honeypot is compromised beyond control.   
• A honeypot is targeting a specific IP address on the Internet. To protect that 
host, the IP of the victim is blocked.  
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• An Internet host targets the Honeynet. The IP is blocked to protect the 
Honeynet.   
• Several Internet hosts target one Honeypot, the Honeypot IP is blocked to 
protect the Honeynet.  
 
Figure 36. Honeygate Architecture 
B.2 Traffic Routing  
The traffic of all of the organizations taking part to the UMD Honeynet is directed to 
the honeypot network using different methods. As depicted in Figure 36, the 
Honeygate gateway is designed to handle different sources of traffic: direct routing 
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(UMD Internal), bridge for Honeymole tunnels, and bridge for GRE tunnel. A 
network bridge connects two network segments. It learns what devices are on each 
side. The traffic will be forwarded from one segment to another if the source and 
destination hosts are not on the same network segments. The bridge is transparent and 
allows us to observe and filter traffic. 
B.2.1 Direct Routing 
The Honeygate host is advertised as the main router for all the campus internal sub-
networks dedicated to the honeypots. In that configuration, the Honeygate host is 
behaving like a regular router.   
B.2.2 Generic Routing Encapsulation Bridge 
GRE is a tunneling protocol that permits the Division of Information Technology to 
tunnel down the traffic from the campus border routers to an intermediate router 
connected to the Honeygate. Like for the Honeymole servers, the traffic received 
from this intermediate router is forwarded to the Honeynet via a bridged network 
interfaces to permit packet filtering.  
The traffic from the campus border network is neither filtered nor protected by the 
University’s intrusion detection systems.     
B.2.3 Honeymole Tunnel 
Honeymole [HON15] is a tunneling program that creates a secure communication 
bridge between a Honeymole client and server. The client, hosted on the remote 
location network and the server, hosted on the University of Maryland network, both 
capture the required traffic to port the external entity honeypot IP addresses to the 
UMD Honeynet. The Honeymole server at UMD is a virtual machine hosted on one 
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of the Honeynet hypervisors. As shown in Figure 37, the server is connected to the 
Internet via a Firewall. This firewall only allows the traffic created by the 
communication tunnel established with the client. The Honeymole server injects the 
traffic received by the Honeymole client to the Honeygate on one of its bridged 
interfaces. The network bridge will then forward the traffic to the UMD Honeynet.  
This server is also connected to the Honeypot Management network to permit 
administration tasks and monitoring. 
 
Figure 37. Honeymole Architecture 
The Honeymole Server is running on top of a Linux OS. We have a Honeymole 




B.3 Honeypots Database  
In addition to the data collection (Section 3.1.3 of Chapter 3), the data collector Spy 
hosts the database that keeps track of the different honeypot-based experiments as 
well as all the UMD Honeynet IP addresses. With about 2,000 IP addresses, it is 
important to keep track of the various past and current experiments as well as their IP 
address allocations.  
B.3.1 Database Schema  
 
Figure 38. UMD Honeynet Database 
As shown in Figure 38, the UMD Honeynet database consists of seven tables 
providing information regarding the honeypots, where they are hosted (virtual 
machine), their IP addresses and the experiment they belong to.  
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a) Experiment and owner tables 
 The experiment table keeps track of all of the experiments including their start and 
end date, and their description. The fields exp_pcap and exp_flow are both flags 
indicating whether the traffic and flow data specific to the experiment should be 
created during the log rotation.  
The experiment table is linked with the owner table. The owner table contains the 
contact information of the person responsible for the experiment.  
b) Host and Hypervisor tables 
The host table contains the information related to the virtual hosts running one or 
several honeypots. Virtual machines are usually hosted on a dedicated physical host 
called hypervisor. The hypervisor table allows us to specify on which hypervisor the 
virtual machines are located.  This table provides for each system its IP address, the 
software version, and its name.  
c) Honeypot, network and type tables  
The honeypot table provides information including the IP address configuration, the 
level of interaction (Link with type table) and the hosting machine (link with host 
table) for each honeypot deployed on the Honeynet.  
The honeypot table is also linked with the network table. This last table contains the 
list of the different subnets that compose the Honeynet. For each subnet the table 
provides information on the IP allocated, details on the location, the IP address of the 
subnet LIH host, the IP address of the Honeymole host (if applicable) and the location 
of the malware repository on Spy. In addition to all these, one of the monitoring tools 
maintains the health status of the Honeymole tunnel and Low Interaction Host. The 
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net_rrd_color contains the color code representing a specific subnet in all the graphs 
generated by the different monitoring tools.  
B.3.2 Database Usages  
The primary usage of the databases is to be able to track down a honeypot from its IP 
address. The need to identify a honeypot from its IP address mostly happens during 
incidents investigations or traffic analyses.  
The database is also used to build the traffic filters for each experiment and subnet 
used during the network traffic log rotation. The database allows us to create a traffic 
file for each experiment and each subnet automatically. There is no need to modify a 
script or a configuration file when adding a new experiment or subnet. 
A set of scripts uses the database to generate the IP configuration of the LIH hosts. 
The scripts extract the IP addresses linked with the different LIH hosts in the 
database, generate the network file configuration file and push it to the different LIH 
hosts.  
B.4 Monitoring and Alerting Systems   
B.4.1 Honeynet Monitoring: DarkNOC  
The Honeynet requires constant monitoring to guarantee that protection systems (for 
example firewalls, traffic shapers) and data collection are operating correctly. The 
volume of data collected daily can be important and significantly impacts data 
processing and extraction.  
DarkNOC is a solution designed to efficiently process large amount of malicious 
traffic received by a large honeynet, provide a user-friendly Web interface to 
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highlight potential compromised hosts to security administrators and provide the 
overall network security status.   
 
Figure 39. DarkNOC Web Interface 
 
The graphical user interface organizes the different data necessary to present a 
summary of the honeypots activity. Figure 39 shows the homepage of DarkNOC.  
The graphical user interface first provides a global view of the activity of the 
honeypots: the data displayed pertain to all of the subnets. The user then has the 
possibility to reduce the scope of analysis to one subnet. The web page provided by 
DarkNOC is divided into four different sections: 1) the subnets status, 2) the flow-
based information, 3) the snort events and 4) a summary of the malware collection. 
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B.4.2 Alerting and Reporting Tools  
a) LIH Watch  
A first script connects to the Low Interaction Honeypots hosts to check whether the 
LIH tools (Dionaea and fake SSH server) are running. If not, an email is sent to the 
administrator and an attempt is made to restart the service. This script is executed 
every six hours. 
b) UMD Hosts Alert   
Another script executed at 6am and 6pm looks for any host from the University of 
Maryland network that has attempted to communicate with the Honeypots. Since the 
honeynet is not hosting any legitimate traffic, any attempt from a UMD host to 
connect to a honeypot is suspicious and is investigated.  
c) Scanner Detection 
Every hour a script uses the netflow repository to identify potential Secure Shell 
(SSH) and Remote Desktop (RDP) scanning the Internet. To do so, the flows are 
aggregated per honeypots and per destination ports. If for port TCP/22 (SSH) or 
TCP/3389 (RDP) the number of destination IPs exceeds a certain threshold for one 
honeypot, this honeypot is flagged and an email is sent to the administrator for 
investigation. This detection is done after traffic filtering. The purpose is to make sure 
the security measures are still efficient.  
d) Phishing Websites Detection 
The same script then checks for potentially exploited web servers within the 
Honeynet. Some attackers often use a compromised honeypot to host a phishing 
website. The script detects potential phishing websites by looking at the number of 
different hosts from the Internet trying to access web servers (port TCP/80) on the 
Honeynet. When such a website is made available online, the traffic towards the web 
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server hosting it significantly increases. The list of potential web servers hosting a 
website is part of the report sent to the administrator every hour.  
e) Traffic Graph Report  
In addition to DarkNOC, the Honeygate also sends a mail report on the Honeynet 
traffic. It shows the number of bits (Figure 40) and packets (Figure 41) per seconds 
for the incoming and outgoing honeynet traffic.  
 
Figure 40. Honeynet Traffic bits per second 
 
Figure 41. Honeynet Traffic packets per second 
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Under normal situations the outgoing and incoming traffic are symmetrical. If a 
honeypot gets compromised and starts to scan or use a denial of service attack against 
an Internet host, the outgoing traffic would be more important than the incoming 
traffic. On the other hand, if a honeypot were the target of a scan or denial of service 
attack, the graph would show that more traffic is coming in.  
f) Zabbix  
Even though Zabbix monitors mostly the core network systems, some honeynet 
components are also monitored.  
Host availability  
It is possible to add software packages on PfSense. These packages add 
functionalities to the gateway. We added the Zabbix agent package allowing us to 
monitor Honeygate like any other systems. Zabbix will report if the gateway is 
unreachable. Zabbix will also report heavy processor usage, which is often linked to 
heavy network traffic.  
The Low Interaction Honeypots and Honeymole server virtual machines are also 
running Zabbix agent and are monitored by Zabbix server.  
Honeymole Tunnels State  
On the Honeymole server virtual machines, Zabbix will collect the number of running 
processes for honeymole. When a Honeymole tunnel is up, two honeymole processes 
are present in the process list. When the tunnel is down, only one process is listed.  
Zabbix will trigger an alert when the number of honeymole processes falls under two.  
Network Traffic Collection  
Zabbix is configured to collect the size of the current hour network traffic capture file 
on Spy. When the Honeynet is the target of a large attack or if one compromised host 
 173 
 
generates a lot of traffic that is not blocked by the gateway, the capture file is 
significantly larger than usual. The threshold for alert is currently set to 2 GB. When 
the capture file is bigger than 2 GB, Zabbix triggers an email alert.  
B.5 Honeypot Experiments Hosting Environment  
The experiment-hosting environment is an important element of the Honeynet. The 
objective is to provide the hardware resources (physical or virtual) to run all of the 
honeypot-based experiments. Different solutions have been implemented over the 
years to maximize the number of honeypots while minimizing maintenance tasks, 
being able to handle heavy network traffic and not overload the infrastructure.  
B.5.1 Physical Hosts  
Initially, most of the honeypot hosts were physical computers, but each new 
implementation of the Honeynet significantly expanded the number of IP addresses 
available for the honeypots. Resource-wise it was not possible to have one physical 
honeypot per IP address even if low interaction honeypots were used. Besides, in its 
current design, each subnet requires at least two machines: One honeymole server and 
one LIH machine. Just for the infrastructure, almost 15 computers would be 
necessary.  
B.5.2 VMware Server 2 
The honeypot virtualization within the Honeynet was first introduced with VMware 
Server 2.0 [VMS15], a virtualization software suite. VMware Server was installed on 
top of a Linux Operating System on fifteen physical machines. Depending on the 
nature of the virtual machines, each node could run up to five virtual machines. 10 
 174 
 
years ago, virtualized servers were quite unusual and attacker could guess that they 
were honeypots, and try to exploit the physical host machine. To prevent the 
detection of the virtualization both VMware Server and the guest operating system 
were patched to hide the information that would reveal the nature of the targeted 
system.  
Even though virtualization was allowing us to more than triple the number of 
honeypots, VMware Server was presenting several issues: the underlying Operating 
System required maintenance and was also consuming significant computer resources 
such as CPU time and memory. VMware Server management interface turned out to 
be very unstable. In addition, the management of the virtual machines was 
decentralized, there was no central console to create and control the different virtual 
hosts across the different physical machines.   
B.5.3 VMware vSphere  
VMware vSphere is the current Honeypot experiment hosting solution. Several nodes 
of the VMware cluster are dedicated to run the honeypot-based experiments virtual 
machines. As described in Section 4 of Appendix A, these hypervisors are connected 
to different networks.  
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Appendix C: Cybercrime Framework 
C.1 Framework Design 
In this appendix, we provide more details on the cybercrime framework design. As 
shown in Figure 42, each cybercrime experiment uses three different types of hosts: a 
network gateway, a collector host and a set of machines, called OVZ hosts. All of 
these hosts are virtual machines running on the lab VMware cluster. Because of the 
specific network configuration that has to be shared across three different 
hypervisors, the virtual machines for the cybercrime projects are hosted on three 
specific VMware servers.  
 
Figure 42. Experiment Design 
The gateway is placed between the Internet and the other components of the 
framework, and is accepting SSH connections on port TCP/22. The OVZ hosts run 
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OpenVZ [OVZ15], a lightweight virtualization solution for Linux systems. OpenVZ 
allows us to run in parallel several honeypots per OVZ host. The collector is common 
to all the cybercrime experiment testbeds. This host aims at centralizing the collected 
data and the processing.  
C.1.1 Collector and Management Host  
The Collector host handles several functionalities within the cybercrime framework.  
a) Data collection, processing and storage  
The collector host is responsible for centralizing and organizing the data generated by 
the different monitoring tools used on the cybercrime framework. This host receives:  
• The authentication events from all the honeypots 
• The key logger traces from all the OVZ hosts  
• The honeypot deployments from all the gateways 
A Perl script processes the raw data and uploads them in a database on a daily basis. 
The data processing script rebuilds the attackers’ sessions on the honeypots from the 
Syslog authentication logs. It also cleans the keystrokes sent by Sebek and matches 
them with the attackers’ sessions.  
b) Central Repository  
All of the scripts running on the cybercrime framework are stored in a repository on 
the collector host. The scripts are automatically distributed to the different 
components of all of the experiments. The framework is flexible enough to allow 
experiment specific scripts. In addition to the scripts, the configuration files and the 
honeypots base images are all stored on the collector host and are all automatically 
distributed when a change occurs.  
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A central database also keeps track of the honeypots deployments and provides the 
gateways the IP to use and the NAT rules associating a honeypot container with a 
public address.  
c) Monitoring  
The collector host also monitors the health of the framework: it makes sure that each 
component is online and that all the monitoring tools are operating correctly. A daily 
email is generated and sent out to the cybercrime team. It contains information on the 
data collected as well as the health of each experiment.   
The collector host also runs the website that provides access to the live data and status 
of the framework.  
d) Maintenance 
The framework provides a set of scripts that performs the daily maintenance 
operations of the different components. These operations include the removal of 
honeypot containers reaching the end of lifecycle and the automatic creation of new 
containers to allow further honeypot deployments. 
C.1.2 Network Gateway 
The gateway is attached to three different networks. One network interface is 
connected directly to the Internet and is configured with the 300 public IP addresses 
made available for the honeypots. The second interface is attached to a private 
network where all the honeypots containers are connected. The third network is used 
for management and data collection purposes. The gateway runs a Linux Ubuntu 
12.04 operating system. The SSH server is a custom designed C program using the 
libssh [LIB15]. The fake SSH service returns a SSH successful authentication 
message to the attackers after a number of brute force attempts. This number is 
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randomly selected between 100 and 200 at the very first login attempt by the attacker 
for a specific honeypot IP address. At this point each attacker is identified by his or 
her IP address.  
When the expected number of attempts is reached, the C program calls an external 
script that 1) records the deployment in a database on the collector server, 2) 
configures the next available honeypot container with the login credentials that 
“successfully” broke into the system, 3) creates a Network Address Translation rule 
(NAT) to associate the public IP address targeted with the private IP of the newly 
configured honeypot container and, 4) attributes and applies one of the configuration 
types of the corresponding experiment. Once the execution of the script is complete, 
the SSH server establish a SSH connection with the newly configured honeypot and 
redirects it to the attacker. This overall sequence of brute-force entry and the resulting 
procedures discussed above can collectively be termed as a deployment wherein the 
intruder is successfully assigned to a honeypot with a randomly assigned type or 
treatment condition. The execution of the script and configuration of the honeypot 
container only takes a few seconds. In addition to running the fake SSH server and 
routing the Internet traffic to the honeypots, the gateway also limits the attacks 
targeting other Internet hosts to prevent their subsequent compromise. This is 
achieved by rate-limiting the outgoing traffic on specific protocols and ports. The 
firewall on the gateway limits:   
• SSH scans and brute force attempts; 
• UDP datagrams to prevent DoS attacks;  




C.1.3 OpenVZ Hosts 
While the gateway manages the traffic and deployment of the honeypots, these 
honeypots need to be constructed and directly maintained by additional hosts. As we 
wanted to provide a UNIX environment to the attackers, OpenVZ was deployed on 
five CentOS 5.4 systems to perform the construction and maintenance tasks necessary 
for the honeypots to exist and function as intended. We used the stable release of the 
OpenVZ kernel 2.6.18-164.15.1.el5.028stab068.9 for the deployment.  
As mentioned previously, OpenVZ is a lightweight virtualization tool for Linux-
based operating systems. An operating system is fundamentally composed of two 
main elements: the kernel and the user space. The kernel controls the computer 
hardware and provides the applications executed by the users functions to interact 
with the hardware. The user space or application space is where all the users 
processes and software are executed. Each virtual machine on VMware or other full 
virtualization solutions will have virtual hardware (CPU, memory, network, hard 
drive…) and will run a complete operating system with kernel and user space. On the 
other hand OpenVZ, the host operating system will share its kernel and user space. 
Each container will be a sub-tree of the host operating system process list. Each 
container will have its own file system, but this file system will be a sub-directory on 
the host operating system file system.  
The advantages of OpenVZ are threefold: first, OpenVZ allows to run several 
lightweight Linux OSs in parallel on a single OVZ host. After stress-testing the OVZ 
hosts, we determined that we could easily run up to 60 containers per OVZ host at the 
same time. With 5 OVZ hosts, this solution gave the ability to run up to 300 
honeypots in parallel. Second, OpenVZ provides the tools to easily adjust the 
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containers’ configuration including the IP address and the credentials. Moreover, the 
OpenVZ virtual network interface does not permit the change of IP address within the 
honeypot container. As a consequence, attackers are not able to change the honeypot 
IP address following compromised entry. Lastly, attackers cannot interact with other 
honeypot containers nor with the host operating system. The attacker’s actions are 
restricted to his or her assigned container. Even with root privileges, each container is 
isolated from the other devices within the design and from the host operating system 
running on each OVZ host, but we can access the containers (honeypots) file systems 
and process list.  
a) OpenVZ Containers  
Each container or honeypot is identified by its CTID (container ID). In our case the 
CTID is also the Honeypot ID. This identification number is unique across the 5 OVZ 
hosts of one experiment. A container can have the following states:  
• Available, pre-deployed honeypot but not yet in use by an attacker  
• In use, fully deployed and configured honeypot, reachable by an attacker via 
its corresponding public IP address.  
• To revert, the honeypot has reached its end of life and awaits the recycling 
process  
b) Template 
OpenVZ uses a template to create a container. This template is a compressed archive 
file containing the containers file system. The template used for this project is built 
upon Fedora 12 operating system. Each container comes with two servers: a Web and 
Secure Shell Server.  
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C.1.4 Network Configuration  
As shown in Figure 42, several networks have been created to support the cybercrime 
experiments proper operations and traffic containment:  
• Honeynet: Shown in blue in Figure 42, this network is connected to the 
gateway to give access to the public IP addresses dedicated to the 
experiments.  
• Honeynet Management Network: Shown in black in Figure 42, this network 
allows Cybercrime administrators to access the data and the different 
components of the framework from the users networks (core, lab and VPN 
networks).  
• Experiment Management Network: Shown in green in Figure 42, this network 
is to separate the management traffic from the malicious once. This is to 
satisfy the network isolation rule. Besides this ensures that we have a constant 
access to the OVZ hosts even if an attacker uses all the bandwidth with his or 
her honeypot.  
• Honeypot Network: Shown in red in Figure 42, this network is dedicated to 
the attackers’ traffic (malicious) between the gateway host and the different 
honeypots or containers.  
C.2 Datasets  





C.2.1 Datasets definition  
In addition to the Network and the raw network traffic collected by the UMD 
Honeynet Data Collector, we also gather information relative to the attackers’ Secure 
Shell sessions that include the commands typed by the attackers.  
a) Sessions  
Syslog [SYS15] is a computer log storage management program. This tool provides a 
standardized format for log messages generated by systems, software, tools and 
operating systems.  
The Syslog configuration of the honeypots has been modified to send all the logs to 
the Collector host in addition to the existing local log files. Among all the events 
received by Syslog, we are particularly interested in the authentication messages 
generated by the Secure Shell server. These authentication messages provide enough 
information to produce records in the database pertaining to the beginning and end of 
the attackers’ session, the origin IP address and the username used to authenticate on 
the system.  
Syslog uses the Honeypot Network shown in red in Figure 42 to send all the log 
messages from the Honeypots to a remote Syslog server running on the Collector. 
Syslog is the only exception to the network isolation rule. In this case, the data 
collected from the Honeypots are transiting among malicious traffic. This solution is 
preferable than connecting the honeypots themselves to a management network.  
The remote Syslog server on the Collector host is able to separate the Syslog events 
from one experiment to another. The Honeypots of each experiment will send their 
Syslog events to an IP address allocated to the experiment. Depending on that IP 
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address, the Syslog server will be able identify the experiment and route the message 
appropriately.  
On the Cybercrime Framework, the Collector host stores the Syslog events in a 
database. Depending on the source of the message (its destination IP on the 
Collector), the appropriate experiment database will be selected to store the message. 
 
########################	  







source	  s_src_example	  {	  







destination	  d_mysql_example	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  sql(type(mysql)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  host("localhost")	  username("syslog")	  password("XXXXXXX")	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  database("example")	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  table("logs")	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  columns("host",	   "facility",	   "priority",	   "level",	   "tag",	   "datetime",	  
"program",	  "msg",	  "pid")	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  values("$HOST_FROM",	   "$FACILITY",	   "$PRIORITY",	   "$LEVEL",	   "$TAG",	   "$YEAR-­‐
$MONTH-­‐$DAY	  $HOUR:$MIN:$SEC",	  "$PROGRAM",	  "$MSG",	  "$PID")	  




#	  Log	  path	  
########################	  
#	  
log	  {	  source(s_src_example);	  filter(f_session);	  destination(d_mysql_example);	  };	  
Figure 43. Experiment Syslog Configuration 
 
To do so, we have to define a log path in Syslog that includes a source, a filter and a 
destination. In the configuration file shown in Figure 43 is defined the source 
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s_src_example that will select all the events received on the IP address 10.2.0.254, 
port UDP 514.  
The destination rule d_mysql_example contains all the information required by Syslog 
to record events in a specific database.   
The log path at the end of the configuration file takes all the messages from 
s_src_example, filters them with the rules listed in f_session and then saves in the 
database specified in d_mysql_example.  
As mentioned previously, Syslog is used to log various system events but we are only 
interested by successful Secure Shell logins and end of sessions. Filters can be 
applied on Syslog messages to discard the events we do not want to save in database. 
Figure 44 shows the set of filters defined in f_session used to only keep the following 
SSH authentication messages:  
• Accepted	  password	  for	  root	  from	  X.Y.Z.W	  port	  6045	  ssh2	  





filter	   f_session	   {	   match("session	   closed"	   value("MESSAGE"))	   or	   match("Accepted	  
password"	   value("MESSAGE"))	   or	   match("Accepted	   keyboard-­‐interactive/pam"	  
value("MESSAGE"));	  };	  
Figure 44. Syslog Filter 
 
Figure 45. Syslog Table Structure 
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Each experiment has a “logs” table used by Syslog on the Collector to record the 
Secure Shell authentication. The table structure in Figure 45 allows Syslog to store 
the following information for each event:  
• host: The Honeypot IP address  
• facility: The software type that has generated the message   
• priority: Combines the facility and the level of security   
• level: The severity of the message from info to critical   
• datetime: The date and time of the event  
• program: Name of the program issuing the message  
• msg: The event message (log)  
• seq: The Syslog event number  
• pid: Process ID of the program issuing the message  
This table will be used later by the processing scripts to rebuild the attackers’ Secure 
Shell sessions.  
b) Keystrokes 
To capture the attackers’ keystrokes, we use a key logger from the Honeynet Project 
called Sebek [SBK15]. Sebek is a kernel module that extracts the keystrokes from the 
read system call. A modified version of the Sebek module has been deployed on each 
of the OVZ hosts. Since the Linux kernel is shared between all the containers, Sebek 
can record the keystrokes for all of them at the same time. The module has been 
modified to support OpenVZ and to add the Honeypot ID in the log. Each 
Cybercrime experiment OVZ host will send the data captured by the Sebek module to 
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a specific port number on the Collector host through the Honeypot Management 
network.  
On the Collector side, a Sebek listener called sbk_extract is started for each 
experiment. Each instance of sbk_extract listens on different UDP ports. The tool will 
decode the Sebek traffic received from the various OVZ hosts. The output generated 
by sbk_extract is not human readable as it is still in an encoded form. To decode and 
organize the Sebek output we use a Perl script called sbk_ks_filter.pl.  
This intermediate script will read the sbk_extract ouput and:  
• filter out the unnecessary logs created by the Sebek modules 
• extract the attackers keystrokes  
• rebuild from the keystrokes the attackers commands by using “[ENTER]” as 
delimiter 
The sbk_ks_filter.pl script generates two files. The first one contains the commands 
issued by the attackers and the other contains the keystrokes. An example of 
keystrokes and its equivalent commands is shown respectively in Figure 46 and 
Figure 47. For both of these files, Sebek provides a timestamp, a VEID also known as 
Honeypot ID, the OVZ host IP address, the User ID, the process ID, the file 
descriptor and i-node of the standard output, and the command name. The keystroke 
output provides an additional timestamp in milliseconds. This timestamp allows us to 
see the time difference between each keystroke in milliseconds.  
The Sebek module on the OVZ hosts already filters out anything that is not related to 
Secure Shell keystrokes, but additional filtering is required on the Collector as well. 
The sbk_ks_filter.pl script removes:  
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• The keystrokes and commands with a VEID of 0. VEID 0 designates the OVZ 
host itself. 
• The keystrokes and commands with an i-node number greater than 10000.  
OpenVZ generates these “keystrokes” during the honeypot configuration 
phase.  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	  10:28:38	  Veid:1021	  Host:10.0.10.21	  UID:500	  PID:12998	  FD:0	  INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519318193697	  ]#w	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	  10:28:38	  Veid:1021	  Host:10.0.10.21	  UID:500	  PID:12998	  FD:0	  INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519318389729	  ]#[RETURN]	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	  10:28:38	  Veid:1021	  Host:10.0.10.21	  UID:500	  PID:12998	  FD:0	  INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519318655731	  ]#c	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	  10:28:38	  Veid:1021	  Host:10.0.10.21	  UID:500	  PID:12998	  FD:0	  INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519318817674	  ]#d	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	  10:28:38	  Veid:1021	  Host:10.0.10.21	  UID:500	  PID:12998	  FD:0	  INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519318859656	  ]#	  	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	  10:28:38	  Veid:1021	  Host:10.0.10.21	  UID:500	  PID:12998	  FD:0	  INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519318925694	  ]#/	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	  10:28:39	  Veid:1021	  Host:10.0.10.21	  UID:500	  PID:12998	  FD:0	  INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519319075653	  ]#t	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	  10:28:39	  Veid:1021	  Host:10.0.10.21	  UID:500	  PID:12998	  FD:0	  INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519319187660	  ]#m	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	  10:28:39	  Veid:1021	  Host:10.0.10.21	  UID:500	  PID:12998	  FD:0	  INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519319375652	  ]#p	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	  10:28:39	  Veid:1021	  Host:10.0.10.21	  UID:500	  PID:12998	  FD:0	  INO:2	  
COM:bash	  MS:1412519319452646	  ]#[RETURN]	  
	  
	  Figure 46. Sebek Filter Keystrokes Output 
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	  10:28:38	  Veid:1021	  Host:10.0.10.21	  UID:500	  PID:12998	  FD:0	  INO:2	  
COM:bash	  ]#w	  
	  
[2014-­‐10-­‐05	  10:28:39	  Veid:1021	  Host:10.0.10.21	  UID:500	  PID:12998	  FD:0	  INO:2	  
COM:bash	  ]#cd	  /tmp	  
	  
Figure 47. Sebek Filter Commands Output 
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C.2.2 Databases  
All data collected and processed by the Cybercrime Framework is stored in databases. 
Each database has its own dedicated database on the database server hosted on the 
Collector. Each experiment database schema has the same structure as the one 
depicted in Figure 48. 
 
Figure 48. Cybercrime Database Schema 
a) Deployment  
This table keeps track of all the honeypots deployments. This table is only populated 
by the Gateway, and it inserts the following information for each successful 
deployment:  
• The Honeypot ID  
• The OpenVZ host running the honeypot  
• The private IP address of the honeypot  
• The deployment timestamp  
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• The attacker’s IP address 
• The country of the attacker based on the IP address  
• The origin network number based on the attacker’s IP address  
• The targeted public address on the Honeynet  
• The successfully “guessed” login and password  
• The honeypot type or treatment number 
This table is also updated by the recycling process to keep track of the honeypots that 
have reached their end of life:  
• dep_expiration is the honeypot expiration timestamp which is the deployment 
timestamp plus thirty days.  
• dep_hpact is a flag to indicate if the honeypot is still active or recycled  
o If dep_hpact = 0: The honeypot has been recycled  
o If dep_hpact = 1: The honeypot is still active  
• dep_shutdown is the timestamp of the recycling  
b) Session  
All the successfully established attacker’s Secure Shell sessions are rebuilt in this 
table from the Syslog authentication logs. From this table it is possible to find all of 
the SSH sessions for each honeypot along with the following information:  
• The username used by the attacker to access the honeypot  
• The login and logout times  
• The IP of the attacker  




The session_error field is used by the data consistency check.  
The session and deployment tables are linked by the deployment ID. One deployment 
can have zero to several sessions. One session corresponds to only one deployment.  
c) Keystroke  
This table stores all of the commands typed by the attackers during a Secure Shell 
session. For example, the typed commands shown in Figure 47. One record in this 
table contains all of the commands along with the header added by Sebek for one 
session.  
The keystroke table is linked with the session table and the deployment table via the 
session ID and the deployment ID. The relation with the deployment is not necessary 
since it can be also done through the session table but it allows a quick sort of the 
keystroke per deployment.  
The multiple_pid, review and error fields are used by the data consistency check.  
d) Keystroke_dirty  
This table keeps track of the changes made by the keystroke cleanup process. Its 
structure is similar to the keystroke table.  
e) Logs  
This table is used by Syslog to store the authentication messages from the Secure 
Shell servers. Its structure and use is described in the previous section.  
f) IP 
This table is mostly used and updated by the Gateway host. It contains the list of the 
Honeynet public IP addresses dedicated to a Cybercrime experiment. Each IP address 
is associated with:  
• The netmask used to configure the network interface on gateway 
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• The IP address state  
o If ip_state = -1: This IP is blocked, a firewall rule is added to block 
the traffic to and from it.  
o If ip_state = 0: This IP is available for brute-force and is not 
associated with a honeypot  
o If ip_state = 1: This IP is in use and associated with a Honeypot. In 
this case the Gateway creates the Network Address Translation rules to 
forward the traffic for that IP to the correct honeypot identified by its 
private IP (ip_privip).  
• The IP of the OVZ host is present for information only. It is a quick way to 
find the OVZ host running the honeypot in case of an issue.  
At boot, the Gateway associates all of the public IP addresses present in the database 
with the network interface connected to the Honeynet network and uses the state of 
each IP to initialize the firewall blocks and traffic forwarding for the active 
honeypots.  
During the deployment phase in addition to creating a deployment record in the 
database, the Gateway updates the corresponding IP record with the new state, the 
honeypot private IP address and the OVZ host IP address.  
During the recycling process, the Collector also updates the IP state and remove the 
OVZ host and honeypot private IPs.  
C.3 Data Processing Script (Session, KS, KS cleanup)  
The data processing script is executed at midnight every day, and it performs the 
following actions:  
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1) Sebek Filter output files rotation  
2) Re-build in database the session information from the Syslog table  
3) Process the command and keystroke files of the day and associate them with 
the sessions  
4) Clean the keystrokes  
C.3.1 Sebek Rotation  
The sbk_ks_filter.pl script creates two files called current.dump and 
current.ks.dump and both are located in /cybercrime/data/<experiment>/sebek/. 
They respectively contain the commands and the keystrokes of the attackers. The 
processing script first suspends the keystroke collection for all the experiment and 




Then Sebek is restarted with new current.dump and current.ks.dump files.  
C.3.2 Sessions 
For each experiment, the processing script looks for the Syslog logs entries similar to 
the one shown in Figure 49. This event indicates that an attacker successfully 
authenticated on a honeypot using Secure Shell. The search is limited to the past 
seven days by using the log timestamps.  
Accepted	  password	  for	  root	  from	  X.Y.Z.W	  port	  6045	  ssh2	  
Figure 49. Secure Shell Accepted Password Message	  
For each authentication success message found, the processing script will extract:  
• The timestamp which is the session start time  
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• The username  
• The IP address  
• But also the process ID stored in database  
And will look for the session closing message recorded after the session start. The 
session closed message like the one shown in Figure 50 indicates that the attacker 
logged out of the honeypot. Both accepted password and session closed events will 
present the same process ID.  This allows us to identify the right session closed 
message. Once found, the record provides the timestamp of the session end.  
pam_unix(sshd:session):	  session	  closed	  for	  user	  root	  
Figure 50. Secure Shell Session Closed Message 
A database query quickly identifies the honeypot where the session occurred and 
returns the deployment ID necessary to create a session in the database. Once the 
session is rebuilt and all the information gathered, a record is inserted in the session 
database. If a session with the same characteristics already exists, the record is not 
created in database to avoid duplicates. As mentioned previously, the script looks at 
all the sessions from the past seven days and thus is likely to find sessions that have 
already been inserted in database. But this is necessary to make sure we record the 
sessions that are lasting several days.  
C.3.3 Keystroke and Session Association  
With the information provided by Sebek, the only way to match the commands 
logged by Sebek with a session is to compare the commands timestamps with the 
session start and end timestamps.  
The script reads line by line the previously rotated Sebek files and sorts the logs per 
VEID also known as honeypot ID. It creates a file for each honeypot ID: 
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/cybercrime/data/<experiment>/keystrokes/<hpid>/<honeypot_id>. This file 
contains the keystrokes of the honeypot. If the file already exists, the new keystrokes 
are appended at the end.  
The processing script then queries the database to obtain the sessions of the 
honeypots with keystrokes from the last seven days. For each session, the script 
identifies all the commands (from the honeypot_id file) matching the start and end 
timestamps.  
At this point, if a previous keystroke record exists in the database for that session, the 
record is deleted and re-created.  
For the same reason as the session processing, the script processes the commands for 
the session of the last seven days. The Sebek log lines that do not fit any session are 
ignored. It is also worth noting that because of the volume of data they represents, the 
keystrokes files are not imported in the database.  
C.3.4 Keystroke Cleanup  
The Session-Keystroke association matching process presents some issues. The 
timestamps are used to match the keystrokes with a session. It works well when an 
attacker opens a session, types some commands and closes the session. However if 
the attacker of one honeypot opens two or more sessions in parallel, the processing 
script will not be able to distinguish which of the sessions the keystroke logs belong 
to.  
Sebek log header provides a VEID that identifies the honeypot. For each session the 
process ID (PID) is unique and does not change during the session. So the PID can be 
used to identify the different sessions with the keystrokes logs. However, when an 
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attacker invokes a program that stays in the foreground and interprets the keyboard 
entries (such as a text editor) the PID reported by Sebek changes but it is still the 
same session. These regular PID changes can be identified using the COM field. The 
COM field reflects the process name that handled the logged keyboard entries. When 
the PID changes within the same session, the COM field is likely to change as well 
and match the previously typed command.  
For example in Table 38, the attacker was initially on the shell bash and ran the 
command ftp, a file transfer tool. Ftp does not return to the shell immediately, it 
offers a prompt and the user can enter ftp commands to download or upload files. Ftp 
now handles the standard input. As a consequence the PID and the COM fields 
changed. Once the attacker exited the ftp program, the PID and COM fields went 
back to their initial value.  




ID   Keystrokes Commands  
696 211 
[2013-­‐10-­‐22	  17:37:26	  Veid:1788	  …	  PID:25014	  …	  COM:bash	  ]#ls	  -­‐a	  
[2013-­‐10-­‐22	  17:37:31	  Veid:1788	  …	  PID:25014	  …	  COM:bash	  ]#ftp	  
[2013-­‐10-­‐22	  17:42:53	  Veid:1788	  …	  PID:25033	  …	  COM:ftp	  ]#bye	  
[2013-­‐10-­‐22	  17:43:26	  Veid:1788	  …	  PID:25014	  …	  COM:bash	  ]#ls	  -­‐a 
 
Some attackers sometimes launch a second shell. The PID changes but the COM field 
does not, however the attacker has to enter “bash” to start the new shell.   
Because of this imperfect relation between keystroke and session logs, the database 
can have keystroke session duplicates.  
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a) Full duplicates  
An example of duplicated keystroke session is shown in Table 39. The commands are 
the same across the sessions. It usually happens when the sessions have about the 
same duration and overlap totally. In that case the keystroke record for session ID 
18999 will be deleted.  




ID   Commands  
18965   2558  
[2014-­‐05-­‐15	  04:50:58	  Veid:3549	  …	  PID:6159	  …	  COM:bash	  ]\#	  
[2014-­‐05-­‐15	  04:52:00	  Veid:3549	  …	  PID:6159	  …	  COM:bash	  ]\#cd	  .t	  
[2014-­‐05-­‐15	  04:52:00	  Veid:3549	  …	  PID:6159	  …	  COM:bash	  ]\#chmod	  +x*	  
[2014-­‐05-­‐15	  04:52:06	  Veid:3549	  …	  PID:6159	  …	  COM:bash	  ]\#./inst	  
18999   2558  
[2014-­‐05-­‐15	  04:50:58	  Veid:3549	  …	  PID:6159	  …	  COM:bash	  ]\#	  
[2014-­‐05-­‐15	  04:52:00	  Veid:3549	  …	  PID:6159	  …	  COM:bash	  ]\#cd	  .t	  
[2014-­‐05-­‐15	  04:52:00	  Veid:3549	  …	  PID:6159	  …	  COM:bash	  ]\#chmod	  +x*	  
[2014-­‐05-­‐15	  04:52:06	  Veid:3549	  …	  PID:6159	  …	  COM:bash	  ]\#./inst	  
 
b) Partial duplicate  
An example of partial duplicate is shown Table 40. When the session duration is 
significantly different or when the sessions do not overlap by much, the commands 
are partially duplicated. In this case we remove the keystroke record for session 
19071. It is clear that command has been duplicated from session 19070 and are 
incomplete.  




ID   Keystrokes Commands  
19070   2553  
[2014-­‐05-­‐15	  04:56:58	  Veid:3541	  …	  PID:28750	  …	  COM:bash	  ]#w	  
[2014-­‐05-­‐15	  04:57:02	  Veid:3541	  …	  PID:28750	  …	  COM:bash	  ]#passwd	  
[2014-­‐05-­‐15	  04:57:39	  Veid:3541	  …	  PID:67569	  …	  COM:bash	  ]#perl	  udp.pl	  




c) Multiple and mixed PIDs across several sessions 
It happens that some attackers open several sessions at the same time with more or 
less overlap and use them actively to issue commands on the system. The keystrokes 
get duplicated on the different sessions and depending on the overlaps, the duplicates 
are usually partial. These keystroke records will naturally show different PIDs 
confirming the sessions overlap. After verifying that the PID change does not account 
for a program execution, the processing script will try to separate the keystrokes for 
each concurrent session. One session will have all the keystrokes for a specific PID 
and the other sessions’ partial duplicates. The partial duplicates in each of the parallel 
sessions will be removed. When the processing script cannot determine properly the 
each keystroke sessions, the records get flagged in the database (multiple_pid and 
error fields) and the error must be fixed manually.  
The review field in the keystroke table indicates the processing script has reviewed 
and if necessary corrected the keystroke record.  
C.3.5 Data Consistency Check 
Because of the complexity of the programs operating the honeypots, collecting the 
data, building the datasets and processing them, inconsistencies across the different 
tables can appear at times. The datasets built by the framework must be trusted as 
they are being in various research projects. Any inconsistency or error should be 
spotted quickly, the root cause identified and the problem fixed. Most of the issues 
raised by the consistency check program are reported to the administrator for manual 
inspection. The fields error in the keystroke table and session_error in the session 
table are both used to flag records with problems.  
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A consistency check is performed every morning. A report of the issues is sent via 
email to the administrator. The email is sent only if at least one issue has been 
detected.  Once a session or keystroke record has been flagged it will not be reported 
again by the following execution of the consistency check tool. 
a) IDs Consistency  
This step consists in checking that the sessions are still associated with a deployment 
and that the keystrokes are associated with a session. For the session table, the dep_id 
of each record is checked against the deployment table to detect orphan sessions. The 
same for the keystroke table and the session records. Orphan records are removed 
from the database since they cannot be associated to a deployment or a session.  
b) Null sessions with Keystrokes  
Null sessions are attackers Secure Shell sessions with a duration of 0 seconds. The 
attacker logs in and logs out immediately. These sessions are most likely automated; 
the attacker may want to check that he or she still has access to the compromised 
system. A scripted bot could also execute a few commands on the honeypot to launch 
an attack program or a network scan or perform any action on the system in less than 
a second.  
In any cases, a null session cannot have an extended keystroke session. The 
consistency check program identifies these null sessions with keystrokes, flag them 
and reports them to the administrator.  
c) Keystrokes and Session match  
At this step, the tool checks that each command in all the keystroke records is a 
perfect fit for the associated session. The tool compares the command timestamp with 
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the session start and end timestamps.  Here again, the keystroke records with issues 
are flagged and reported.  
d) Session Start and End  
This is a simple check, it detects for each session when, according to the database, a 
session start timestamp is posterior to a session end timestamp.  
C.3.6 Data Extraction  
One of the objectives of the cybercrime initiative is to involve different domains of 
expertise not necessarily linked to engineering or computer science. All of the 
datasets should be easily accessible by any authorized researcher. The SQL language 
used to query the cybercrime databases can quickly become a barrier to data access. 
To solve that issue, some ruby scripts and a web page have been developed to provide 
a way for researchers to extract the data into text files compatible with most 
spreadsheet software.  
a) Frontend  
The frontend application is a web page hosted on the processing server Poseidon. 
This web page offers the possibility to submit a data extraction job. These extraction 
jobs are customizable via an online form shown in Figure 51:  
• The user can extract the data from one or more experiments (or databases)  
• The extraction can include the attackers’ commands 
• The result files can contain the commands categories (tags)  
• The filters allow the user to select specific deployment IDs or session IDs. 
When yes is selected, the two additional fields shown in Figure 52 appear.  
• The user can select a start and end date for the deployments. 
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• The output field allows the user to customize the output file names.  
• The email address is used by the program to notify the user when an 
extraction job has started and ended. The email provides also a link to 
download a ZIP archive containing the result files.  
 
Figure 51. Data Extraction Online Form 
After filling out the online form, the extraction job will be inserted in database. The 
database keeps track of all the extraction requests with their status (not yet processed, 
processing and processed). 
 
Figure 52. Session and Deployment IDs filters 
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b) Backend  
Two different scripts are involved in the backend. The first one checks the database 
for new extraction job every five minutes. Once a new job is submitted, this script 
launches the extraction process with all the options specified by the user. As the 
extraction process can be resource and time consuming, only one job is executed at a 
time.  
To facilitate the data analysis of the Cybercrime experiments, a modular ruby script 
has been written to extract the data from the Collector database and aggregate the 
deployment, session and keystroke information. This extraction script generates four 
types of output:   
• Session Aggregate: This file gathers general information on each deployment 
as well as some specific characteristics and metrics pertaining to the first nine 
sessions (if present).  
• Keystroke Panel: A list of commonly used and well-known UNIX commands 
has been built. The panel file will contain the number of times these well-
known commands have been executed for each session.  
• Union Session Aggregate: This file gathers general information on each 
deployment as well as characteristics and metrics on the first nine union 
sessions.  
• Union Session Panel: This file gathers general information on each 
deployment as well as characteristics and metrics for all the union sessions. 
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Union sessions are cases when an attacker opens multiple Secure Shell sessions at 
once. The Union session collapse and combines the characteristics of all these 
sessions into one.  
When the extraction script starts processing a job, the user is notified via email and 
the database maintaining the job queue is updated with the “processing” status. A job 
in a processing state will prevent the execution of other jobs at the same time.   
Once the extraction process is done, the user receives an email with a link to 
download the ZIP archive containing the output files. The ZIP archive will be 





C.4 Honeypot Life Cycle 
The honeypot lifecycle is determined by the experimental design and also by the 
technical implementation. As depicted in Figure 53, three phases characterize the 
attackers actions against the Honeypots. The first one is the scanning phase where the 
attackers look for SSH servers on the Internet. When the IP address corresponds to a 
non-deployed honeypot, the experiment gateway receives these scans and replies to 
them to show that a SSH service is running.  














Attacker	  connects	  to	  
Honeypot	  and	  uses	  it 
Data	  Collection 
Recycling 
Honeypot	  is	  recycled	  
after	  30	  days 
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C.4.1 Brute-force Attack 
 
Figure 54. Brute Force Attack Attempt 
The second phase is the brute-force attack where the attackers try to guess the login 
and password. The gateway handles these attacks. As shown in Figure 54 once the 
threshold of guesses is reached, the honeypot is deployed. Once deployed, the 
attacker can establish a SSH session with the Honeypot using the “guessed” 
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credentials. This is the compromise phase during which we collect most of the data 
related to one honeypot.  
After 30 days, the honeypot is shut down: the public IP address is blocked and the 
corresponding container is marked for recycling.  
C.4.2 Honeypot deployment  
The deployment process, shown in Figure 55, handles 1) the network configuration 
(traffic redirection of a public IP address to a Honeypot private IP address using 
Network Address Translation (NAT)), 2) the honeypot configuration and 3) the 
logging to database.  
The deployment is initiated by the Gateway following a successful login and 
password “guess”. The gateway determines the Honeypot ID of the next available 
Honeypot as well as the honeypot type randomly. It will then contact the OVZ host 
hosting the container with the corresponding Honeypot ID. The container will be 
















C.4.3 Honeypot Recycling  
a) OVZ Containers Recycling 
Due to technical issues related to Sebek, the honeypot OVZ containers cannot be 
recycled right after the 30-day compromise phase. The OVZ host operating system 
crashes when the Sebek kernel module is loaded and a honeypot container is being 
stopped for destruction. Once the operating system has crashed, all of the containers 
stop working and a reboot is necessary. This interrupts the normal operations of the 
experiment. To prevent this interruption, we wait until the 60 honeypot containers are 
ready for recycling. The process is divided into two steps. As shown in Figure 56, the 
recycling script determines whether all of the 60 honeypots on a given OVZ host have 
reached their end of life or not. If yes, a recycling flag file is created and the OVZ 
host is rebooted. This part of process is executed every nights.  
 
Figure 56. OVZ Containers Recycling Process Part 1 
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The second part of the process takes place at the OVZ host’s OS (Figure 57). After 
the reboot, the recycling script detects the flag file.  Containers are backed up on the 
Collector Host and then destroyed. Based on the number of containers per OVZ host 
(typically sixty) and the number of OVZ hosts (five), new honeypot IDs are 
determined and a new set of containers is created. The system then continues normal 
boot operations: it starts the honeypot containers and loads the Sebek module. The 
framework will detect the creation of these containers and will release the block of IP 
addresses chosen randomly. At the end of the recycling process, the Sebek module is 
loaded in memory.  
 
Figure 57. OVZ Containers Recycling Process Part 2 
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b) Honeypot Recycling  
The recycling process is executed every night. The Collector host looks for honeypot 
deployments that have passed their expiration date. For each expired honeypot, the 
Collector host:  
• connects to the corresponding OVZ host and changes the container ID name 
from localhost (default) to to_recycle,  
• connects to the Gateway to install the firewall rule blocking the public IP 
address  
• updates the IP table in database with the new state  
• updates the deployment table to mark the honeypot as inactive and add the 
shutdown timestamp.  
c) IP Unblock  
The recycling process blocks the public IP addresses of the honeypots being 
deactivated. When an OVZ host is entirely recycled, meaning old honeypots 
destroyed and new ones created, it is necessary to unblock a number of public IP 
addresses equal to the number of freshly created honeypots.  
This process is executed every day in the morning after the recycling process on the 
OVZ hosts. It identifies the number of IP addresses available to brute-force attacks 
and checks on each OVZ hosts how many containers are not in use and not marked 
for recycling: 
• If the number of available honeypots is greater than the number of available 
IP addresses, the script determines the number of IP to release and randomly 
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selects IP addresses from the database. The firewall block is then removed on 
the Gateway and IP address state is updated.  
• If the number is equal, nothing is done  
• If the number of available IP is greater than the number of honeypots, in this 
case the script will block the surplus of IP addresses.  
C.5 Multi-Experiment Architecture 
 
Figure 58. Cybercrime Framework 
As shown in Figure 58, the Cybercrime framework has been designed to host several 
experiments. The framework provides a common Collector host for all the 
experiments, and a template of OVZ hosts and Gateway. OVZ hosts, OVZ containers 
(honeypots) templates and Gateway can be customized depending on the experiment 
design. The experiments share the same physical networks, but different IP address 
ranges are used to separate them, in particular on the Honeypot Traffic network. As a 
consequence, the Collector host must have several IP addresses on the Honeypot 
Network in order to be reachable from the honeypots of each experiment to receive 
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